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“Whatkindofresearchareyoudoing,sir?” a seriously looking
border police agent at San Francisco Airport inquired. The
answer“RealEstateFinance”immediatelyendedtheimmigra-






Housing is a massive factor in people’s consumption. For
industrialized nations, it is the biggest component in the
basket of goods used for calculating the consumer price in-
dex. TheBureauofLaborStatistics(BLR2010)estimatesthat
Americanhomeownersspentabout23.8percentoftheirto-
tal consumption on housing.
Buying a house to live in is the largest investment many
households make. For The Netherlands, home owners had
60.5 percent of their total wealth in 2010 tied up in their
home (CBS Statline, 2010). Households invest into housing
early in their investment life-cycle. Only later they accumu-
latetheﬁnancialfatneededtoinvestintootherassetclasses.
For households headed by a person aged 25-45, the share of




Housing not only dominates the asset side of households’




are paid oﬀ. For households beyond the age of 64, the mort-
gageonly playsa minor role(8.6 percent of totalwealth).
Housing is big enough to leave a sizable footprint on the
economy in general. The value of all owner occupied Dutch
housing is estimated to be 1.7 trillion Euros in 2009 (CBS,
2010), which is more than two times the value of the grossINTRODUCTION
domestic product (GDP) and easily exceeds the total capital-
ization of all companies listed at the Amsterdam stock ex-
change. All outstanding residential mortgages in the United
Statesamountto76.2percentoftheAmericanGDPin2006,
while the Danish and Dutch counterparts even reached a ra-
tio of one hundred percent (IMF,2008).
During the last years of the Greenspan era, the United
States pulled themselves out of the dot-com crisis and the
economic shock following the terrorist attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, by fueling the housing sector with easy credit.
The total new investment into US residential real estate had
grown from 405.8 billion USD in 2001 to 653 billion USD in
2006beforecollapsingtoameager288.8billionUSDin2009
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010). House prices were
perceived to enjoy never-ending growth. Between February
2000 and February 2006, the Case/Shiller home price in-
dex for 20 American cities increased by a breathtaking 105
percent. This price rally heated up the rest of the economy.
Homeequityloansandsecondmortgageschanneledthenew
housing wealth into general consumption. We all know the
end of this story: Collapsing home values in the US were
the starting point of a global ﬁnancial crisis that paralyzed
the ﬁnancial industry and grew into a full-ﬂedged economic
recession. This crisis has painfully demonstrated: Housing
matters.
This dissertation comprises of 4 individual studies that
analyze the fundamentals and mechanisms of housing mar-
ketsfromtwodiﬀerentdirections. Chapters1and2research
housingbubbles and house price volatility,while Chapters3
and 4 look at the impact of demographic dynamics on hous-
ingmarkets.
Chapter 1 examines the long run relationship between
pricesandrentsforhousesinAmsterdamfrom1650through
2005. It estimates the deviation of house prices from funda-
mentalsandﬁndsthatthesedeviationscanbepersistentand
long-lasting. Furthermore, it looks at the feedback mecha-
nisms between housing market fundamentals and prices. It
ﬁndsthatmarketcorrectionofthemispricingoccursmainly
through prices, not rents. This correction back to equilib-
rium,however,can takedecades.
The underlying factors of house price volatility are at the
focus of Chapter 2. It is the ﬁrst study that tests how the dy-
namics of house prices are aﬀected by the option to rebuild
or enlarge existing dwellings. It incorporates this option in
astandardhedonicregressionmodel,andshowshowneigh-
borhoods and houses with unrealized renovation potential
can be identiﬁed. It uses an unexplored dataset of housing
transactions in West Berlin, covering thirty years between
1978 and 2007. The empirical results show that house value
has an elasticity of about 0.15 with respect to development
potential, measured by the ratio between the square meters
allowed by zoning and the existing house size. For high op-
tionvalue properties the elasticityincreases to0.23.
TheevidencepresentedinChapter2suggeststhatthehigh
uncertainty and high growth period between 1989 and 1994
14INTRODUCTION
was associated with a signiﬁcant increase in option value
forthepropertieswithsubstantialredevelopmentpotential;
about 40 percent of the boom was due to increase in option
value. During the 10 year bust after 1994, about 50 percent
of the decline was due to change in option value. Volatility
of this magnitude applies to about 10 percent of all proper-
ties sold during the sample period. More than 68 percent of
all sales have increased volatility over the cycle due to unre-
alized option value.
Demographic trends shape housing markets
Demographic contraction is one of the key challenges many
industrializedcountrieswillfaceinthefutureoralreadyex-
perience today. To give a brief example, the United Nations
PopulationDivision(2007)estimatesthatRussiawilllose24
percent of its current population by the year 2050. For Bul-
garia, the expected decline in total population is 35 percent
in the same period, while neighboring Turkey will experi-
enceanimpressivepopulationgrowthof29percent(seeFig-
ure1). ThepopulationsofJapanandGermanywillbothdrop
by 18 percent. Within countries, huge regional diﬀerences
can be observed. In Germany, for example, all Eastern states
exceptBrandenburgexperienceddoubledigitpopulationde-
cline rates since 1990. Beside the rapid changes in total pop-
ulationnumbers,societiesagedramatically. InSouthKorea,
for instance, the median age is increasing three years every




Will greying populations demand less housing or diﬀer-
ent kinds of housing services? Chapter 3 answers this ques-
tion based on very detailed 2001 cross-sectional data of En-
glishhouseholds. Itreﬁnestheexistingmethodologybydis-
tinguishing between life cycle variables that are expected to
change with age for each household, and cohort variables
thataredeterminedbythehousehold’sbirth-cohortandnot
byage.
The chapter’s key results are that housing demand is
mainly driven by human capital and that it does not decline
with age. A scenario analysis with diﬀerent population pro-
jectionsshowsthatinthecaseofstagnatinghouseholdnum-
bers total demand can still increase as the population grows
older. These ﬁndings are relevant to many European coun-
triesthat already experiencepopulation shrinkage.
Chapter 4 researches within-city home price dynamics in
bullish and bearish residential real estate markets and dif-
ferent demographic environments. It contributes to the lit-
erature addressing the urban layout of cities by formulat-
ing and empirically testing a novel idea for changes in the
price gradients across neighborhoods under diﬀerent mar-
ket regimes. The study ﬁnds that the combination of city-
wide falling home prices and declining population numbers
hurts low-value neighborhoods most, while falling home-
pricesincitieswithrobustdemographicsdonotleadtoshifts
15INTRODUCTION
in the within-city distribution of housing wealth.
A new level of spatial detailedness is achieved by combin-
ingahigh-qualitydata-setforTheNetherlandswithestima-
tion techniques borrowed from the geoscience domain. The
datacompriseof1.8millionsinglefamilyhometransactions
and 0.8 million apartments sold by members of the Dutch
Realtor Association (NVM). This is the ﬁrst paper that esti-
mateshomepriceindexsurfacesforanentirecountrybased
on a spatial error model.
16INTRODUCTION
Figure 1: Projected change of total population for European countries
Notes: Map is based on the population forecasts developedbythe UnitedNations Population Division (2007).
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in the U.S. and many other countries in the world is still
not fully resolved. Numerous academic articles and popular
press accounts point to mounting evidence of a U.S. hous-
ing bubble as house prices increased on average more than
ﬁve percent per year from 2000 to 2006. On the local level,
some markets experienced yearly price increases of more
than 20 percent. As a result, even the former chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Alan
Greenspan, noted that some local markets showed signs of
speculative activity.1 The same holds for other countries.
SpainandIreland,forexample,sawaveragehousepricesin-
creasebetween1997and2007ofnearly190percentand240
percent, respectively. These countries have seen their house
prices fall rapidly since then. More recently, the rapid rise
in property values in China has raised concerns of a bubble
forming there.2 However, the housing market experiencing
oneofthebiggestrisesofall,SouthAfrica,hasmerelystabi-
lized.
The worry of economists and policy makers is that asset
1For example, see Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan to the Amer-
ican Bankers Association Annual Convention, Palm Desert, Califor-
nia (via satellite), September 26, 2005 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boardDocs/Speeches/2005/200509262/default.htm).
2Fora discussion of current Chinese housing markets,see Mufson (2010).CHAPTER 1. HOUSE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS
price bubbles may quickly turn into busts, resulting in eco-
nomic contraction. In the last few years, the world has seen
thatsuchfearscanbejustiﬁed. HelblingandTerrones(2003),
and Claessens et al. (2009) investigate the eﬀects housing
market declines have on recessions. Helbling and Terrones
(2003) document 20 severe housing market declines in 14
countries over the period 1970 to 2002. For the period from
1960 to 2007, Claessens et al. (2009) look at 122 recessions
and 114 episodes of house price decline, of which 28 were
characterizedas busts. Both papers show that these housing
market declines generally overlapped or coincided with re-
cessions, and that recessions coinciding with housing mar-
ket declines resulted in output losses roughly two to three
times as big as other recessions. Claessens et al. (2009) con-
clude that the extent of the house price decline most consis-
tently inﬂuences the depth of a recession, even after taking
into account other ﬁnancial variables like credit availability
and equity prices.
Recognizing an asset price bubble prior to a price crash








more aﬀordable than they had been in 1995. In addition,
McCarthy and Peach (2004) presented a critical analysis of
the data and methods commonly used to support the claim
of a housing bubble. After adjusting common housing mar-
ket metrics (such as the ratio of the median price of existing
homes to the median household income) to account for the
eﬀects of interest rate changes, McCarthy and Peach (2004)
foundlittleevidencesupportingabubbleintheU.S.housing
market.
The problem with identifying the presence (or lack
thereof)ofbubblesinassetmarketsisthelackofsuﬃciently
longtermdatathatwouldallowresearcherstoidentifycases
where asset prices signiﬁcantly deviate from fundamental
values. Furthermore, market price deviations from funda-
mental values over a short time period do not guarantee
that market prices will decline – the often-predicted bubble
crash. Rather, it may be possible that bubble conditions are
sustained,followedbygradualrestorationoftheequilibrium
relationship.
The purpose of this paper is to utilize a 355-year time se-
ries of real house prices and rents to demonstrate that sub-




vergenceof prices and fundamentals.
The following section presents a brief review of recent
studies that have examined possible asset bubbles. Section
2 then presents the housing market data as well as the data
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concerningconsumerpricesandinterestrates,whileSection
3presentsthemethodsandresultsofourinvestigationofthe
relationship between house prices and fundamentals. This
analysis of the Amsterdam housing market reveals that sig-
niﬁcant and long-lasting price deviations are possible, fol-
lowedbycorrectionsthatcaneitherbegradualorsharp. Sec-




Much of the popular press takes for granted that the recent
house price increases seen around the world are evidence of
a “bubble” in housing markets. For example, in a recent sur-
vey, McCarthy and Peach (2004) found that the high ratio of
homepricesrelativetohouseholdincomeandofhomeprices
relativetomarketrentsfortheequivalentpropertywere“the
most widelycitedevidenceof a bubble.”
But the existence of house price “bubbles” remains a con-
troversial topic in economics. For example, Case and Shiller
(2003), using housing market fundamentals as proxied by
state-level Per Capita Personal Income and house price in-
dicesfromFiservCSWfortheperiod1985to2002,concluded
thathousepricesinmostU.S.citiesreﬂectfundamentalval-
ues. Nevertheless, additional survey data from four cities
showedevidenceof speculativeactivity.3
However,McCarthyandPeach(2004)usingdatafrom1977
to 2003 suggested that the evidence based on common fun-
damental value ratios is not conclusive because these ratios
ignore the dramatic decline in mortgage interest rates dur-






Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) also examined the
traditionalmetricsofhousingmarketfundamentals,includ-
ing the house price growth rates, price-to-income ratio, and
rent-to-price ratio, and noted that the absence of interest
rates in such analysis can lead to false conclusions. Their
main conclusion, based on the OFHEO repeated sales hous-
ing indices from 1980 to 2004, was that the cost of home
ownership rose moderately relative to the cost of renting,
even though larger deviations from fundamentals occurred
in some markets. Thus, the analyses of Himmelberg, Mayer
and Sinai (2005) and McCarthy and Peach (2004) supported
the conclusion of Case and Shiller (2003) that prices in most
U.S.housingmarketsappearedtobeinlinewithmarketfun-
damentals.
A number of recent studies have explored the connection
3In addition, Higgins and Osler (1998) provide additional evidence that re-
gional housing bubbles occurred around 1989.
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between prices and fundamentals. For example, Brunner-






that inﬂation lowers future real mortgage costs. They found
thatthenominalinterestrate,asopposedtotherealrate,af-
fectsthehouseprice-rentratio. Afterdecomposingthisratio
into a rational and a mispricing component, they concluded
that the latter component is strongly driven by movements










deviate from fundamentals. This conclusion is in line with
themainﬁndingsofClayton(1996),whostudiedtheVancou-
4The use of the rent-price ratio as a measure of price movement relative to
fundamentalvalueismotivatedbythesimilaruseofthedividend-pricera-
tio in stock market research (e.g. Leamer, 2002; and Campbell and Shiller,
2001)
verhousing marketfor the period from 1979to1991.
On the theoretical front, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)
derivedamodelindicatingthatassetbubblescanpersistover
substantial periods of time, even in the presence of ratio-
nalarbitrageurs. Intheirmodel,theinabilityofarbitrageurs
to coordinate selling combined with individual incentives
to time the market lead to bubble persistence. A more re-
cent theoretical model developed by Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) showed that when short sales are constrained, as is
the case in the housing market, signiﬁcant asset price bub-
bles can occur even when traders have small diﬀerences in
beliefsregarding asset fundamental values.
Furthermore, Glaeser and Gyourko (2009) argue that ar-
bitrage between the housing rental market and the owner
occupied market is diﬃcult. Rental homes tend to be very
diﬀerent from owner occupied ones, both in terms of lo-
cation and in terms of the building itself, and households
only rarely switch from the one housing type to the other.
They conclude that the no arbitrage assumption is diﬃcult
tomaintain in the short run.
To conclude, the current literature concerning house
prices and fundamentals suggests that prices may deviate
from fundamentals over longer periods of time, and that ﬁ-
nancial arbitrage between owning and renting is diﬃcult in
the short run. This suggests that it is meaningful to investi-
gate the relation between house prices and fundamentals in
the(very)longrun. However,nobodyhasbeenabletoinves-
tigate this issue for a time period long enough to provide di-
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rect empirical evidence of these long-run relationships: the
typicaltimeseriesusedinthestudiescoveratmost40years.
In contrast, we use a data series spanning more than three
centuries to analyze the long-run relation between house
prices and fundamentals.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Sources and description
We use housing market data from multiple sources covering
theperiodfrom1650through2005. First,weuseanindexfor
Amsterdam house prices based on the same data source as
Eichholtz (1997). These data are from Van Eeghen, Bisschop,
and Wijnman (1976), covering the period from 1650 through
1965. The dataset covers all transactions of dwellings on the
Herengracht, one of the central canals in Amsterdam. As
noted in Eichholtz (1997), the Herengracht was constructed
between 1585 and 1660. By 1680, most of the lots on the
canalweredevelopedandfrom1616untilthepresentday,the
Herengracht has remained one of the most prestigious ad-
dresses in Amsterdam. The price index is computed based
on the estimatedcoeﬃcients from the followingmodel:
∆ i   XG   ϵi (1.1)
where  istherealloghousepricediﬀerencebetweentrans-
action pairs, X is a matrix of time dummy variables, G is a
coeﬃcient vector, and ϵi is the error term. We follow meth-
odsoutlinedinBailey,MuthandNourse(1963)andCaseand
Shiller (1987) to create the matrix X. Eichholtz (1997) esti-
mated a biennial index based on housing and commercial
property transaction data, and then included a dummy for
property use to control for the switch from residential to
commercial use. Moreover, Eichholtz (1997) used the period
1634 through 1973, thus including the tails of the sample pe-
riod,inwhichtransactiondatawererelativelythin. Wefocus
on the housing transactions alone, and disregard the begin-
ning and end of the Eichholtz’ (1997) sample period to com-
putean annual repeat sales index.
Theannualaveragenumberoftransactionsperyearis10.9
and the standard deviation is 6.8. The annual number of
transactions is relatively high in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century and in the twentieth century. For 1945, we do
nothaveanytransactions,andtheindexobservationforthat
yearis an interpolatedvalue.
We augment this index with house price data from the
CBS, the Dutch national statistics bureau, and the NVM, the
national organization of Dutch realtors, covering the period
from 1965 through 2005. The CBS/NVM series covers ap-
proximately 60 percent of all housing transactions in the
country, with relatively more weight in the western part of
the Netherlands. The numbers denote median house prices
forthe year.
Therentalindexisalsoconstructedfrommultiplesources.
For the ﬁrst 200 years, from 1650 through 1850, we use data
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concerning residential rents for Amsterdam from Eichholtz
and Theebe (2007). This series is a repeat market rent in-
dex,basedondatareportedinLesger(1986)forabroadsetof
rentalhouses,varyinginlocationandstructuralquality,and
owned by the institutional investors of that time: orphan-
ages, hospitals, and poor-relief boards. In all, this dataset
covers 7,670 market rent observations for 1,055 properties
scattered across an area that is currently the center of Am-
sterdam. The market rents are observed at the beginning of
new rent contracts. For the period from 1650 to 1850, the av-
erage number of annual observations is 24.1, and the mini-
mum is 4.
The sample of individual rent observations could not be
extended beyond 1850, unfortunately, since to our knowl-
edge no suﬃcient number of rent records is available in the
archivesforAmsterdamafterthatyear. Thus,weusetwona-
tionalhouserentindicesfrom1851. Theﬁrstseriescoversthe
period 1851 through 1913 and is from van Riel (2006). In the
Netherlands, tax authorities estimated the potential rental
income that could be generated from owner occupied resi-
dential real estate, since the imputed rents were treated as
income and taxed. The rent capacity is not a percentage of
the value of house, which would make the rent index a di-
rect function of prices. Instead, the average rent of compa-
rable houses in the vicinity was taxed, providing informa-
tiononthedevelopmentofmarketrents. Theseconddataset
spans the remaining period 1914 through 2005, and is based
on a range of publications from the Dutch Central Bureau of

















Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Notes: Overtheﬁrst250years,theDutchcurrencywasbasedongold,leading
to stable consumer prices throughout the 18th and 19th century. At the be-
ginning of World War I, however, the gold standard could not be sustained
anymore and money supply massively increased. As a consequence, con-
sumer prices tripled until 1918. In the years after the war, the banking sec-




pricestrended upwardssince then. Graphis scaled in logarithms.
Sources: Please refer toTable1.2.
24CHAPTER 1. HOUSE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS
Statistics (CBS, 1939,1948,1999, 2008).
RentcontrolwasintroducedintheNetherlandsin1916/17,
as part of a broader government policy concerning prices of
basicneeds. The1916“Distributiewet”regulateddistribution
and prices of basic foods, while the “Huurcommissiewet” of
1917 introduced rent control, ﬁxing rents at the 1916 level,
but later allowing controlled house rents to rise with inﬂa-
tion. Interestingly,whilenominalrentshadindeedbeengo-
ing up before that, causing public pressure for government
intervention,rentsinrealtermshadinfactbeengoingdown.
Between 1914 and 1916, real rents declined 22 percent. Most
Dutch housing rents have been under the control of the gov-
ernment since then, so from 1916 onwards the rent index
mostly reﬂects controlled rents, and partly rents freely set
in the market.
Overall, these price and rent series provide a yearly pic-
ture of the developments and growth in the Amsterdam
housing market over a 355-year period from 1650 to 2005.
In order to make adjustments for the cost of living, we use
a long-run consumer price index, again based on diﬀerent
sources. Nusteling (1985) is the source for the development
of the general consumer price level until 1850. This index is
based on a basket of consumer goods, including rye bread,
beer,butter,meat,potatoes,peas,diﬀerenttypesofﬁsh,and
various textiles. The basket changes with broad use of the
products. For the period between 1850 and 1913 we employ
VanRiel(2006),whousesasimilarbasketofgoods,andadds
housingrentalexpenses. From1914onwards,weusetheCPI
calculatedbythe DutchCentral Bureau of Statistics.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Over the ﬁrst 250 years of the sample period, the Dutch
Guilderwasbasedongold,leadingtostableconsumerprices
throughout the 18th and 19th century. At the beginning of
World War I, however, the gold standard could not be sus-
tained. TheDutchcentralbanktriedtostabilizetheexchange
rateoftheGuilderbymaintainingstableinterestrates. Nev-
ertheless, money supply massively increased due to (still
unregulated) private banks providing excessive loans to the
economy. Consequently,consumer prices tripleduntil 1918.
Intheyearsafterthewar,manyoftheseprivatebankloans
defaulted resulting in a severe crisis for the Dutch banking
sector. WhenTheNetherlandsreturnedtothegoldstandard
in1925,adecadeofdeﬂationbegan. Duringthisperiodprices
gradually reverted to their historical means. However, after
itsmaintradingpartnersGermanyandGreatBritainleftthe
goldstandard,TheNetherlandsagainmovedawayfromgold
in 1936 – and prices directly trended upwards (Hart; Jonker,
and van Zanden, 1997). This was the beginning of a long
period in which inﬂation, though not constant, became the
norm.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 provide graphs of the house price and
rent indices, in nominal and in real terms. The graphs show
that most of the increase in nominal house prices and rents
occurred in the twentieth century. The indices follow each
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Price index (nominal)  Rent index (nominal) 
Notes: Graphis scaled in logarithms.
Sources: Pleaserefer toTable1.2.
other closely over time, especially in their long-run move-
ments,butoftenalsointheiryear-by-yearbehavior. These-
ries appear both stationary and volatile in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century, showing a downward trend in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and are rather
stable throughout the remainder of that century.
Thetwentiethcenturyismostvolatileforbothseries,with
large swings in real rents and prices, especially during the
two world wars and in the inter-war period. Ironically, a



















real rent index  real house price index 
Notes: Neither the real price nor the real rent index increases dramatically
in 355 years. The real price and rent indices, starting both at 100 in 1650,
reach respective levels of 197.1 and 203.2 in 2005. However, for most of the
sample period the indices vary around 100. The upward climb of real rents
and house prices started only in the 1950s, and they have now both reached
thehighest levelsin history.
Sources: Please refer toTable1.2.
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government measure aimed at keeping rents at stable lev-
els is the cause for the high volatility in real rents. In 1917,
the Dutch government ﬁxed rents in the lower and middle
housing market segments to 1916 levels. Due to high inﬂa-
tion at the end of World War I, these ﬁxed nominal rents re-
sulted in a severe drop in real rents, before a period of de-
ﬂation, caused by a return to the gold standard, drove real
rents up to unprecedented levels (Nijssen, 2000). In 1934,
real rents peaked at 3 times their 1918 level. It is interest-
ing to observe that, although rent regulation was oﬃcially
suspended in the period from 1927 through 1940, rents did
not adjust downward despite the Dutch government’s poli-
ciestodeﬂatewagesandprices. DuringtheGermanoccupa-
tion, rents were again ﬁxed. After World War II rents stayed






mained relatively constant in real terms. With substantial
governmental intervention thereafter, rents developed very
smoothly in nominal terms but displayed high volatility in
real terms.
Realhousepricesappearmorevolatilethanrents,withpe-
riods of large ﬂuctuations when rents are stable. For exam-
ple,intheearly1670s,averyvolatiledecadefortheDutchre-
public, rents declined, but prices fell much further. Another
exampleisthelargepeakinhousepricesaround1780,which
correspondstothefourthAnglo-Dutchwar(Eichholtz,1997).
Also a notable price movement occurs in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. At the time the Dutch housing market experi-
enced a house price bubble followed by a bust, but rents re-
mainedstable, as Figure 1.3 shows.
ThesecondstrikingobservationfromFigure1.3isthatnei-
ther the real price nor the real rent index increases dramat-
ically in 355 years. The real price and rent indices, starting
both at 100 in 1650, reach respective levels of 197.1 and 203.2
in 2005. However, for most of the sample period the indices
vary around 100. The upward climb of real rents and house
prices only started in the 1950s; they have now both reached
theirhighest levelsever.
Shiller (2007) provides an interesting comparison of our
Netherlands price index with indexes for Norway and the
U.S. over the period 1890 to 2010. His analysis reveals that
real prices in The Netherlands and Norway have substan-







covering the complete 355-year sample of housing market
data, thus we combine several sources that allow us to go
back to 1783. For the period 1783 through 1795, we calculate
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bondyieldsonthebasisofinformationregardingpricesand
couponsforbondsissuedbytheProvinceofHollandasstated
in van Zanden (2000). From 1796 through 1813, we rely on
price-quotesofinterestbearinggovernmentbondsissuedby
theTreasuryoftheCityofAmsterdam,asprovidedbytheof-
ﬁcial price list of the AmsterdamStockExchange.




(1996) on the basis of these bonds for the period from 1814
through 1955. Since the Dutch government has been buying
back these bonds in the last decades, their current market
prices no longer reﬂect market interest rates, and therefore,
weaugmentthisdatawithaseriesoflonggovernmentbond




ment defaulted requiring a restructuring of its government
debt. As a result, the default risk premium on Dutch gov-
ernmentdebtrosesubstantiallyatthattime. However,since
then the Dutch government has never defaulted on its debt,
resulting in a gradual decline in the default risk premium.
The high yields observed beginning in the late 1960s reﬂect
anincreasinginﬂationpremiumresultingfrominﬂationary
pressures in the 1960s and 1970s. The peak in interest rates
reﬂects the Dutch government’s monetary policy actions for








1783  1813  1843  1873  1903  1933  1963  1993 
bond yields (nominal) 
Sources: Please refer toTable1.2.
ﬁghtinginﬂationin1980-1982. Theimplementationofthose
policies resulted in a signiﬁcant reduction in inﬂation, and
hasled toa gradual reduction in the inﬂation risk premium.
Table 1.1 shows the mean annual change and volatility of
house prices, rents, bond yields, and consumer prices over
the period from 1650 through 2005. We also provide this in-
formationforvarioussub-periodsidentiﬁedashavingsimi-
lardemographicandeconomicconditionsinthecityofAm-
sterdam. The majority of the growth in prices and rents oc-
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curredinthedecadesafterWorldWarII.Intheperiodbefore
that, including two world wars and the Great Depression,
realhousepricesandrentsﬂuctuatedmorethaninanyofthe
other sub-periods. Inﬂation during and directly after World
War I ﬁrst halved real values, followed by a unique period of
deﬂation that led both prices and rents to peak in the 1930s.
The sub-period that had the strongest decline in real house
pricesandrentswasfrom1781to1814,whichwastheonlyex-
tended period in Amsterdam’s recorded history with a con-
sistently declining population. This period saw real prices
declineonaveragebyapproximately3.9percentperyear(or
-0.0385inlogarithmicterms). Incontrasttobubbleperiods,
we see a 33-year period of sustained price declines, imply-
ingamarketimplosion. Interestinglyrealrentsdeclinealso,
butataslower1.9percentperyear(or-0.0186inlogarithms)
pace. This evidence clearly contradicts the popular percep-
tion that housing prices only go up, and that even if they do
go down,it will only be for short periods.
Regarding the interest rate, two striking features are evi-
dent in Table 1.1. First is the very high real interest rate from
1815 through 1850. During this period, the real interest rate
averagedover5 percentper year. Thisperiod followedasus-
tained economic and political crisis, which resulted in a re-
structuring of government debt. As a result, Dutch govern-
ment debt was probably not regarded as risk-free. The sec-
ondstrikingfeatureistheextremelylowrealinterestratefor
the post-World War II period. We ﬁnd an average interest
rateof 0.24percent between1946and 1973.
Table 1.2 provides more information regarding the statis-
ticalbehavioroftheindicesandsub-indices. Thistablegives
sources for each of the indices and their components, and
also provides nominal means, standard deviations, and per-
centiles. These statistics show substantial diﬀerences be-
tween sub-indices, so the question is whether this is caused
by diﬀerences in measurement, or by the fact that the sub-
indices reﬂect diﬀerent time periods and market regimes.
We calculated the same statistics for sub-periods before and
afterthe break points betweensub-indices.
Concerning house prices, the statistical moments of the
1965-2005 sub-index diﬀer strongly from those of the 1650-
1965 index. However, the mean and standard deviation for
house price changes between 1945 and 1965 are 0.065 and
0.300, respectively. This mean lies very close to the one for
the1965-2005period,whichsuggeststhatthisshiftinmeans
in not caused by the index break point, but by real underly-
ingchangesintheeconomy. Forexample,inﬂationbecamea
structural factor after the Second World War, which is likely
to have been a cause of higher nominal mean house prices.
Ontheotherhand,thestandarddeviationbetween1945and
1965 is much higher than in the subsequent period, possibly
reﬂecting measurement error of the index, and the fact that
thelevelofaggregationswitchesfromacanalinAmsterdam
tothe countryas a whole.
For rents, Table 1.2 shows that the standard deviations for
each of the three sub-indices are in the same range. When
looking at smaller sub-periods around index change points,
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Table 1.1: Amsterdam’s housing market throughout the centuries
 Period Periodcharacterization ∆ ln(Price) ∆ ln(Rent) ln(bondyields) ∆ ln(CPI)
1650-2005 – 0.0116 0.0111 0.0457 0.0096
(0.1973) (0.0434) (0.0158) (0.0688)
1650-1670 Strong economy, 0.0054 0.0007 - -0.0081
rapid urbanization, expanding city (0.2676) (0.0479) (0.1045)
1671-1720 Economic slowdown, -0.0032 0.0037 - 0.0027
slow population growth (0.2058) (0.0302) (0.0797)
1721-1780 Economic slowdown, 0.0056 0.0013 - 0.0011
stable population (0.1719) (0.0327) (0.0731)
1781-1814 Economic crisis, -0.0293 -0.0094 0.0449 0.0092
shrinking population (0.1911) (0.0620) (0.0181) (0.0812)
1815-1850 Stabilizing economy, 0.0091 0.0034 0.0483 -0.0043
modest population growth (0.1808) (0.0434) (0.0061) (0.0834)
1851-1913 Strong economy, 0.0116 0.0016 0.0361 0.0038
increasing population (0.1219) (0.0396) (0.0051) (0.0339)
1914-1945 Turmoil economy, 0.0082 0.0196 0.039 0.0212
stable population (0.3118) (0.0300) (0.0066) (0.0767)
1946-1973 Economy very strong, 0.0573 0.0571 0.0463 0.0439
increasing population (0.2597) (0.0382) (0.0152) (0.0272)
1974-2005 Strong economy, 0.0594 0.0484 0.0689 0.0344
increasing population (0.0913) (0.0241) (0.0177) (0.0253)
Notes: Thistableprovidesmeansandstandarddeviations(inbrackets)ofchangesinthenaturallogarithmsofnominalhousepricesandhouserents,aswellas
thenominalinterestrateandtheconsumerpriceindex(CPI).SeparationbetweenperiodsisbasedontheeconomicdevelopmentofAmsterdam,population
growth,andcityexpansion. Interestratesareavailablefortheperiod1796-2005. SeeTable1.2forindexsources. ForperioddemarcationsseeDeVries(1984),
VanZanden (1994), Spies et al (1993),De Vriesand Vander Woude(1995).
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for the period between 1914 and 2005. This is mostly caused
by inﬂation. This suggests that the statistical behavior of
our rent indices changes because of underlying changes in
the economic situation rather than as an artifact of diﬀerent
measurement methods.
1.4 House prices and fundamentals
In the ﬁrst step of our analysis we investigate the price-rent
ratio in order to calculate potential price deviations from
marketfundamentals. Figure1.5showstheAmsterdamrent-
priceratioforourcompletesampleperiod,aswellasitsaver-
age over that period. Obviously, when house prices are high
relative to housing rents, the rent-price ratio is low. Thus,
many market observers conclude that a rent-price ratio far
below its historical average indicates that asset prices have
increased beyond fundamental values (i.e. housing rents) –
suggesting a possible bubble in the housing market.
Whiletherent-priceratioisameasureofhousepricesrel-
ative to fundamentals, it does not give a complete picture of
the housing market. For example, the period 1781 through
1815 saw a dramatic rise in the rent-price ratio from 4.6 per-
centto11.4percent,suggestingthatpricesdecreasedrelative









1825  1850  1875  1900  1925  1950  1975  2000 
observed rent/price ratio  average rent/price ratio 
Notes: Information on both rents and prices are available for only very few
houses and years at the same time in our sample, so we do not observe the
rent-price ratio directly. We therefore rescale the aggregated rent-price ra-
tiobasedontherentandhousepriceindicesto4.5percentin2001,whichis
theannualrentalyielddirectreturnonDutchresidentialrealestateasstated
inthe ROZ/IPD indexfor this year(ROZ, 2007).
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Table 1.2: Description of data sources and selected time series properties for (sub-)indices
Index Years Scope Source Mean Std. 5th P. 95th P.
House prices ∆  ln price index 
1650-1965 Herengracht A’dam Eichholtz (1997) 0.0060 0.2067 -0.3400 0.3450
1965-2005 National NVM (2008) 0.0555 0.0843 -0.0981 0.2187
Rents ∆  ln rent index 
1650-1850 Amsterdam Eichholtz & Theebe (2007) 0.0004 0.0419 -0.0678 0.0564
1850-1913 Amsterdam Van Riel (2006) 0.0016 0.0394 -0.0629 0.0842
1914-2005 National CBS (1993; 1948; 1999; 2008) 0.0411 0.0345 -0.0062 0.0982
Bond yields ln bond yields 
1783-1795 Province of Holland Own calc. based on van Zanden
(2000)
0.0300 0.0040 0.0251 0.0402
1796-1813 Amsterdam Amsterdam Stock Exchange Oﬃ-
cial Price List
0.0546 0.0171 0.0409 0.1014
1814-1955 National Eichholtz & Koedijk (1996) 0.0398 0.0080 0.0295 0.0556
1956-2005 National CBS (2010b) 0.0636 0.0177 0.0400 0.0899
Consumer price index (CPI) ∆  ln CPI 
1650-1850 Amsterdam Nusteling (1985) 0.0009 0.0810 -0.1261 0.1301
1850-1899 Amsterdam Van Riel (2006) 0.0001 0.0356 -0.0455 0.0543
1900-2005 National CBS (2010a) 0.0304 0.0479 -0.0387 0.1080
Notes: All numbers in nominal terms.
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to rents. However, during this period, rents and prices both
declinedatrelativelysimilarrates: -3.9percentand-1.9per-
cent, respectively. Thus, even with this small diﬀerence in
relativedeclines,the rent-priceratio changedsubstantially.
In addition, another important observation to be made
from Figure 1.5 is that the rent-price ratio has deviated from
its long-run average for substantial periods of time. For ex-
ample,theratioisbelowthelong-runaverageformostofthe
eighteenth century, and above it for the ﬁrst 60 years of the
nineteenth century. Clearly, the graph suggests that a de-
viation of the rent-price ratio from its own average is not a
guarantee for a quick reversion to the average. In the last 75
years, the ratio has been rather volatile, especially so during
the middle decades of the twentieth century. We note that
in the last 20 years, the Amsterdam rent-price ratio has de-
clined,but still remains within historicalrange.5
Our analysis builds on the methods employed by Camp-
bell and Shiller (1988 and 2001), Brunnermeier and Julliard
(2008), and Campbell et al (2009). This approach is based
on the present value model: the former two papers have
dividends and interest rates as the fundamentals underly-
ing stock prices, whereas the latter two papers use rents and
interest rates as fundamentals for house prices. Of course
underlying dividends, rents and interest rates are them-
5Weformallytestforthepresenceofunitrootsintherentandpriceindices.
TheDickey-Fullerteststatisticsarereportedintheappendix. Theyindicate
that both series contain unit roots and are thus non-stationary. The ﬁrst
diﬀerences, however,are stationary.
selves resting on deeper foundations, like economic devel-
opment, demographics, technological change, and wars and
other disasters. However, the method used by these authors
assumes that interest rates and rents (or dividends) capture
those fundamentals. As in Campbell et al (2009), we de-
ﬁne the gross return on housing   h  over the period from
  to       as a function of the price of housing     and the
rentalpayment   :
 h;t    
 t      t  
 t
(1.2)
Taking logs and assuming the rent-price ratio is stationary,
wecan express(2) as




 j h;t   j  
  ∑
j  
 j∆ t   j
]
(1.3)
where  h;t is the log return to housing,  t is the log house




     
)
thelong-runaveragerent-priceratio,and  isa
constant of linearization that equals
(
















return to housing as a function of an interest rate and a risk
premium   h        h , the rent-price ratio can be decom-
posed into three components consisting of the discounted
expected future real interest rates, the discounted expected
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future rent growth, and the discounted housing risk pre-
mium. Thus,the rent-priceratio is expressedas:
 t    t      
  ∑
  
       t  t    
  ∑
  




       t ∆ t  
(1.4)
where    t is the conditional expectation computed from a  -
period VARforecast.
For each year between 1785 and 2005, we compute  t    t
using the Amsterdam house price and rent indices scaled
to the 2002 ratio of 4.5 percent.6 At each period  , we cal-
culate the average rent-price ratio over the prior 40-years
       to         as an approximation of
(
     
)
. We then
calculate and  foreachyearbasedonour
(




growth, discounted expected future housing risk premium,
anddiscountedexpectedrealinterestratein(4)foreachyear
  based on 40-year forecasts for each variable obtained from
the maximum likelihood estimation of a VAR(1) model over
6We cannot observe the rent-price ratio directly, as information on both
rentsandpricesareavailableforonlyveryfewhousesandyearsatthesame
time in our sample. We therefore rescale the aggregated rent-price ratio
based on indices to 4.5 percent in 2001, which is the rental yield for that
yearonDutchresidentialrealestateasstatedintheROZ/IPDindexforthis
year(ROZ, 2007). Weﬁnd our results tobe robustfor diﬀerent scales.
the period       to       . We chose a lag of 1 based on the
Schwarz’BayesianInformationCriterion(SBIC)fortheover-
all data series. Besides, we checked the robustness of our re-
sultsunderseveralVARspeciﬁcations,changingthenumber
of lags and the time period on which the VAR is based. This
didnot markedlychangethe results.
Table 1.3 gives an overview of our VAR estimation results.
For 181 years (Panel A: 1825-2005), we estimate VAR models
based on information from a 40 year rolling window. The
forecasting models cover the real interest rate    , the hous-
ing risk premium    , and the change in real rents  ∆  . The
ﬁrstsectionsummarizesthecoeﬃcientsfortherealinterest
rateforecast model:
 t         i t        t      ∆l∆ t     ϵt  (1.5)
while the second section describes the housing premia
forecastmodel:
 t         i t        t      ∆l∆ t     ϵt  (1.6)
Theresults from the real rent changeforecast model:
∆ t         i t        t      ∆l∆ t     ϵt (1.7)
are displayed in the bottom section. Columns 1, 2, and 3 dis-
play the inter-quartile values for the estimated coeﬃcients
for t  , t  ,∆ t  ,respectively. Column4displaysthere-
sultsoftheWaldtestthatnoneoftheincludedregressorsex-
plainsthedependentvariableandthelastcolumnshowsthe
distributionof the    measureof modelﬁt.
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The performance of our VAR models is surprisingly good
whencomparedtostudiesbasedonmoderndata. Forexam-




variables that are not available with older data. In addition,
we see that over half of the yearly estimated VAR models
haveWaldstatisticsthatdenotestatisticalsigniﬁcanceatthe
5percentlevel,indicatingthatwecanrejectthenullhypoth-
esis that none of the model factors explain the dependent
variable in overhalf of the years.
Weﬁndthatthecoeﬃcientsfortheﬁrstlagofthevariable
have (on average) the highest statistical signiﬁcance. Bond
yields in year  , for instance, are mainly driven by bond
yields in period      . For example, we ﬁnd that 50 percent
of the yearly estimated coeﬃcients for  i are signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level. In contrast, rents and prices do not have
a strong impact with 0.6 percent and 7 percent of the yearly
coeﬃcients for  ∆l and    signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,





the lagged housing premium has a signiﬁcant impact on the
current housing premium with 78 percent of the yearly es-
timated coeﬃcients for    signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
LikeCaseandShiller(1989,1990)weﬁndthepredictabilityof
housingreturnsintheoppositedirection. Inourdata,hous-
ing excess returns are reverting to their mean, as indicated
bynegativecoeﬃcientsforitslaggedvalues. Throughoutthe
centuries, the coeﬃcients on the lagged housing premium
arebecominglessnegative. Inthelast10yearsofoursample,
the coeﬃcients turn positive, reconciling our ﬁndings with
studieson modern data.
Table 1.3 also reports results for two sub-periods (from
1825through1915andfrom1916until2005)toinvestigatethe
possibleroleofrentcontrolinourresults;theﬁrstperiodre-
ﬂects completely free rental markets, while the other covers
theregulatedperiod. Theintroductionofrentcontrolaltered
the predictability of changes in rents. In our “free” century
(1825-1915), changes in rents were hardly predictable. For
example, the coeﬃcients for lagged values of rent changes
( ∆l) are negative and only signiﬁcant at the 5 percent con-
ﬁdence level in 7 out of 91 years. In addition, the median
   for this model is 11 percent. In contrast, during the sub-
set 1916-2005, the presence of rent control links the nom-
inal rents to changes in CPI and thereby transmits the au-
toregressive properties of the inﬂation time series to rents.
As a result, in the third section of Panel C we note that the
coeﬃcients for lagged changes in rents ( ∆l) become posi-
tive and statistically more signiﬁcant with 29 percent of the
yearlycoeﬃcientsbeingstatisticallysigniﬁcantatthe5per-
cent level. Furthermore, the median    for this model in-
creasesto33percent.
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Table 1.3: Summary of VAR estimation results
Dependent variable Coeﬃcient estimates p-value    
 t    t   ∆ t   (Wald)
Panel A: 1825-2005
 t 25th percentile 0.344 -0.049 -0.137 0 0.127
Median 0.459 -0.015 0.016 0.007 0.235
75th percentile 0.577 0.002 0.095 0.121 0.332
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.503 0.072 0.006 0.564 NA
 t 25th percentile -1.531 -0.529 -0.021 0 0.118
Median -1.120 -0.399 0.318 0.008 0.229
75th percentile -0.577 -0.304 0.867 0.148 0.340
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.320 0.779 0.155 0.613 NA
∆ t 25th percentile 0.062 -0.053 -0.214 0 0.103
Median 0.194 -0.018 0.03 0.035 0.177
75th percentile 0.379 0.016 0.438 0.204 0.331
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.127 0.133 0.182 0.519 NA
Panel B: 1825-1915
 t 25th percentile 0.295 -0.112 -0.241 0.066 0.107
Median 0.366 -0.048 -0.115 0.119 0.128
75th percentile 0.469 -0.023 0.041 0.187 0.153
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.484 0.088 0.011 0.154 NA
 t 25th percentile -1.281 -0.577 0.128 0 0.232
Median -0.858 -0.522 0.343 0.001 0.286
75th percentile -0.366 -0.396 0.839 0.007 0.394
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.429 0.967 0.264 0.912 NA
∆ t 25th percentile -0.005 -0.116 -0.26 0.070 0.095
Median 0.171 -0.048 -0.18 0.169 0.112
75th percentile 0.440 0.052 -0.049 0.239 0.15
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.165 0.253 0.077 0.187 NA
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Dependent variable Coeﬃcient estimates p-value    
 t    t   ∆ t   (Wald)
Panel C: 1916-2005
 t 25th percentile 0.441 -0.013 -0.021 0 0.267
Median 0.537 -0.003 0.047 0 0.327
75th percentile 0.641 0.018 0.118 0.002 0.431
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.522 0.056 0 0.978 NA
 t 25th percentile -2.268 -0.401 -0.122 0.018 0.096
Median -1.391 -0.309 0.185 0.138 0.121
75th percentile -0.810 -0.236 1.078 0.233 0.202
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.211 0.589 0.044 0.311 NA
∆ t 25th percentile 0.086 -0.03 0.105 0 0.252
Median 0.197 -0.005 0.438 0 0.331
75th percentile 0.320 0.009 0.529 0.004 0.407
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.089 0.011 0.289 0.856 NA
Notes: For181years(1825-2005),weestimateaVARmodelbasedoninformationfroma40yearrollingwindow. Theforecastingmodelscovertherealinterest
rate  , the housing risk premium  , and the change in real rents ∆ . The ﬁrst panel summarizes the coeﬃcients on the real interest rate forecast model  t  
    i t      t    ∆l∆ t   ϵt,whilethesecondpaneldescribesthehousingpremiaforecastmodel t         i t      t    ∆l∆ t   ϵt.
Theresultsfromtherealrentchangeforecastmodel∆ t          i t       t     ∆l∆ t    ϵt aredisplayedinthebottompanel. Column4displays
the results of the Wald test that none of the included regressors explains the dependent variable. The last column shows the distribution of the    measure
of modelﬁt.
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Based on our estimates of the fundamental values driving
the rent-priceratio, wecalculatethe pricing error as
ϵt     t    t   
(
   t     t      t     ∆ t
)
(1.8)
where    t,    t,    t,   ∆ t denote our calculated approximations
of the constant of linearization, the future real rate, future
housing risk premium, and future rental growth, respec-
tively. This pricing error represents the price deviations
from fundamentals and is the focus of our subsequent anal-
ysis.
Figure1.6showsthatthetheoreticalrent-priceratiobased
on fundamentals follows the actual rent-price ratio through
time. The correlation between annual changes of observed
and fundamental rent-price ratios is 0.19. However, the es-
timated correlations increase for shorter intervals. For ex-
ample, over the period prior to 1916 the correlation between
theobservedandfundamentalrent-priceratiosis0.56. How-
ever, in the second period (1916-2005), the correlation drops
to -0.11. As a result, we see that the fundamentals-based ra-
tio is less volatile during the crisis years of the inter-bellum,
both in yeartoyearchangesand in long-termswings.
Figure1.7depictsthediﬀerencebetweentherent-pricera-
tio and its theoretical counterpart. This graph shows that
prices(orrents)candeviatefromfundamentalsforextended
periods of time. For example, throughout the second half of
the19thcentury,thepricingerrorwascontinuouslynegative,
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Notes: Thetheoretical rent-priceratio is expressedas
 t  t     
  ∑
  


















where h;t isthelogreturntohousing, t istheloghouseprice, t isthelog


















.    t is the conditional expectation computed from a  -period
VARforecast
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higher than predicted by our model. Starting with World
War I, a period of ﬁnancial turbulences left its mark both
on the actual rent-price ratio and on its fundamental coun-
terpart. During World War I, The Netherlands ﬁrst experi-
enced a period of strong inﬂation, followed by deﬂation in
theearly1920sandduringtheearly1930s,againfollowedby
inﬂation in the late 1930sand 1940s. Forboth series, volatil-
ity shoots up, caused by huge swings in house prices and in-
ﬂation.7 In these uncertain times, house prices seem to be
more depressed than fundamentals suggest, indicating that
investorsattachedasubstantialdiscounttolongterminvest-
ments likehousing.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century the
magnitudeofthemispricingdeclinesasthedistortionsfrom
the turbulent (inter)war periods fade out. Alternating peri-
ods of relative over-/underpricing of homes with regard to
fundamentals can be observed. For example, in the 1970s,
home prices appreciate much more than suggested, as low
after-tax mortgage costs diminished in real terms through
high inﬂation. This bubble lasts for a few years only. Resi-
dential real estate investors’ exuberance tips over when real
interest rates increase sharply in the 1980s as the target-
ing of inﬂation becomes a prime concern of the monetary




intoprices and toa lesser extentintorents.















   t      t      t     ∆ t
)
 
Where    t,    t,    t,   ∆ t denote our calculated approximations of the constant
of linearization, the future real rate, future housing risk premium, and fu-
turerental growth,respectively.
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ing depressed market sentiments. From 1993 onwards, the
rent-price ratio remains constantly below its fundamental




Since continuously negative or positive pricing errors have
occurredoverthevaryingtimeframes,thequestionemerges
as to whether prices or rents will correct to eliminate the
mispricing. Step three of our analysis deals with this ques-
tion and investigates the rent-price ratio adjustment mech-
anism.
Following Gallin (2008), we estimate the following vector
error correction model:
∆ t   A0 t     A1∆ t     A t      t (1.9)
where  t is deﬁned as
(
ln   ln   
)′
, and  t   includes ex-
ogenousvariablesinﬂuencing∆ t. MatrixA0 representsthe
product of the cointegration vector and the matrix contain-
ing the error correction coeﬃcients (Gallin 2008). We for-
mally test for the existence of a cointegration vector for the
price and rent series and whether it is diﬀerent from (1 -1).
We ﬁnd no evidence for the cointegration vector to diﬀer
from(1-1),whichisinlinewiththeoryandallowsforamore
eﬃcient estimation of the model. Since a positive (negative)
errorcorrectioncoeﬃcientforpricesimpliesthatpriceswill
decrease (increase) when the current rent-price ratio is low
relative to the long run average, and vice versa for rents: a
positive coeﬃcient suggests falling (increasing) rents when
therent-priceratio is relativelylow(high).
Table 1.4 reports the estimated error correction coeﬃ-
cients for the full time-period as well as the rent-controlled
(1916-2005) and non-regulated (1650-1915) periods. In gen-
eral, we see that the error correction coeﬃcients for prices
are statistically and economically more signiﬁcant than the
coeﬃcients for rents. For example, the estimated error cor-
rection coeﬃcients for the 1650-2005 period is positive and
signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level) for prices but is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant for rents. However, we do see that for the
sub-period 1916-2005, both estimated coeﬃcients are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level with prices being
positive and rents being negative. Thus, the results indi-
cate that when prices diverge from fundamentals both rents
and prices can be the mechanism for restoring equilibrium.
However, the absolute magnitude of the price coeﬃcients is
6 to7 times higher than the size of the rent coeﬃcients. As a
result, we conclude that rents and prices do adjust to imbal-
ances, and, consistent with Gallin (2008), our results show
that prices appear to adjust more than rents. Furthermore,
weﬁndthattheprominentroleofpricesintheerrorcorrec-
tion process becomes even stronger in the years 1916-2005,
whenrent regulation hinders rental adjustments.
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Table 1.4: Error correction coeﬃcients for real rents and real prices
Time period Error correction coeﬃcients
∆ln    ∆ln   
1650-2005                
               
1650-1915               
               
1916-2005                   
               
Notes: Standarderrorsinparentheses. *,**,***indicatesigniﬁcanceofcoef-
ﬁcient at the 10%, 5%, 1% conﬁdence level.
The signs of all error correction coeﬃcients are in line with expectations.
For prices, the error correction coeﬃcients are statistically and economi-
cally more signiﬁcant than the coeﬃcients for rents. This means that devi-
ationsintherent-priceratioaremostlycorrectedforbypriceadjustments,
notchangesinrents. Theroleofpricesintheerrorcorrectionbecomeseven
stronger in the years 1916-2005, when rent regulation hinders rent adjust-
ments.
Overall, the results indicate that our key ﬁnding holds in







presence of pricing bubbles in asset markets is the lack of
suﬃciently long time-horizon data. Thus, the purpose of
this paper is to utilize a 355-year time series of real house
prices and rents to investigate whether substantial devia-
tionsofmarketpricesawayfrommarketfundamentalvalues
canpersist.
Our analysis consisted of two parts. First, we esti-
mated a measure of housing market mispricing based on
the relationship between market fundamentals (expected
rent growth and expected house price appreciation) and the
price-rent ratio. Second, we investigated the link between
the rent-price ratio and changes in rents and house prices
overvarious time horizons.
Several lessons can be learned from our analysis. First,
house prices and rents are cointegrated, indicating that the
same underlying fundamentals likely inﬂuence both. Sec-
ond, our analysis of the rent-price ratio reveals sustained
periods of “bubble” and “crisis” conditions that can con-
tinue without a corresponding correction (or crash). Third,
our analysis shows that changes in house prices and rents
are both mechanisms for “correcting” imbalances between
prices and fundamentals. Between these, prices appear to
havegreaterimportance in correcting disequilibria.
Based on these ﬁndings, our investigation into the long-
rundevelopmentsofhousepricesandrentshasimplications
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fortheongoingdebateconcerningtherecentpriceincreases
and subsequent corrections in many of the worldwide hous-
ing markets. While it appears that many markets have had
bubble characteristics, our study shows that bubble crashes
arenotalwaysinevitableintheshortrun. Whilepricesdore-
vert back to fundamentals, this reversion may take decades.
So the move towards equilibrium may be more a fading out
thanacrash. Recently,marketslikeAmsterdam,CapeTown,
and Paris that have been characterized by strong price gains
in the last decade and were widely thought of as overvalued,
have nevertheless kept their value, while other markets ex-
perienced a free fall.
One of the implications of this analysis is that it is decid-
edly diﬃcult to know when, or even if, an asset price bubble
will collapse. The results suggest that it is unwise to use per-
fect hindsight to criticize lenders who originated mortgages
at the peak of the market and subsequently suﬀered signif-
icant losses due to borrower defaults since historical trends
showthatitispossibleforpricebubblestoslowlydeﬂateover
long periods such that the losses may not have occurred. Fi-
nally, our results imply that lengthy periods of little or no
house price appreciation are also possible. Thus, those look-
ingforaspeedyrecoveryinthehousingmarketafterthecri-
sis maybe disappointed.
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Appendix
VAR Results in graphs
ThegraphsinFigure1.8provideplotsoftheyearlyindividual
coeﬃcients(and95percentconﬁdenceinterval)fortheVAR




are stationary using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. A
series is considered non-stationary if it contains a unit root.
We follow David Dickey and Wayne A. Fuller (1981) to deter-
mine the existence of a unit root and therefore whether the
series is stationary. The Dickey-Fuller test requires estimat-
ing the following autoregressive (AR( )) process for the rent
( )and price ( ) series:
∆ t          t       
 ∆ t       
 ∆ t  
         
p  ∆ t p      t
(1.10)
where  t denotes the rent and price series, respectively, and
                       p     . The rent and price series
containaunitroot(andarenon-stationary)ifwefailtoreject
the null hypothesis that        by comparing the estimated
DF -statistictothecriticalvaluesobtainedfromtheDickey-
Fuller distribution.
Table 1.5 reports the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
statistics for the rent and price series. Based on the ADF
statistics,weconﬁrmthatbothseriescontainunitrootsand
thusarenon-stationary. Werepeatthetestusingﬁrstdiﬀer-
ences of each series (Table 1.6), and ﬁnd that we are able to
rejectthe null hypothesisof non-stationarity.
The choice of lag-length when estimating the augmented
Dickey-Fuller equation is not exact. Thus, we also test for
unit roots using the Phillips-Perron non-parametric proce-
dure (Peter Phillips and Pierre Perron, 1998), which corrects
forautocorrelation. Tables1.5and1.6alsoreportthePhillips-
Perron test statistics, which conﬁrm the presence of unit
roots.
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Figure 1.8: Yearly VAR coeﬃcient estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44CHAPTER 1. HOUSE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS
Table1.5: Unit root tests for levels of real rent and house price indices
Lag ln Rents  ln Prices  ln Price/Rent 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP
1 6,44 7,32 0,79 0,24 -4,36 -5,58
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0005) (0.0001)
2 5,81 7,18 1,28 0,57 -3,59 -5,46
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0067) (0.0001)
3 5,58 7,17 1,76 0,86 -3,06 -5,44
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0315) (0.0001)
4 4,6 7,04 1,92 0,99 -2,91 -5,56
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0461) (0.0001)
5 3,7 6,83 2,04 1,09 -2,75 -5,68
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0667) (0.0001)
6 3,55 6,68 1,59 1,01 -3,01 -5,89
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0358) (0.0001)
Notes: For each series we present the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics for 1-6 lags. Numbers in parentheses are
asymptoticp-values.
Table 1.6: Unit root tests for ﬁrst diﬀerences of real rent and house
price indices
Lag ln Rents  ln Prices 
ADF PP ADF PP
1 -10,08 -15,35 -17,42 -26,7
(  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
2 -8,14 -15,47 -14,35 -27,39
(  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
3 -6,17 -15,58 -11,57 -28,08
(  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
4 -4,89 -15,77 -9,97 -28,48
(  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
5 -4,38 -16,03 -7,76 -28,62
(  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
6 -3,62 -16,27 -7,54 -28,48
(  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
Notes:For each series we present the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics for 1-6 lags. Numbers in parentheses are
asymptoticp-values.
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for existing dwellings, option value derives from the possi-
bility toadd space, or todemolishand rebuild.
1See, for example, Titman (1985), Quigg (1993), Capozza and Li (1994) and
Capozzaand Sick(1994).
Theliteraturehasdevelopedastandardhedonicspeciﬁca-
tion valuing houses and other real assets (Rosen, 1974). This
modelconsidersthevalueoftheexistingvectorofassetchar-
acteristics,omittingexplicitconsiderationofanyvaluefrom
the option to redevelop the property to a level consistent




2Rosen speciﬁcally excluded the value of durable assets from his theory
(1974,p. 37).
3Note the asymmetry in option value during rising and falling markets.
During declining markets, owners have little choice except to allow their
properties to deteriorate, slowly reducing their investment: See Glaeser
and Gyourko (2005) for extensive discussion of the asymmetry. We model
the call option (i.e., the redevelopment option) rather than the put option
(i.e., the abandonment option).CHAPTER 2. REAL OPTIONS AND PRICE VOLATILITY
In order to investigate how option value drives the prices
of existing homes, we combine insights from the hedonic
pricing literature with real option value. We use a model in
which the value of the redevelopment option is an additive
term in a standard hedonic speciﬁcation.4 In eﬀect, the re-
development option is an option to change the vector of he-
donic characteristicsof a dwelling.
We propose that option value is a positive function of the
unrealizeddevelopmentpotentialofthelot,measuredbythe
maximum structure allowed by zoning relative to the exist-
ing structure. If the existing conﬁguration of the dwelling
and the land it stands on is close to the optimum, then the
strike price of the option is high because the use value of the
existing vector is exchanged for the value of the new conﬁg-
uration. In this case, the value of the redevelopment option
is low. Similarly, a small old house in a neighborhood with
larger newerhouses mayhavesubstantial option value.
We use a new database to document changes in real op-
tion values, analyzing their role in the pricing of the West
Berlin housing market. Existing empirical tests of real op-
tiontheoryfocusoncrosssectionaldata. Foranunderstand-





4Speciﬁcally, we provide a closed form solution to the model developed in
Clappand Salavei(2009) and weadd drift in house prices.
iorof existinghomes.
First,ourdatasetofBerlin’sresidentialrealestatesalesnot
only provides transaction prices, location and a – limited –
setofhedoniccharacteristics,butitalsocoversthedegreeof
existing development for each dwelling, and the maximum
development permitted by zoning, which allows for the as-
sessmentoftheoptionvaluetoredevelopexistingdwellings.
Byemployingthisdatabase,thispaperistheﬁrsttousezon-
ing limits for an empirical estimate of the real option value
embeddedin existingdwellings.
Second, during the 30 years covered by the database the
city of Berlin experienced signiﬁcant political and economic
volatility, with important consequences for the West Berlin
housingmarket. Duringthethreedecadesfrom1978through
2007 the West Berlin housing market has experienced three




in its early stages, but after 1961, when the Wall was con-
structed, West Berlin experienced a period of relative tran-
quility and prosperity. Sealed oﬀ from its direct surround-
ingsbytheironcurtain,protectedbyNATOagainstexternal
threats, and ﬁnanced by generous transfer payments from
West Germany, the lucky western part of the divided city
lived a quiet but comfortable life. This situation continued
until1989. Ourdatashowthathousepricesbetween1978and
1989grewsteadilybyanaverageof1.9percentperyearinreal
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terms.
The quiet period ended abruptly and unexpectedly with
the collapse of the communist rule in Eastern and Central
Europe. Germany experienced three major political shocks
during a three year period, popularly called the Big Bang
period: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reuniﬁcation
of East and West Germany in 1990, and the decision to re-
turn the federal government to Berlin in 1991. In Berlin,
theseeventssetinmotionarealestateboom,bothinhousing
and in commercial real estate. The real estate boom, which
peakedin1994,isclearlyvisibleinourdata,whichshowthat
home prices markedly accelerated in the years just after the
fall of the Wall in 1989, with real prices rising by an average
of 4.6 percent per yearfor ﬁveyears.
Thisboomendedjustasthefederalgovernmentstartedto
move to Berlin in 1994. This move coincided with the pin-
nacle of the housing market boom, and the housing market
went into a long-lasting decline after that. During the 13
years after 1994 the cumulative decline in real house prices
was 45percent, or 2.9 percent annually.
Themaincontributionofthispaperistogiveaninsightin
the extent to which real option value has exacerbated these
swings in house prices: this study is the ﬁrst to document
thesubstantialroleplayedbyoptionvalueinlong-runhous-
ing market volatility. For the boom period between 1989 and
1994,ourresultsforhouseswithhighoptionvalueshowthat
increases in the redevelopment option value added about
40 percent to the growth in the real value. In the subse-
quent bust, about 50 percent of the decline in the real value
ofthesehighoptionvaluehouseswasassociatedwithreduc-
tions in their option value. But also for houses with low op-
tion value, the economic contribution of changes in option
value appears to be important, and especially so in the bust
phase of the cycle: 12 percent of the decline in real value can
be attributed to changing real option value. This suggests
that option value ampliﬁes the long-term price swing of ex-
istingdwellings.
This paper proceeds with a section introducing the theo-
retical model we use for the analysis. It subsequently tells
thestoryoftheBerlinhousingmarketinitsurbaneconomic
setting,andprovidesdetailsofthedataweuse. Thenextsec-
tion provides the framework for the empirical analysis, and
the section after that presents the empirical results, starting
with the presentation of a constant-quality house price in-
dexforBerlin,subsequentlypresentingcoeﬃcientestimates
for the hedonics and the redevelopment option, and ending
with a calculation of the economic signiﬁcance of the rede-
velopmentoptioninthediﬀerentphasesoftheBerlinhous-
ing market cycle. The paper ends with a summary and con-
cludingsection.
2.2 Methodology
The model we propose is a standard hedonic model with an
additive redevelopment option value term: i.e., house value
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consistsofusevalueplusoptionvalue. Intuitively,whenex-
isting houses trade, a lump sum for the redevelopment op-
tionvalueisembeddedintheprice. Theoptionvaluetermis
motivatedbythepossibilityoftearingdownandrebuilding,
or substantially remodeling and adding to the house, modi-
fying the vectorof hedonic characteristics.
2.2.1 Embedded Option Value
This section develops a simple hedonic model where market
participants pay for the use value of the existing vector of
characteristics and additionally for the option to redevelop
to a diﬀerent vector. The model provides a framework for
specifying a regression capable of separately identifying the
amount paid for the option and the amount paid for use of
the existing vector.5 As shown here, the main empirical im-
plication of the option value framework is that an additive
nonlinear termis needed for option value.
Our theory is based on a certainty model: i.e., there is no
underlying stochastic process. Grenadier (1999 and 2002)
motivates our use of the certainty model as a starting point:
the NPV rule may be more empirically relevant than the
5EarlierrealoptionstheorydevelopedbyRosenthalandHelsley(1994)deals
with the case where the structure is valueless; only land value (i.e., option
value) remains. Quigg (1993) uses construction costs and assumed param-
eterswithanoptionvalueformulatobackouttheoptioncomponentfrom
the value of vacant land. She uses the hedonic model only to estimate the
value of an optimal structure.
value arising from the variance of the underlying stochastic
process.
In the certainty model, option value is generated by irre-
versibility,whichoccursbecauseitiscostlytochangethehe-
donic vector. Consider a vector of property characteristics
  
i thatchangesonlybydepreciationuntiltheownerdecides
to redevelop – i.e. exercise a one-time call option at cost k,
the construction costs associated with the redevelopment.6
This is an exchange option: at time  , the depreciated vec-
tor  
i   T isexchangedforanewstructurecharacterizedby
the vector  n
i . The discount rate is   and spot implicit rental
ratesaredenotedbythevector ,whichgrowsexponentially
at rate     .7 To keep the model simple, the new vector
is predetermined, not optimally chosen. Then the hedonic
modelwith a redevelopmentoption becomes:
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wise, change in implicit market rents will be modeled with a scalar multi-
pliedbyeachelementof the rent vector.
7I.e., each element of the vector of implicit rents grows at the same expo-
nential rate. Finite expected returns, and option value   , require that
             .
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The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (2.1) is the
value of the existing vector (i.e., the use value of the prop-
erty); this is the only term included in the standard hedonic
model. The term subject to maximization is the value of the
option to redevelop.8 This exchange option – i.e., exchange
ofthedepreciatedvectorofcharacteristicsforanewone–is
exercisedat some time  .9 The last term is the present value
of the cost of the exchange.
Notationcanbesimpliﬁedwiththescalarvaluesintoday’s
money of the old vector of characteristics,   
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(2.2)
Asshownintheappendix,equation(2.1)canberewrittenas:
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A cross-sectional hedonic model with option value is an
estimate of equation (2.3) at time      , when everything
8Further explanation of a certainty model similar to this one can be found
on page 138 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994); page 146 adds uncertainty in the
context of Tobin’s  . Rosenthal and Helsley (1994), use a stochastic model
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is known except  , which is optimally chosen. Assuming
      ,the ﬁrst order condition is:
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   . These multipliers give the
amountbywhichthevalueoftherenovatedpropertydiﬀers
fromthe strike(    
i     ).10
The appendix demonstrates that a simple closed form so-
lution for equation (2.3) is available for the case where      
and      :11


















  ϵi (2.5)
This solution provides the main empirical implication of
theory: option value is a nonlinear term added to the stan-
dardhedonic value,   
i ,and option value declinesin   
i .
Figure 2.1 illustrates equation (2.5). The graph shows how
the redevelopment option value and the total house value
10As pointed out by Dixit and Pyndick (1994) the value of the new asset is
appreciatingatratewhereasthecost  isconstant,motivatingT  > 0.
Here,depreciation further motivateswaiting toinvest.
11In private correspondence, Professors Jyh-Bang Jou (Massey University)
andTanLee(AucklandUniversity)havedemonstratedthatasimilarclosed
form solutionis availablein the case where      .
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change with diﬀerent levels of an existing home’s use value.
Total house value (use value plus option value) is the up-
per line. In this example, we set parameters   and   at, re-
spectively, 0.015 and 0.05, both in line with West Berlin his-
tory. We choose normalized parameter values for construc-
tion cost (     ), the value of a new house ( n
i    ), and the
rent vector, which is a vector of ones. Diﬀerent values for
  and   will “stretch” the graphs but leave the implications
of (2.5) unchanged. Please note that the total home value is
not monotonically increasing in use value (as assumed by
traditional hedonic models). Total value starts to increase
again, once use value falls below a certain threshold. Casu-
allyspeaking,itbecomeseasiertoredeveloponcethecurrent
structureshavedeterioratedenough. Theoptionisrationally
exercised at the tangency between the option payoﬀ and the
optionvalue. Inthisexample,thispointcorrespondstoause
value of 0.571.
The appendix outlines the generalization of equation (2.5)
to a valuation equation where implicit market prices follow
a standard Wiener process. This generalization reveals that
option value increases with the variance of the underlying
stochastic process. It does not change the fact that option
value is an additivepowerfunction as in equation (2.5).










0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5 
use value 
total option value  total value  option payoﬀ 
Notes: The dotted line is the second term of equation (2.5). The solid line is
the sum of the two terms: use value (ﬁrst term) plus option value (second
term). Usevalueoftheexistinghouse,  
i isonthex-axis;thepartofthisthat
varies in cross-sectional is the quantity of existing characteristics,   
i . The
optionisrationallyexercisedatthetangencybetweentheoptionpayoﬀand
the option value: where use value is 0.571 in this example. Parameters used
here:         ,        , both based on West Berlin history. Normalized
numbers: Construction cost,      . Value of new house,  n
i    ; the rent
vectoris a vectorof ones, constant in cross section.
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2.2.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation with Embedded
Option Value
The purpose of this section is to derive empirically testable
propositions from equation (2.5). In the housing literature,
hedonicregressionsaretypicallyestimatedinlogs(lnPisthe
dependentvariable). Therefore,wemeasuretheoptionvalue












vector of market rents is ﬁxed in the cross-section: call this
ratio “development potential”,  i. We measure the ratio be-
tween the old and new quantities by the maximum size of a
house (in square meters) allowed on each lot by zoning di-
vided by the size of the existing house. As suggested by the-
ory, if the ratio is close to 1 (log close to zero), the property
is close to optimal intensity and option value is likely to be
low.12 A large development potential ratio suggests that the
last term in equation (2.5) has the potential to be large if the
parameters and current price level support an option that is
at-or in-the-money.
Themodelsuggests the followingtestablehypotheses:
H1: The coeﬃcient for ln i will have a positive
signduringperiodsofsigniﬁcantoptionvalue,zero
duringotherperiods. Thiscanbetestedagainstthe
12Of course, option value is also a function of the parameters of the model
and the current level of house prices. This motivates our approach, which
is to shift the regression parameter on the option value term over time so
thatit can respond tochangesin the economic and politicalenvironment.
alternative that the coeﬃcients for ln i have neg-
ativesigns.
H2: The eﬀect of  i should be nonlinear:13 near
zero over much of its range and signiﬁcantly pos-
itiveat high levelsof D.
An additional testable hypothesis follows from the dramatic
events in Berlin between 1989 and 1992: option value should
behigherbecauseexpecteddriftandvarianceareexpectedto
increasearound these events.14
H3: Thecoeﬃcientsforln i shouldbehigherdur-
ing the Big Bang period and lower before and after
that time.
2.3 Events and Data
2.3.1 Events Associated with the Creation and





increases as one movesfrom right toleft in Figure 2.1.
14When a Wiener process for rents is introduced as in the appendix, option
valueisapositivefunctionofvariance,andweexpectvariancetoincrease
due tothe uncertainty surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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1961. The Berlin Wall locked in the Eastern German popula-
tion, making any free movement of people from the East to
theWestvirtuallyimpossible. Ironically,theWallstabilized




This period of tranquility ended abruptly and unexpect-
edly in 1989. Even those who were witnessing political de-
velopmentsfromwithindidnotforeseetheeventsthatwere
tofollowshortly. InJuneof1989,justafewmonthsbeforethe
fall of the Wall, Gerhard Schröder, who would later become
Germany’s Chancellor, said: “After 40 years of Federal Re-
public of Germany, one should not lie to a new generation in
Germany about a chance of re-uniﬁcation. This chance does
not exist.”15
After Hungarian border oﬃcials gave up stopping East
Germans driving into Austria, the East German regime had
no choice but to open the border to the West as well. On
the evening of November 9th, a member of the East German
Politbureauannouncedtheendofthebordercontrolsandin
the very same night thousands of East Germans crossed the
border into West Berlin (Schmemann, 1989). This political
and economic “Big Bang” event evolved at a speed that was
unheard of during the preceding 40 years of careful diplo-
macy. On October 3rd, 1990, East and West Germany were
15Gerhard Schröder on 12.6.1989 in Bild-Zeitung. Source: http://dipbt.
bundestag.de/dip21/btp/13/13247.asc (retrievedon Dec. 15, 2010)
re-united, including a full integration of the monetary sys-
tem,the administration, and the judicial system.
In a very close vote in June 1991, the uniﬁed German par-
liament decided to make Berlin the political capital of Ger-
manyagain. Movingthegovernment,parliament,andabout
half of the federal administration, including approximately
9,000 civil servants, started in 1994 and was ﬁnalized by
1999.
Theseeventssetinaperiodofgreatexpectations,notleast
for the real estate sector. Plans were hatched to redevelop
the center of Berlin, many areas of which had been largely
untouched since their destruction in 1945, and house prices
started rising much more quickly than they had done in the
years before. The boom from 1989 to 1994 fueled construc-
tion activity in Berlin, suggesting the exercise of develop-
ment options: about 140,000 housing units were added to
the housing stock from 1992 to 2002, which is a net growth
of8 percent of the totalstock.
But, soon after the shocks of the early nineties, Berlin’s
population started falling and its economy started stalling.
While it was still a walled city, West Berlin received dispro-
portionate transfers from the West German federal govern-
ment, ultimately aimed at sustaining the city’s population
levels. After1995,thesesubsidiesweregraduallyphasedout.
From 1992 through 2002 the number of Berliners holding
any kind of job declined by 6 percent (Destatis, 2009). The
number of total hours worked decreased at a faster rate, in-
dicating that full-time jobs vanished even more rapidly. De-
54CHAPTER 2. REAL OPTIONS AND PRICE VOLATILITY
spite the inﬂux of government employees, Berlin’s popula-
tionnumbersstartedtodeclineslightlyin1994,andthende-
clinedmore rapidly eachyearuntil 2001.16
2.3.2 The Dataset
Micro-dataforhousingtransactionsarediﬃculttoobtainin
Germany, as house sales are treated as private information.
Every transaction of land or buildings, however, needs to be
certiﬁed by a notary, who sends the title deed to the local
land register. A copy of each contract is forwarded to local
‘committees for land price valuation’ (Gutachterausschuss
für Grundstückswerte). These independent expert panels
maintain transaction databases and disseminate aggregated
information on price trends for land and buildings. In addi-
tion, they oﬀer plot-speciﬁc appraisals for the government,
the mortgage industryand privateparties.
Thirdpartiesarenotgrantedaccesstothesedatabasesdue
to strict privacy laws. Moreover, the databases exist on local
levelonly. Thecommitteesforlandpricevaluationareruled
by state law, which varies slightly in the degree of privacy
protection across Germany. For the state of Berlin, universi-
tiesareallowedtoanalyzethedataaslongasnoinformation
can be traced backtosingle transactions.17
16ArecentpaperbyGlaeserandGyourko(2005)showshowthecombination
of population decline and a durable housing supply is likely to cause sub-
stantial decline in house prices and new construction. Here, we associate
the Big Bang eventswith the creation and destruction of option value.
17Schulzetal. (2003)andSchulzandWerwatz(2004)aretheonlypaperswe
We got access to a database including all transactions of
single-familyhomesforWestBerlinfrom1978through1989
and for the united Berlin from 1990 through 2007. All
recordsincludethesalespriceanddate,theaddress,andkey
hedonics.
Our single-family dwellings data set comprises of 37,276
transactionsbetween1978and2007.18 Thedatabasecontains
measures of the building’s interior ﬂoor space and the size




teriorsizes below20 m  orabove500m .19
The database contains two additional hedonic variables:
1) replacement value and 2) maximum ﬂoor space allowed
by zoning. The former provides us with a proxy for build-
ing age and condition. The structure’s replacement value is
estimated by a professional appraiser during an external in-
spection conducted at the time the sale is entered into the
knowof that use (subsets of) these data.
18ForacityofthesizeofBerlin,thisnumberoftransactionsseemsverylow,
especially for a 30-year period. It can be explained by the fact that only
12percentofhomesinBerlinareowner-occupied,whichisthelowestlevel
amongGermanstates. Furthermore,thegreatmajorityofhomesinBerlin
is multifamily rather than single family.
19We could link several exceptionally large buildings to new embassies, or-
ganizational buildings, or other non-residential uses being established in
residential areas. Other extremely small or large outliers are probably
recordingerrors.
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database. The replacement value (adjusted with the con-
sumer price index to the year 2000) is not only missing for
incomplete records but for all sales of naked land that is
zonedforresidentialuse,butnotdevelopedyet. Thesetrans-
actionsalsoincludelandwithtemporarilydeviatinguseslike
ad-hocparking lots. Weexclude3,369 observationsthatlack
replacementvalue.
ThedataitemthatmakestheBerlinhousingdatauniqueis
the information regarding the upper ceiling of developable
ﬂoor space allowed under the zoning at the time of transac-
tion. Thisisthecrucialdataitemneededtoassessthemagni-
tude of the redevelopment option. Under the German zon-
ing regime, the upper ceiling is expressed as a ratio of the
total interior space allowed, divided by the lot size. This
means that the development potential is a direct function of
the space realized, the size of the land, and the zoning ra-
tio. Even for neighborhoods where the zoning ratio is uni-
form, we have a substantial amount of variation, since lot
sizesinBerlinarenotstandardized. Thatmeansweestimate
themagnitudeoftheredevelopmentoptionwithsomenoise.
Based on the ratio of maximum interior area allowed by
zoning divided by the current interior ﬂoor space, we cal-
culate the unrealized space potential at the dwelling level.
A quarter of our sample has a development potential ratio
of one, which means that they are fully developed. We ob-
serve substantial variation of development potential within
andacrossneighborhoods. IntheDahlemarea,forinstance,
homeshavebeendevelopedtoonaverageof81percentofthe
theoretical upper boundary, while those in Reinickendorf
haveonly43percentofthetheoreticalmaximumdeveloped.
Before 1985, only a third of all records report the infor-






2.4.1 Controlling for Location
The quality of a location and our measure of space potential
are interlinked. Better-located properties are likely to be re-
developedﬁrst,implyingthatoptionvalueiscorrelatedwith
location value. At the other end of the spectrum, very high
levels of development potential lose their economic mean-
ing as zoning limits the development potential from a legal
point of view only. In areas with lenient zoning and low at-
tractivenesstheoptiontoaddspacetothebuildingwillbefar
out of the money while similar redevelopment possibilities
inaprosperingneighborhoodwillcarryvalue. Thus,itisnot
suﬃcient to simply use our zoning variable to measure the
amount of development potential, the  n
i     
i term in equa-
20t-tests show that the reporting of this variable is not conditional on the
valueof anyof the other hedonic variables.
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tion (2.5).
Our empirical strategy to control for location is ﬁrst to
matchsalesoffullydevelopedpropertieswithsalesofneigh-
boringpropertiesthatmayormaynotbefullydeveloped. We
focus on areas where our measure of development potential
has economic meaning by identifying homes that are built
on relatively large lots that have been fully developed. For
these dwellings we believe that zoning is the limiting fac-
tor to redevelopment, rather than economic considerations
like location quality or the state of the local housing market.
Therefore, the redevelopment option may be in-the-money
for transactions near sales of fully developed properties and
within the same time period.
Technically,weselectallfullydevelopedpropertiesonlots
with sizes above the median lot size and pair them with all
transactions within a circle with a half mile (804 m) radius21
thatoccurredinthesame3-yearband(1978-1980,1981-1983,
…, 2005-2007) as the reference point. Requiring this tem-
poral proximity besides spatial proximity makes our analy-
sis robust to possible changes in Berlin’s spatial equilibrium
caused by the re-uniﬁcation in 1990. We exclude midpoints
that have fewer than 9 comparables in the reference circle
andtimeperiod. Intotal,487fullydevelopedhomesonlarge
lots remain in our sample, augmented with 6,256 compara-
ble transactions. For each of the 487 areas, we deﬁne spa-
tial dummy variables. The comparables are not exclusive, as
21ThissetuptomatchpropertiesbylocationhasalsobeenusedinEichholtz,
Kokand Quigley(2010).
observations can be located in the intersections of the half-
mile-circles. Our strategy of isolating the sales with at least
some development potential and matching them geograph-




West Berlin and its neighborhoods (shaded in light grey).
Eachlocationof a single-familyhome transaction ismarked
by a small black dot. The vast majority of these homes is
located in Berlin’s periphery, while the multi-unit-rental
buildings dominate the city center. The 487 circles are
marked by white dots surrounded by dark grey circles with
a radius of half a mile. Overall, the circles cover 35 of the
49westernneighborhoodsandadequatelyrepresentthege-
ographicdistribution of the full sample.
Finally,wereﬁnethemodelingoflocationwithineachcir-
cle by adding spatial variables such as distances to rivers or
openspace,primaryschoolorkindergarten,publictransport




derived from free GIS maps supplied by the OpenStreetmap
project,23 while the complete list of subway-, railway-, and
22Detailed information on how to use the Google Maps toolbox for geocod-
ingcan be obtainedfrom the authors on request.
23www.openstreetmap.org
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Figure 2.2: Geographic distribution of single-family home transactions in West Berlin.
Notes: The Map shows the boundaries of Berlin and West Berlin’s oﬃcial neighborhood classiﬁcations(shaded in light grey). Each location of a single-family
hometransactionismarkedbyasmallblackdot. ThevastmajorityofthesehomesarelocatedinBerlin’speriphery,whilerentalapartmentbuildingsdominate
in the city center. We match fully developed buildings, which have large lots (represented by white dots) with buildings that are within a half-mile circle
(surrounding dark-greycircles)tocontrolfor the location of the buildings.
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light rail-stations was obtained from the Berlin transporta-
tion authorities. We calculate the fastest route to the center,
which is a combination of the walking time to these public
transport hubs and the subsequent commuting time to the
center. We look up the commuting time on a Monday morn-
ing to Berlin central station for each of the public transport
stations in the 2009 transportation schedules.24 The school
administration’s oﬃcial address list reveals the location of
allofprimaryschoolsandkindergartens. Inaddition,wede-
ﬁnedummyvariablesforthedistancestothe(formerly)for-
tiﬁed East-West border (Berlin Wall and Brandenburg bor-
der).
2.4.2 Comparing Fully Developed to High Op-
tion Value Sales, Same Neighborhood
Fullydevelopedsalesaccountfor26.3percentofoursample.
For these sales the option to add space has no value because
zoningprohibitsadditionalspace. Wedeﬁnedhighdevelop-
mentpotentialastheupper26 3rd percentileofthedistribu-
tion of development potential. It is these properties where
we expect value to be increased most by the presence of the
option after controlling for hedonic characteristics: lot area,
24The new central station is located in what can be considered the center
of the united Berlin, close to government quarters and parliament. It is
Berlin’s central transportation hub. During the Cold War, Berlin Zoo sta-
tionservedasinterimmainstation. Itisabout4train-minuteswestofthe
newcenter.
interiorﬂoor space and replacementvalue.
Table2.1presentsthesummarystatisticsoftheﬁnalsam-
ple, the subsample of matched dwellings in the half-mile
circles, and the subsamples of high, low, and no option
value dwellings. Average transaction values for single-
family homes, at 2007 prices, were roughly between EUR
350,000 and EUR 375,000. When comparing the matched
sample with the full sample, one can see that dwellings in
the matched subsample have higher selling prices, larger lot
sizesand a somewhathigher replacementvalue.
Next, we compare the descriptive statistics for high op-
tionvaluepropertiestothoseforfullydevelopedproperties.
The average sales prices (in 2007 Euros) for the high option
value sample are almost identical. By construction, the high
option value sales are on larger lots and have less interior
area. Not surprisingly, they have lower replacement value;
the magnitude of the diﬀerence suggests that building age
anddepreciation are captured byreplacementvalue.25
The location variables suggest that the half-mile radius
circles successfully control for neighborhood. For exam-
ple, both types of property are, on average, about 25 min-
utes from the city center by train (excluding the commut-
ing time from the home to the nearest train station). More-
over, the standard deviation of this time is very similar.
Likewise, comparisons of distance to water and distance to
greenspacedonotshowastatisticallysigniﬁcantdiﬀerence.
25Maintenance will be optimally reduced for properties approaching the
trigger point for redevelopment.
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About12percentofdwellingsinbothsubsamplesarelocated
within 200 meters of a railroad track and each has 6-7 per-
cent of dwellings located within 200 meters of the former
border (e.g., the Wall) between East and West Berlin. This
suggests that we have adequately matched the locations of
the twotypesof property.
2.4.3 Regression model
In order to empirically investigate the eﬀect of option value
onthevalueofexistingdwellingsweproposeanempirically
testableform of equation (2.5):
ln  i        BhXi   BsSi   ByYi
  f           h          D ln  i          ϵi
(2.6)
where   indexes properties sold at time  ; the time subscript
is suppressed to emphasize the essential cross-sectional na-
ture of the regression.26 The vector of quality hedonics is
givenbyXi;location(distancesandneighborhooddummies)
are represented by the vector Si and time dummies by the
vectorYi. WeallowforthenonlinearityillustratedbyFigure
2.1withtwodummyvariables:         isoneifln i iszero,
otherwise zero;        is one for the sales with relatively
high values for ln i (e.g., upper 25th percentile), otherwise
26The empirical estimates shift coeﬃcients over time to allow option value
tovary.
zero.27 The coeﬃcients on ln i can now be interpreted as
theelasticityofhousepricewithrespecttodevelopmentpo-
tential. The coeﬃcient before the interaction of ln i and
       canbeinterpretedasameasureofcurvature,asthe
priceelasticityforoptionvalueisallowedtochangeforhigh
option value observations. ϵi is a noise term. Concerns over
potential correlations between ϵi and omitted location vari-
ables are addressed by pairing high option value properties
withneighboringfullydevelopedproperties,asexplainedin
theprevioussection.
Equation (2.6) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). We further control for location in all regressions by
calculating Huber-White robust standard errors with clus-
teringfor eachof the 487neighborhoods.28
2.5 Results
In order to test H1 and H3, we need to split our full 30-year
sample into sub-periods based on housing market circum-
stances. We base these sub-periods on house price changes,
so to demarcate the sub-periods we need to a house price
27The log linear transformation given by equation (2.6) is highly robust
whereasamaximumlikelihoodestimationofthenonlinearformofequa-




vide enough variation toobviatethe need for bootstrap methods.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics comparing matched sample with complete sample
Fullsample Matchedsample NoOV LowOV HighOV
Price (inﬂated to 2007 EUR) 345 (211) 377 (247) 365 (195) 392 (241) 364 (299)
Lot size (  ) 515 (269) 572 (280) 383 (184) 569 (232) 767 (304)
Interior ﬂoor space (  ) 146 (53) 155 (59) 167 (68) 162 (56) 128 (47)
Replacement value (2007 EUR) 153 (121) 164 (136) 218 (124) 171 (125) 96 (139)
Dist. to water ( ) 2963 (1757) 2860 (1637) 2856 (1789) 2926 (1614) 2747 (1510)
Dist. to green space ( ) 1734 (1477) 1504 (1298) 1500 (1284) 1514 (1320) 1490 (1269)
Dist. to kindergarten ( ) 583 (396) 593 (378) 594 (396) 595 (375) 590 (364)
Dist. to primary school ( ) 650 (330) 652 (336) 683 (363) 637 (329) 650 (316)
Dist. to transportation hub ( ) 1392 (1239) 1730 (1630) 1866 (1681) 1723 (1652) 1607 (1526)
Minutes to center from hub 26 (8) 26 (8) 26 (8) 26 (8) 27 (9)
Rail tracks        0.10 (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34)
Border        0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
D fully developed 0.23 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
D high OV 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
ln(Development potential) 0.38 (0.38) 0.36 (0.37) 0 (0) 0.27 (0.16) 0.87 (0.25)
N 19825 6723 1767 3189 1767
Notes: Means and standard deviations(in brackets). D high OVis deﬁned 1 for all observationswith developmentpotential       and0 otherwise.
index of Berlin. Before presenting the regression results of
equation (2.6), weﬁrst providethis index.
2.5.1 Berlin House Price Index
Based on our data set of single-family homes we estimate
a standard hedonic price index spanning the years 1978
through 2007.29 We estimate time dummy coeﬃcients for a
standardhedonicfunctionalformwithnooptionvaluevari-
29OursistheﬁrstWestBerlinconstantqualityindexbasedonastandardhe-
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perienced roughly three phases for the 30 years covered by
the index. The ﬁrst period, between 1978 and 1989, can be
characterized by steady growth. The average nominal house
priceincreaseoverthistimeperiodwas5percentperannum.
In real terms,the annual growthratewas 1.9 percent.
The great expectations in the aftermath of the fall of the
Wall fueled price increases, peaking in 1994 with nominal
prices being 47 percent above 1989 values. The average an-
nualpriceincreaseforthisperiodwas8.1percentinnominal
terms,and 4.6percent in real terms.
In1995,housepricesdecreasedslightlyfollowedbyamuch
larger drop in 1996. In 2007, house prices were back at 1989
levels–innominalterms. Inrealterms,however,priceshad
plummeted to 55 percent of their 1994 values, and 84 per-
centoftheir1978values. Theaveragepricefallbetween1994
and 2007 was 2.3 percent per annum in nominal terms and
2.9percentinrealterms. Thesluggishperformanceofthelo-
caleconomy,adversedemographictrendsandthefadingout
of the Berlin subsidies, combined with low growth for Ger-
manhousepricesingeneral(LindenthalandEichholtz,2010)
arelikelyreasonsforthedisappointingpriceperformancein
the Berlin housing marketafter1994.


















Single family homes (nominal)  Single family homes (real)  CPI 
Notes: Hedonic indices for single-family homes were estimated based on a
standard hedonic model with annual time dummies. The CPI index is pro-
vided by the German central bank (available online at Hedonic indices for
single-family homes were estimated based on a standard hedonic model
with annual time dummies. The CPI index is provided by the German cen-
tral bank (available online at http://bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_
zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&tr=UJFB99).
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Testing the Static Option Value Model
We ﬁrst analyze redevelopment option value for the full
sampleperiod,usingtheregressionmodelgivenbyequation
(2.6). Regressions1a,2aand3aexcludedistancevariables,re-
lying on our matching of fully developed sales (ln i    )
with less developed (ln i    ) sales within half a mile to
control for omitted location variables; moreover, we include
487 location dummies in all regressions. We also estimate
every regression including further variables controlling for
location based on geographic information systems (regres-
sions 1b, 2b, and 3b).
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 2.2 provide the regression
results for the standard hedonic model – i.e., omitting op-
tion value variables. This model captures the cross sectional
variationinBerlinhousepricesratherwell,astheR-squared
is around 0.9. The results are robust to adding the distance
variables as additional controls for location (regression 1b).
Most of these variables are not statistically signiﬁcant, sug-
gestingthatthe487neighborhoodsdoagoodjobofcontrol-
ling location. Within these neighborhoods, value is signif-
icantly reduced by increased distance to the nearest public
transitstation. Valueincreaseswithlongercommutingtime
to the center of Berlin reﬂecting Berlin’s industrial origins
with factories and working class quarters in the center and
higher quality buildings for the better oﬀ in the green belt
around it.
Next, we introduce option value into the model by the log
of the variable   measuring development potential. Again,
we use a speciﬁcation with hedonics alone and one that
also includes location eﬀects. As before, time and spatial
dummies are included in both setups. We have adequately
captured option value only if estimates are non-negative
(hypothesis H1). The results presented in columns 2a and
2b show that we cannot reject H1: the estimated elastic-
ity of house value with respect to development potential is
16.0 percent for the model with hedonics only, and 15.3 per-
cent for the full hedonic model, both signiﬁcant at the 1 per-
centlevel.
Moreover, the introduction of the redevelopment option
intothemodelleadstoaneconomicallyandstatisticallysig-
niﬁcant change in the coeﬃcients for lot size and interior
space.30 The coeﬃcient for lot size decreases by just over
25 percent, while that for interior space increases by about
50 percent. The eﬀects of the other variables do not change
markedly. The directions of these changes are predicted by
standard omitted variables analysis: option value increases
with lot size and decreases with interior space, and option
valueisnecessarilynon-negative. Thisimpliestheomission
of option value from the standard hedonic will cause the co-
30Rosen’s (1974) theory implies that hedonic coeﬃcients represent implicit
market prices. Our model separates option value from the present value
of rent from existing characteristics. This implies that the coeﬃcients for
hedoniccharacteristicsinourmodelmeasuretheimplicitvalueoftheﬂow
of rents, whereas those in the standard hedonic model (results in column
1a,Table2.2)representsomecombinationofrentalvalueandthevalueof
the option.
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Table 2.2: Regression coeﬃcients for static regressions
ln(price) Model
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
ln(lot size)                                                                                                
ln(interior space)                                                                                                
ln(replacement value)                                                                                                
Logarithmofdistanceto…
Green space                                                
Water                                             
Kindergarten                                             
Primary school                                           
Publ. transport hub                                                   
Minutes hub to center                                                
Border                                                     
Rail tracks                                                    
ln(dev. potential)                                                             
ln(dev. pot.)D high dev. pot.                                
D fully developed                                
D high dev. pot.                                  
Neighborhoods            
Time dummies            
Constant                                                                                                      
R-squared                                    
Notes:             ,            ,          . Robust standard errors (clustered for each of 487 neighborhoods) in parentheses, N=6688. Years covered:
1978-2007. Thenaturallogarithmofsalesprices(inﬂatedto2007Euros)isregressedagainstasetofhedonics(lotsize,interiorﬂoorspace,replacementvalue
of building) and variables describing the real option to extend the building. Development potential is deﬁned as the ratio of maximum home size allowed
undercurrentzoningdividedbycurrentsize. Timeandneighborhoodeﬀectsarecontrolledforbyspatial(i.e.,neighborhood)andtemporaldummies. Fully
developed sales with lot size greaterthan the median (523square meters)are matchedwith sales within half a mile toconstruct the 487neighborhoods.
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eﬃcientoflotsize(interiorarea)tobebiasedupward(down-
ward).
We subsequently investigate the eﬀect of option value by
introducing dummies for dwellings with high development
potential (       ) and with zero development potential
(       ),andbyincludinganinteractiontermofthedevel-
opmentpotentialwiththedummyforhighdevelopmentpo-
tential. The coeﬃcients for these variables allow for curva-
tureoftheoptionvaluewithrespecttothedevelopmentpo-
tential illustrated by Figure 2.1. The results are provided in
columns3aand3bofTable2.2. Thecurvaturewithrespectto
the development potential axis is as predicted by Figure 2.1
and H2. The results show that the elasticity of house value
with respect to development potential is about 23.5 percent
(= .045 + .190) for the 1,767 sales with the highest develop-
ment potential. These are the smaller structures on large
lotsinneighborhoodswheretheoptionislikelytobein-the-
money. The statistically signiﬁcant 2.8 percent premium for
fullydevelopedpropertiescontrolsforaresiduallocationef-
fect: betterlocatedpropertiesarelikelytobedevelopedﬁrst.
The signiﬁcant 9.4 percent discount on the high option
value dummy does not mean that high option value homes
carry a discount. This negative intercept is more than oﬀset
by the larger coeﬃcient for ln(development potential). Multi-
plythiscoeﬃcientestimate(0.19+0.045)withtheminimum
value for ln(development potential) for high option value sales
(0.58)toget0.11andadd-0.093. Inotherwords,thehighop-
tion value properties start at a value of 4.4 percent in addi-
tiontopropertyvalueandincreasetoamean(75thpercentile)
of 10.0 (14.7) percent. The sale with the largest option value
has80.4percentofpropertyvalueintheredevelopmentop-
tion.
2.5.2 Option Value During the Boom and Bust
Years
The two pronounced phases of boom and bust evident in
the graph of Berlin house prices depicted in Figure 2.2 pro-
vide for a natural experiment. We expect substantial option
valuetobecreatedduringtheboomyears,whilemuchofthis
shoulddissipateduring the subsequent bust.
Totestwhetheroptionvaluedoesindeedgoupintheboom
and down in the bust, we estimate a hedonic model in which
we approximate the boom period with a dummy variable
for the six years from 1990 through 1995, and the bust with
a dummy for the years from 1996 through 2007. The left
out time period is the “quiet” period preceding the Big Bang
events: the period from 1978through 1989.
The basic setup of this model includes hedonic variables,
dummies for the boom and bust years and spatial dummies.
The results are presented in Table 2.3, model 1. House value




tobust of about 16 percent is statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 2.3: Regression coeﬃcients for time-varying option value models
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ln(lot size)                                                                           
ln(int. space)                                                                           
ln(replacement value)                                                                           
period = boom (1990-1995)                                                                           
period = bust (1996-2007)                                                                                
ln(dev. potential)              
|  quiet                                             
|  boom                                             
|  bust                                     
ln(dev. potential ratio)  D high dev. potential
|  quiet                                             
|  boom                                             
|  bust                                            
D high dev. potential                                
|  quiet                
|  boom                
|  bust              
D fully developed                              
|  quiet             
|  boom              
|  bust              
Constant                                                                                
R-squared                              
Notes:            ,           ,          . Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=6688. The natural logarithm of sales prices (inﬂated to 2007 Euros) is
regressedagainstasetofhedonicsandvariablesdescribingtherealoptiontoextendthebuilding. Developmentpotentialisdeﬁnedastheratioofmaximum
home size allowed under current zoning divided by current size. Under model speciﬁcations 5-8, the option value coeﬃcient is allowed to change across
threetime periods: build-up(1978-1989),boom (1990-1995) and bust (1996-2007). Neighborhood eﬀects are controlledfor byspatial dummies.
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To investigate the eﬀect of option value on long-term
house price movements – and to test H3 – model 2 includes
development potential in the regression, and it is interacted
with the market phase dummies. The results show that
we cannot reject H3: redevelopment potential has a signiﬁ-
cantlypositiveeﬀectonvalueintherelativelyquietﬁrstpe-
riod, and this eﬀect goes up during the boom – but the dif-
ference is not signiﬁcant. During the boom, the elasticity of
house value with respect to development potential is 0.272,
even exceeding the elasticity on the high option value prop-
erties in the static regressions (Table 2.2, models 3a and 3b).
As predicted by the theoretical model, the redevelopment
option elasticity shows a statistically signiﬁcant decline of
more than 0.15 in the subsequent bust.31 During the bust
the elasticity was roughly half what it was during the quiet
period, indicating a very substantial decline in option value
overthe marketcycle.
To check for robustness of the results, we try a number
of alternative speciﬁcations of the model with the time-
dependent redevelopment option. First, we investigate the
eﬀect of the redevelopment option by only letting the re-
development option for dwellings with high redevelopment
potential be time-dependent, keeping the other measures of
option value constant. The results, model 3 of Table 2.3, do
not materiallydiﬀer from model2.
Models4and5testhypothesesH2andH3simultaneously
31Note that the introduction of the redevelopment option has an eﬀect on
the coeﬃcients for lot size and interiorspace similar tothe static model.
by shifting the elasticity with the dummy for high develop-
mentpotentialandallowingallelasticitycoeﬃcientstoshift
over the three sub-periods. Again, H2 and H3 cannot be re-
jected: the coeﬃcients on the interaction term in all three
periodsaresigniﬁcantlypositive. Inbothspeciﬁcations,the
coeﬃcient for option value in the boom is statistically and
economically signiﬁcant, but the diﬀerence with the coeﬃ-
cient for the quiet period is not statistically signiﬁcant. For
the bust, we do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative dif-
ference with the preceding periods. For high option value
properties, the elasticity is over .47 (.14 plus .33) during the
boom; it declines by two thirds, to .15 during the bust; in-
terestingly, high option value properties retain a signiﬁcant
positiveelasticityevenduringthebust. Forlowoptionvalue
properties the elasticity of .14 goes to zero during the bust
phase.32
Table2.4convertstheelasticityestimatesinTable2.3into
the amount of option value over time for low and for high
option value sales.33 Table 2.3 suggests that the share of
32Adding the high development potential dummy conﬁrms H1 since the
minimum (25th percentile) of ln    for these properties is .58 (.68). This
implies that option value as a percentage of property value is a minimum
of 6 percent during quiet and boom periods and 3.7 percent during the
bust. Forthe25th percentilepropertythesenumbersareabout10percent
and 5 percent. Note that fully developed properties have a 3 percent pre-
mium during all phasesof the cycle.
33Thisisdonebymultiplyingthepointestimatesofelasticitiesbytheappro-
priate mean values of the development potential variable (Table 2.1): 0.27
for the 3189 mid range sales and 0.87 for the 1767 high option value sales.
Thenthecoeﬃcientontheappropriatedummyforhighdevelopmentpo-
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option value in transaction prices increased by between 15
and 20 percent during the boom for both low and high op-
tionvalueproperties. Duringthebust,optionvaluedropped
to less than half of its pre-boom percentage for high op-
tionvalue properties, and the 4 percent option premiumfor
properties with low development potential disappears. The
relativemagnitudeofthechangewasuniformacrossthelow
andhighoptionvaluesegments,anditisrobustacrossmodel
speciﬁcations 3 through 5.
Translating these relative numbers into Euro amounts vi-
sualizes the economic magnitude of the real option compo-
nentinhomevalues. Modelspeciﬁcations3through5imply
that the option to add more space to the building is worth
up to EUR 98,000 for high option value sales during the
boom. Due to the high elasticity of property value with re-
specttodevelopmentpotential,andtheincreaseinthiselas-
ticity during the boom, roughly 40 percent of the change in
house value from the quiet period was due to change in op-
tionvalue. Duringthebust,about50percentofthedeclinein
valuewasduetochangesinoptionvalue. Turningtoproper-
ties with low option value (nearly half of the sales we exam-
ined) option value also seems to contribute to the volatility
ofhouseprices. Thisisespeciallytrueduringthebust,when
about 12 percent of the decline in value is due to change in
option value.
tential is added: the exponent of the result is option value as a percentage
of property value.
2.5.3 Generality of Results
We control for location factors by pairing fully developed
sales with nearby sales of those with some development po-
tential. Speciﬁcally, we selected a sample of 6,723 sales from
the full sample of 19,825. This is the 35 percent of sales on
lotsabovemedianforthefullsampleandwithatleast9sales
within a half-mile ring of the fully developed sales. The re-
sulting sample has sales in 35 of West Berlin’s 47 neighbor-
hoods as deﬁned by the government.34 We calculate that
68percentofallsingle-familyhomesinthefullsamplehave
atleast10percentdevelopmentpotential. Forhomeswithlot
sizes bigger than the median, the share increases to 90 per-
cent. With more than two thirds of all buildings sold being
subject to changes in embedded real option value, our re-
sults can be generalized to Berlin’s market for single family
homes.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the eﬀects of the redevelopment op-
tiononthevalueofexistingdwellings,basedonatheoretical
model showing that option value is additive to the use value
of the existing characteristic vector. In our hedonic model,
implicit market prices measure the value of rents from ex-
isting property characteristics, while additionally, a market
34The 47 government neighborhoods cover all of West Berlin; they are not
overlapping. See Figure 2.2 for a map.
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Table 2.4: Share of option value in total home value in boom and bust period
Model Model
2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
Shareofdevelopmentoptionvalueintotalvalueofhome Changeinvalueofdev. optioninabsoluteterms(2007EUR)
LowOV LowOV
quiet 6.1% 1.6% 3.6% 3.5% quiet to boom 11,129 1,293 5,649 4,756
Boom 7.6% 1.6% 4.2% 4.0% boom to bust -22,787 -2,237 -17,777 -15,991
Bust 3.2% 1.6% 0.0% 0.2%
HighOV HighOV
Quiet 21.1% 17.3% 18.6% 18.3% quiet to boom 40,171 32,379 35,050 30,084
Boom 26.7% 21.7% 23.5% 22.0% boom to bust -81,331 -65,896 -77,120 -68,544
Bust 10.8% 8.9% 7.5% 8.4%
Valueofdev. option(inEurosinﬂatedto2007values) Changeinvalueofdev. option/changeintotalhomevalue
LowOV LowOV
quiet 20,777 5,545 12,128 11,843 quiet to boom 14.1% 1.6% 7.1% 6.0%
Boom 31,907 6,838 17,777 40,345 boom to bust 16.6% 1.6% 13.0% 11.7%
Bust 9,119 4,601 0 609
HighOV HighOV
Quiet 71,615 58,576 63,297 62,035 quiet to boom 50.7% 40.9% 44.3% 38.0%
Boom 111,787 90,955 98,347 92,119 boom to bust 102.7% 48.1% 56.3% 50.0%
Bust 30,456 25,059 21,227 23,575
Notes: : All calculations are based on coeﬃcients from Table 2.3. As an example of percentages consider high OV during the quiet period, 18.3 % =
exp((.127+.259)*0.87 -0.168), where 0.87 is the mean value for ln    from Table 2.1. To convert the percentages into Euros, we used the median transaction
pricesforeachphaseinoursample: Forthebuild-upperiod,themedianpricewasEUR339,500,fortheboomphaseEUR418,700andforthebustphaseEUR
281,700.
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premium is paid for the option to tear down and replace, or
substantially redevelop, the existing property. Theory im-
plies that any redevelopment option value is a function of




by ﬁnding fully developed properties on lots above median
size. The presence of neighboring properties with unreal-
ized development potential establishes the possibility of in-
the-money option value after controlling for location. The
eﬀect of option value on property value is expected to be




ning the years 1978 through 2007 allows us to analyze the
eﬀects of the redevelopment option over diﬀerent phases in
the housing market cycle. The main prediction of theory is
conﬁrmed: the elasticity of house value with respect to de-
velopment potential is 15 percent on average over our full
sample period; for high development potential homes, the
elasticity increases to23percent.
The time period covered in the dataset includes Berlin’s
Big Bang, which coincided with a boom in house prices,
followed by a prolonged bust. The constant quality house
priceindexpresentedinthispapershowsthataveragehouse
pricesfelleveryyearinthe10yearsafter1994,losing45per-
cent in real terms from their peak. For high option value
homes, about 40 percent of the price increase during the
boom years can be explained by the change in the value of
the redevelopment option, while about 50 percent of the of
thesubsequentfallinpricescanbeattributedtoreductionin
option value. For low option value homes, the eﬀects on the
real estate cycle are less pronounced but still economically
signiﬁcant. These results generalize to about 75 percent of
West Berlin neighborhoods by geography and to 68 percent
ofall sales.
Our results support our re-interpretation of coeﬃcients
from standard hedonic models. When an appropriate op-
tion value variable is included in the regression, the coeﬃ-
cients on hedonic variables should be interpreted as the im-
plicit market value of rental income. When the option value
variable is excluded, these coeﬃcients include the eﬀects of
additiveoptionvalue. Thediﬀerenceisverylargeinourem-
pirical ﬁndings: the coeﬃcient on the log of lot size (log of
interior area) is about 25 percent lower (50 percent higher)
when the development potential variable is included in the
regression.
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Appendix A: Derivation of
Hedonic Model with Option Value
The model setup and deﬁnitions of terms are given by equa-
tion (2.1). Simplify by noting that the integrals from   to in-
ﬁnity can be restated as the integrals from 0 to inﬁnity dis-
countedbacktothe present:
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notation. Moreover,assumingzerodepreciation,     gives
the simplest possible closed form solution, as can be seen by
examiningequation(2.7). Thiscaseisparticularlyrelevantin
West Berlin, where our data do not contain property age or
any other way to separately identify depreciation. The max-
imization problemthen simpliﬁesto:
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Thisis a special case of equation (2.3) in the text.
Theﬁrstordercondition(FOC)forchoosingTtomaximize
equation(2.8) is:35
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At the time of redevelopment       , equation (2.9) im-
plies that the net increase in value is a multiple of cost be-
causethe option todelayhas value.
The second order condition evaluated at        is      
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Substitute into equation (2.8) given        to derive the
solutiongivenin the textas equation (2.5):
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GeneralizationtoaWienerprocessforrents
The additive functional form given by equation (2.11) sur-
vivestheintroductionofastochasticprocessforrents. Sim-
plify by reducing the vector of hedonic characteristics to a
35In the following, we maximize under the assumption that        : i.e
at time       parameters are such that the value gap   n
i     
i   is rising
towardsa trigger point where equation (2.9) holds.
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scalar,  
i,whichimpliesthatrent, isalsoascalar. Consider
an Itoprocess for the rent:
  
 
            (2.12)
where the rate of drift per unit time,   is   and   scales the
variance of a standard Wienerprocess,  .
Given these simplifying assumptions and the stochastic
process in equation (2.12), Clapp, Jou and Lee (2009) derive
the following solution where the new aggregate level of the
hedonic vector n
i , is chosenoptimally:
 i      
i      
i B1 ϵi                            
(2.13)
The i parametersarefunctionsofthecurrentlevelofprice,
the constant rate of interest  , the rate of depreciation  ,
the parameters of equation (2.12) and parameters of the cost
function.
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18 years after Mankiw and Weil started a short-lived but in-
tense debate on how demographics drive the demand for
housing,empiricalevidenceisstillnotconclusive,especially
in an international context. Demographic change, however,
is one of the key challenges many industrialized countries
willfaceinthefuture. Togiveabriefexample,theUnitedNa-
tions Population Division (2007) estimates that Russia will
lose 24 percent of its current population by the year 2050.
For Bulgaria, the expected decline in total population is 35
percent in the same period, while neighboring Turkey will
experience an impressive population growth of 29 percent.
On a regional level, population changes are even more pro-
nounced. The German federal state of Thuringia, for exam-
ple, is already losing 1 percent of its population annually
(Thüringer Landesamt für Statistik, 2008). Beside the rapid
changesintotalpopulationsnumbers,societieswillagedra-
matically. InSouthKorea,forinstance,themedianageisin-
creasing three years every ﬁve years and the share of inhab-
itants older than 60 years will increase from 14 percent now
to 42 percent in 2050. International demographic dynamics
dwarfthe so-called babybust in the UnitedStates.
Giventhefundamentaldemographicchangecurrentlyun-
derway, it is surprising how few studies have researched theCHAPTER 3. DEMOGRAPHICS AND HOUSING DEMAND
eﬀect of demographics on housing markets in Europe and
Asia. For Japan, Ohtake and Shintani (1996) ﬁnd that de-
mographic change has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on housing prices
through the short-run adjustment process in the hous-
ing market. Ermisch (1996) establishes a link between age
(among other demographic variables) and the level of hous-
ing services demanded in six British agglomerations. Lindh
and Malmberg (1999) show that the population’s age struc-
ture is related to residential construction in Sweden and
other OECD countries. Lee et al. (2001) ﬁnd evidence that
demographicsdoexplaintheamountofhousingservicesde-
manded in Austria. Neuteboom and Brounen (2007) predict




demand for housing to be very low for residents younger
than 20 years, to shoot up for 20-35 years-olds, and to de-
clineconstantlythereafter. Furthermore,theycreatedatime
series of housing demand by combining the cross-sectional
resultsontheage-speciﬁcquantityofhousingdemandwith
time series data on the age composition of the population.
Regressing this demand time series against the aggregated
housing quantity (represented by the net stock of residen-
tial capital) revealed no signiﬁcant dependency. Real house
prices,however,werefoundtodependondemandasdeﬁned
by their model. Mankiw and Weil concluded that the ageing
baby-boom generation’s move out of the high-demand age-
classes would drive total demand down and result in a sharp
dropin house prices.
Criticism of this paper came from many directions: Peek
andWilcox(1991)investigatedthemovementsofhouseprice
indices and found that real after-tax interest rates and con-
struction costs were the main determinants of price swings.
Demographic variables like income and age were still sig-
niﬁcant but not as pronounced as suggested by Mankiw and
Weil. Hendershott’s (1991) main point of criticism was the
lack of predictive power of the Mankiw and Weil models for
the 1970s and 1980s, making predictions for the 1990s im-
possible. Inaddition,hecriticizedthenegativetimetrendin
theirbasicequationwhichaccountsformostofthepredicted
declineMankiw and Weilhad explainedbydemographics.
Engelhardt and Poterba (1991) applied the Mankiw and
Weil approach to new data. For Canada, they observed an
age-housingdemandrelationshipsimilartotheoneMankiw
and Weil found for the US. Canadian house prices, however,
werenot determinedbythe deriveddemand variable.
GreenandHendershott’s(1996)paperwasthenextcorner-
stone of the debate. They followed Mankiw and Weil in link-
ingpercapitahousingexpendituresanddemographicinfor-
mation based on cross-sectional data from the 1980 census.
The methodology, however, advanced in two aspects: ﬁrst,
they estimated the real contribution each hedonic charac-
teristic of a dwelling makes to the household’s housing ex-
penditures. This made it possible to control for the quantity
and quality of housing services consumed. Second, they re-
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gressed the marginal prices of each of these hedonic charac-
teristicsagainstthedemographicvariablesofthehousehold.
These innovations allowed the quantity of housing services
consumed (by deﬁning a constant quality house) and all de-
mographic characteristics but age to be kept constant. They
found that demand for housing does not decline with age,
butratherthateducationandincomedeterminethequantity
servicesofhousingconsumed. ThisimpliesthatMankiwand
Weil underestimated the housing services the baby-boom
generationwoulddemandinthefuturebynotcontrollingfor
the fact that younger generations enjoyed a better education
than their predecessors.
This paper extends the work of Green and Hendershott
(1996) in three directions: ﬁrst, we reﬁne the existing
methodology and model the demographic dynamics more
carefully. Weseparatelifecyclevariables,thatchangetheirval-
ues according to the household’s state in the life cycle, from
cohort variables, which do not change with age. Instead of al-
lowingeverydemographicvariabletovary(likeMankiwand
Weil,1989),orkeepingalldemographicsconstant(likeGreen
and Hendershott, 1996) we explicitly consider the change in
the life cycle variables like income or household size over
time. This leads to a more robust projection of housing de-
mand.
Second, a very detailed micro-dataset provides informa-
tion on the hedonic attributes of a representative share of
English residential real estate in combination with exten-
sivedemographicinformationontherespectivehouseholds.
The majority of earlier studies was based on publicly avail-
able census cross-sections. These are easy to analyze, allow
for very large samples, and are very representative. On the
downside, however, census data oﬀers only very basic in-
formation on the physical attributes of the dwellings1. For-
tunately, our data set oﬀers rich information on the physi-
calcharacteristicsofindividualhomes,theirinteriorandex-
terior condition, energy eﬃciency, the local environment,
and the attitudes of the inhabiting households towards their
residence as well as similarly detailed information on the
household’s demographic proﬁle. Overall, more than 900
variables are coded in the data set, of which approximately
two thirds are relating to the dwelling, and one third to the
household.
Third, using English data gives us the opportunity to
analyze an environment diﬀerent from the Unites States.
This international perspective is crucial since demographic
changes in the US are, although important, dwarfed by the
developmentsinEuropeandAsia. TheUnitedStatesarepro-
jected to experience further population growth (albeit at a
lower rate than before) combined with a younger age distri-
butionthan most European countries.
Britain is not expected to have a demographic contrac-
tion like continental European countries, especially in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, but the situation is very distinct
from the US and Canada. The British population growth is
1GreenandHendershott(1996),forinstance,hadtorestricttheiranalysisto
18 hedonic variables of housing quality,including8 regional dummies.
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leveling oﬀ more rapidly and the population’s age structure
is already older than the American. Until 2050, the pro-
jectedgrowthrateinBritishpopulationnumbersislessthan
half the American equivalent2. This makes the UK housing
market a very interesting environment to investigate demo-
graphicimplications.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In the
ﬁrst sections, we present the method and data we use. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results and establishes a link between
demographics and housing demand. Continuing in Section
5, wecombine our results with demographicprojections, al-
lowing for demand forecasts for the next 20 years. A sum-
maryand discussion of the main results ﬁnishes the paper.
3.2 Method
We follow the method ﬁrst proposed by Rosen (1974) and
subsequently reﬁned by Green and Hendershott (1996). The
ﬁrst step is to estimate the relationship between the ﬂow
of housing services and the hedonic characteristics of the
dwelling:
          (1)
where   is the ﬂow of housing services from the dwelling
(rent paid or user costs of housing – for a discussion see the
nextsection),and  isavectorofthehedoniccharacteristics
2TheUnitedNationsprojectthepopulationgrowthfrom2010to2050tobe
11%, while the UnitedStateswill enjoya totalpopulation increase of 27%.
ofthehouse. Then,wetakethederivativeof  andobtainthe
real marginal contribution  i of each hedonic characteristic
tohousing demand:
 i  
  
  i
     (2)
Inthelaststep,themarginalcontributionsobtainedfrom(2)
are regressed against the demographic characteristics of the
household:
 i    i            (3)
where   is a vector of the demographic characteristics of
the household. The household’s age   and income   are
excluded from   and controlled for separately (Green and
Hendershott,1996).
AgainfollowingGreenandHendershott(1996)inselecting
functional forms for (1) and (3), we use the translog function
byChristensenet al. (1975) toestimateequation 1:
           
n ∑
i  





 ij    i     j  ϵ  (1′)
   being the intercept,  i the coeﬃcient of characteristic  ,
and  ij is the coeﬃcient of the characteristics   and   inter-




 i      (4)
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n ∑
i  
 ij      (5)
 ij    ji  (6)
We restrict (1) to be homogeneous of degree one, therefore
the aggregated housing service of a house can be computed
(based on Euler’stheorem) as:
   
n ∑
i  
 i i  (7)
where  i is the amount of characteristic   included in the
house. Taking partial derivatives of (1′) with respect to  i
gives us the hedonic prices i:
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n ∑
j  
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 i
  (2′)
Considering the case when markets are perfect and housing




demographicvariables and on the levelof i:
 i       z i 
   ∑
a  
 a a     y   
   ∑
a  
 ya   a    (3′)
where the  ’s are individual coeﬃcients,  a are dummies
for 14 ﬁve-year age cohorts (starting at age 15), and   is in-
dependently and normally distributed.   is the household’s
incomenetofhousingexpenditures,whilethevector  con-




 ij       z i 
   ∑
a  
 a ja   j  y   
   ∑
a  
 ya j ja  (3′′)
where  j and  j contain the demographic proﬁle of the
householdand its income.
Life-cyclevariableslikethehousehold’ssize,employment
status, physical ﬁtness, and, most importantly, household
income are unlikely to stay constant when households age.
Cohort variables like educational level, gender, and ethnic-
ity will not change in age. Instead of allowing every demo-
graphic variable to vary (like Mankiw and Weil, 1989), or
keeping all demographics constant (like Green and Hender-
shott, 1996) we explicitly model the change in the life cycle
variables like income3 over time, while keeping the cohort
variablesconstant.
Like Campbell et al. (2001), we use income dynamics esti-
matesderivedfromahouseholdpaneltocalibratethemodel.
3HwangandQuigley(2006),inestablishingacausalitybetweenincomeand
housing services consumed, ﬁnd that exogenous increases in aggregated
income drivehouse prices up.
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For the 1991-2001 waves from the British Household Panel
Survey,weestimatea ﬁxed eﬀect model:
          i;t    i  
   ∑
a   
 a  a;i;t
 
   ∑
a   
  ∑
edu  
 a;edu  _    a;edu;i;t    i;t
(8)
where  i is capturing household ﬁxed eﬀects,   a is a
dummyvariableequalto1forhouseholdswithaheadaged 
(and 0 otherwise),   _     are age-education interaction
dummies,   and   are coeﬃcients, and   is independently
and normally distributed.
Furthermore, we assume household size, employment,




Finally, total demand for housing   can be obtained by
summing over the age classes and then the housing charac-
teristics:
   




 a ia  (9)
where a is the share of householdsin age-class .
3.3 Data
This paper builds on data collected for the English Hous-
ing Condition Survey (EHCS). The EHCS is a study under-
taken by the Oﬃce of the Deputy Prime Minister to assess
the condition of the English4 housing stock and to evalu-
ate the eﬀect of housing market policies. A representative
cross-sectionofhouseholdsisinterviewedabouttheirviews
on their home and neighbourhood, their income, and hous-
ing costs, and about demographic details of the household’s
members. Additional information on the interior and exte-
rior condition of the dwelling, its energy eﬃciency, and the
local environment is obtained by a subsequent professional
inspection. Eachdwelling’smarketvalueisestimatedbytwo
professionalappraisorsindependently(OﬃceoftheDeputy
Prime Minister, 2003). From 1971 until 2001, the EHCS was
conducted every ﬁve years. Since April 2002 the EHCS has
beenrunning on a continuous basis5.
For 17,500 dwellings a full interview, physical survey, and
4SimilarstudieshavebeenundertakenforWalesandScotland,butunfortu-
natelythesesurveysarenotentirelyequivalenttotheEHCS.Wewillthere-
fore use English data only.
5The English Housing Condition Survey gradually evolved over time which
makesitdiﬃculttocombinethedatafromdiﬀerentyearsinquasi-panels.
Multiple demographic key variables like the education of the household’s
members or their attitudes towards the dwelling they live in were only in-
troduced in 2001. Our later analysis shows that especially the educational
achievement is crucial in explaining the willingness to pay for housing,
thus we do not consider the pre-2001 cross-sections, which lack this in-
formation.
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market valuation is obtained. Excluding vacant dwellings
leaves us with a sample of 16,749 households covering all
tenuresandregions. TheEHCSisbasedonastratiﬁedsample
with over-sampling of the rented tenures, which otherwise
would be too small a sample to allow for reliable results. As
a consequence of this sampling technique, each observation
must later be weighted with a grossing factor when calcu-
lating aggregated national ﬁgures from this sample (ODPM,
2002).
The rental market for housing is subject to two strong
sources of governmental intervention: ﬁrst, Local Author-
ities (LA) and Registered Social Landlords (RSL) oﬀer rel-
atively inexpensive housing to low- and middle-income
households. Aﬀordability is important, since the median of
theincome6 oftenantsfromRSLorLAdwellingsisonlytwo
We have access to the continuous survey data for 2002, 2003, and 2004.
Again, the number of variables is lower than in 2001. Pooling these years
doesnotcreateadditionalinformation,sinceinterestingdetailswillbelost.
Inaddition,thenumberofobservationsperyearisroughlyhalfthenumber
of 2001, making an analysis based on single years with a large number of
explanatoryvariables impossible.
Overall, demographic changes between 2001 and 2004 are not very pro-
nounced since the period is relatively short. Possible changes in demand
patterns over time will be mainly caused by other factors like the expected
changes in house prices, risk premia, or the cost of housing ﬁnancing. In
sum, we prefer the richness of the 2001 data set over the intersection of
more years.
6Incomeistheannualnetincomeofthehouseholdreferencepersonandany
partner from wages, pensions, savings and social beneﬁts. It does not in-
clude housing related beneﬁts such as council tax beneﬁt, housing beneﬁt,
thirds of the median of income renters in the unregulated
market. Second, a substantial share of low-income house-
holds are eligible for direct housing subsidies, especially the
very young and the old households. Where housing beneﬁts
arepaid, theyamount to85%of all rent paid on average.
For this study, both forms of state intervention cause se-
vere distortions, since we assume that subsidies will shift
demand upwards, and the choice of dwelling characteris-
tics will no longer be solely determined by the household’s
housing preferences and budget. We therefore exclude all
dwellings rented from Local Authorities and Registered So-
cialLandlords,whichfurtherreducesoursampleto9,453ob-
servations. After grossing the remaining observations still
represent80%oftheEnglishhousingstock,accordingtothe
Oﬃceof the Deputy Prime Minister(ODPM, 2002).
Single cross-sections can obviously provide information
for one moment in time only. Disentangling age eﬀects
common to all households from cohort eﬀects is impossible.
When one generation has a relatively strong willingness to
pay for housing services (after controlling for income etc.),
studies based on one cross-section necessarily have to as-
sumethatthefollowinggenerationswillhavethesamepref-
erencewhenreachingthisage. Forecastscanbeinaccuratein
case there are inter-generational diﬀerences in tastes (My-
ers,1999). Thedatathispaperisbasedonallowustoanalyze
one cross-section only, thus our ﬁndings are subject to this
Income Support Mortgage Interest or any payments made under a Mort-
gage PaymentProtectionInsurance policy(ODPM, 2002).
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limitation.
The EHCS classiﬁes dwellings into the following cate-
gories: small terraced houses, large terraced houses, (semi-
)detached houses, bungalows, and ﬂats7. Dwelling types are
relatively similarly distributed in 8 out of 10 regions. (Semi-
)detached houses and bungalows make up the largest share
(54%), followed by terraced houses (29%) and ﬂats (18%). In-
ner and Outer London, however, have a diﬀerent structure,
withlesshouses(67%/35%)andahighershareofapartments
(34%/65%)8.
With respect to the year of construction, all dwellings are
clusteredinto9cohorts9. Largeregionaldiﬀerenceswithre-
spect to the construction time distribution can be observed.
In general, the least attractive construction cohorts ranging
from1850until1964aremoreoftenobservedinthenorthern
regions and London. The South-West has the highest share
of pre-1850 buildings. Our data suggest a natural selection
7A small terraced house is a house forming part of a block where at least one
house is attached to two or more other houses. It has a ﬂoor space up to
70  , in contrast to the medium/large terraced house, which is bigger than
70  . Semi-detachedhousesarehousesthatareattachedtooneotherhouse,
whereas a for a detached house none of the habitable structure is joined to
anotherresidentialbuilding. Bungalowsarehouseswithallofthehabitable





the (inter-)war period 1919-1944, 1945-1964, 1965-1974, 1975-1980, 1981-
1990, and 1991-2001.
process in favor of quality: Buildings erected before 1850 are
on average twice as valuable today as the average value of a
house built after 1850 (Table 3.2). High quality dwellings or
houses at unique locations are more likely to survive, which
will be reﬂected in relatively higher values for the very old
cohorts.
A similar north-south diﬀerence can be observed in our
sample with regard to age. Prices of dwellings in the north-
ernregionsarelessthanhalfthepricesofthoseinthesouth-
ern regions (not correcting for quality). London has a spe-
cialroleagain,withprivateresidentialpropertyvaluesbeing
twiceas high as the national average(Table3.2).
The northern regions display a lower share of owner-
occupied dwellings and a higher share of residential prop-
erty provided by Local Authorities when compared to the
southof the country(London being an exceptionagain).
3.8%ofallhouseholdsinoursampleliveindwellingsthat
failtomeetminimalqualitystandardsandareregarded‘un-
ﬁt’ for housing according to the law10. Again, Inner London
has a special position with twice the national percentage of
unﬁt dwellings, which might be caused by the relatively old
housingstockand lowhome-ownershiprates.
When analyzing the demographic characteristics of
10For a dwelling to be ﬁt under Section 604 of the 1989 Local Govern-
ment and Housing Act it must satisfy criteria related to: disrepair; struc-
turalstability;dampness;lighting,heatingandventilation;watersupply;
drainage; facilities for food preparation; and the presence, location and
functioningof essential utilities (WC, bath/shower,and sink).
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North East 12 17 47 10 13 1 4 10 18 26 17 6 11 7
Yorkshire & Humber 14 16 45 12 12 3 11 9 18 22 14 6 11 5
N. West & Mersey 16 18 45 8 13 2 11 12 20 20 13 5 11 6
E. Midlands 10 12 55 14 8 4 7 7 14 22 16 8 13 8
W. Midlands 15 16 49 7 14 2 7 8 19 25 16 6 11 6
South West 12 15 45 14 13 7 8 7 12 20 15 8 15 7
Eastern 12 12 46 15 15 4 5 5 12 22 19 9 14 9
South East 10 14 48 10 18 3 8 7 13 23 17 8 14 7
Outer London 13 20 32 2 34 0 8 10 39 15 11 4 7 5
Inner London 7 22 5 1 65 1 21 14 15 17 12 5 9 6
England total 13 16 44 10 18 3 9 9 17 22 15 7 12 7
Note: Dwellingtypesarerelativelysimilarlydistributedin8outof10regions. (Semi-)detachedhousesandbungalowsmakeupthelargestshare,followedby
terracedhouses and ﬂats. Inner and OuterLondon, however,havea diﬀerent structure, with less houses and a higher share of apartments.
Largeregionaldiﬀerenceswithrespecttotheagestructureofhousescanbeobserved. Ingeneral,theleastattractiveagecohortsrangingfrom1850until1964
are more oftenobservedin the northern regions and London. TheSouth-Westhas the highest share of pre-1850buildings.
Source: owncalculations based on EHCS data.
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North East 1.04 67 7 21 5 42,774 75,285 79,332 40,079
Yorkshire & H. 2.11 68 10 18 4 48,417 85,245 76,334 58,836
N. West & Mersey 2.79 70 9 14 8 43,952 94,270 84,649 53,722
E. Midlands 1.78 74 9 14 4 52,883 102,856 93,336 38,154
W. Midlands 2.08 71 6 14 8 54,454 105,750 111,789 56,894
South West 2.07 76 10 7 7 84,107 145,635 125,584 72,046
Eastern 2.28 74 9 12 5 96,356 153,136 117,680 76,201
South East 3.33 76 11 7 7 111,728 215,237 159,019 83,024
Outer London 1.83 70 12 11 7 152,590 242,808 211,440 112,374
Inner London 1.15 43 17 28 13 295,674 491,748 217,515 173,685
England (total) 20.46 71 10 13 6 90,996 161,360 125,771 73,640
Notes: Thenorthernregionsdisplayalowershareofowner-occupieddwellingsandahighershareofresidentialpropertyprovidedbyLocalAuthoritieswhen
compared tothe south of the country(London being an exception).
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householdsinoursample,wefollowtheEHCSdeﬁnitionfor
Household Reference Persons (HRP), representing the house-
hold’s social and economic position. The HRP is the person
in whose name the dwelling is owned or rented or who is
otherwise responsible for the accommodation. When two
or more people jointly own or rent the dwelling, the person
with the highest income is takenas HRP (ODPM, 2002).
Educational levels diﬀer signiﬁcantly across age groups
in the sample. More than 50% of all residents aged 65 and
above do not reach the GCSE-level (or comparable), as op-
posed to merely 12% for the 25-29-year-olds. Of the 25-29-
year-olds 38% are holding a university degree, as compared
to less than 15% for people older than 65. Since education is
the most prominent determinant of human capital, one ob-
viously needs tocontrolfor it.
Weregardtenureasatypicalexampleofalifecycledriven
variable. Our data suggests that tenure is determined by the
household’s current position in the life cycle. The largest
share of students and young professionals heading a house-
hold ﬁrst lives in privately let dwellings. The share of pri-
vately rented houses decreases by half between age 20 and
30, as people leave school or university and start working,
start families, and buy their own homes. From age 30 un-
til40,thesharedropsagainbyhalfandstayslowthereafter.
Theverylowhome-ownershiprateamongresidentsaged70
and older, however, could be caused by a negative cohort ef-
fect for this generation.
3.4 Results
The user cost of housing   for renters is the sum of rent, en-
ergy, and service costs (if not included in the rent already),
andthelocalcounciltax11,ifapplicable. Forowner-occupied
housing, the cost of housing  owner can be understoodas the
opportunity cost of not investing in an asset class similar to
residentialreal estate:
 owner        f               (10)
where   is the value of the dwelling,  f the risk-free inter-
est rate in 2001,   a risk premium for residential real estate,
  the expected capital gain, and   is the sum of all direct
costs for maintenance, energy, and council tax. We set  f
to 4.78% which is the yield for 20-year British government
bonds in 2001.   is set to 2.5%, which is the average real an-
nualgrowthrateoftheHalifaxhousingindexfor1983-2001.
Fortheriskpremium wetakeonehalfoftheUKequitypre-
mium of 4.2%, as estimated by Dimson et al. (2003). Figures
for the direct costs are provided in the EHCS data set. We
subsequently try a number of speciﬁcations for the interest
rate, the equity premium and the expected price apprecia-
tion, which scales the vector of marginal prices. The relative
magnitude of the marginal prices compared to each other is
11Inoursample,20%ofdwellingsaresubjecttocounciltax,whichistheonly
residential property tax in the UK. Council tax is paid by the resident and
not necessarily by the owner. We account for council tax support granted
toeconomically weakhouseholds.
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Table 3.3: Education and income by birth cohort




































































20-24 5 25 37 24 9 10,658 6,165 13,693 10,687 11,443 13,985
25-29 14 30 18 26 12 19,102 13,966 18,104 20,692 23,299 23,145
30-34 14 34 20 19 13 22,733 15,365 21,014 21,736 29,203 30,391
35-39 15 34 20 19 12 24,136 17,780 21,545 25,117 29,789 30,831
40-44 22 28 17 20 13 24,229 18,726 20,648 24,664 30,819 34,761
45-49 30 25 16 19 10 22,892 18,400 22,379 24,340 28,303 35,739
50-54 36 20 14 18 12 22,635 18,038 20,694 26,330 29,263 36,002
55-59 43 20 13 14 10 18,748 15,424 17,220 21,067 25,197 31,205
60-64 48 18 9 16 9 14,488 12,690 15,194 16,315 20,086 20,429
65-69 58 18 7 13 4 11,649 9,528 12,353 12,733 17,687 18,955
70-74 63 13 8 11 5 9,860 7,941 11,482 13,129 14,089 17,666
75-79 68 11 10 8 3 8,648 7,223 9,587 13,160 13,008 17,296
80+ 71 9 9 7 4 7,581 6,688 8,890 9,413 11,885 16,754
Notes: Income is the median annual net income at the household level, including income from savings, pensions and
housing beneﬁts.
Source: EHCS, 2001 cross-section.
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stable, however.
We estimate (1′) by ordinary least squares, subject to con-
straints (4)-(6). Table 3.4 presents the coeﬃcients and the
partial derivatives  i for each of the 47 hedonics, which can
be understood as the premium (or discount) households are
willing to pay for one more unit of this characteristic. The
signs of the partial derivatives are all as expected: positive
for normal goods and negative for inferior goods. As an ex-
ample,residentsarewillingtopayanadditional£1,793ayear
for living in a detached house, when compared to an apart-
ment, which is the reference house type. Not surprisingly, a
residence in London comes at a hefty premium when com-
pared tothe North East.
Houses constructed in the 19th century are preferred over
more recently erected structures. Houses built before 1850
are most attractive, while the least attractive construction
periods are 1945-1974 and 1991-2001. Older houses appar-
entlyhavefeatureslikearchitectureorneighborhoodattrac-
tivenessthatarenotcapturedinourcontrolvariablesbutac-
countedfor in the time dummy.
Other normal goods like parking space or a garage, a sec-
ond living room or bathroom, central heating, more ﬂoor
space, or a larger plotsize all havepositivederivatives.
Living in a city center (as opposed to a rural environment)
is attractive when compared to a suburban residential or an
urban area. Neighbors are not valued much: isolated loca-
tionsorplaceswithonlyafewdwellingsaremoreexpensive
than places with many houses surrounding. As expected,
areas experiencing high demand are more expensive; areas
with many vacancies, on the other hand, come at a discount.
The EHCS provides two measures of the level of crime in an
area. In the interviews, respondents are asked about their
perceptions with regard to crime. We ﬁnd a positive coef-
ﬁcient for the dummy indicating that no crime is perceived.
Second, we interpret the presences of secured windows and
doors as an indicator for a threat of burglary, and we ﬁnd
negative coeﬃcients for it. Links to public transport close to
thehouse makea placemore attractive12.
Having established hedonic prices, we link the prices to
the demographic characteristics of the inhabitants by equa-
tion (3′). We use 52 variables13 to estimate how the port-
folio of housing services demanded varies with age, house-
12The explanatory power of the regression improves quite substantially
when estimating (1′) including dwellings rented out by social landlords
andlocalauthoritiesintothesampleaswell,withthe   nearing0.76. Ap-
parently,rentsareeasiertoexplainbytheunderlyinghedonics,sincethey
are heavily regulated. In many cases regulation prescribes a clear relation
betweenhedonicslikeﬂoorspaceornumberofroomsandtherentasked.
In addition, buildings in the social housing sector are more standardized
than owner-occupied houses, which makes them easier to model in a lin-
ear way.
13Weregressthemarginalprices i againstthefollowingdemographicvari-
ables: age-group dummies (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-
49, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80+), education dummies (up to
GCSE/O level/CSE Equivalent; up to A level or equivalent; up to degree,
or degree equivalent; higher degree/postgraduate qualiﬁcation), employ-
ment status dummies (full time work, part-time work, retired, unem-
ployed, full time education), gender, dummy for persons with long-term
illness in household, ethnicity dummies (black, Asian, other non-white),
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Table 3.4: Marginal prices  i for hedonic characteristics
Variables describing dwelling Variables describing location
Variable Mean SD N Variable Mean SD N
Dwellingtype(vs. apartment) Region(vs. NorthEast)
Terraced small 296 714 1213 Yorkshire and Humber 109 640 970
Terraced large 433 1026 1798 North West and Mersey 619 1156 1057
Detached 1793 1577 4617 E Midlands 729 994 1044
Bungalow 1956 1650 882 W Midlands 888 998 905
tenure (vs. renting) S West 2326 1734 1138
Owner Occupied 1421 2890 8225 Eastern 2269 1559 994
Yearofconstruction(vs. 1991-2001) S East 3237 2057 1010
pre 1850 1724 2214 387 O/London 7929 3579 779
1850-1899 1240 2437 1046 I/London 10422 6040 549
1900-1918 1039 1583 1127 Neighborhoodtype(vs. rural)
1919-1944 807 1272 1982 City centre 197 3586 248
1945-1964 288 952 1811 Urban -924 2383 2026
1965-1974 285 880 1329 Suburban residential -399 1910 5152
1975-1980 429 1184 545 Rural residential -263 1890 1301
1981-1990 444 1111 781 Village centre -348 1881 392
Misc. #housesincommunity(vs. 500+)
Parking lot 722 740 6412 isolated 1599 2478 190
2nd living room 427 787 4439 Under 100 781 1256 1329
2nd bathroom 818 1432 1001 100-299 364 670 2413
2nd WC 536 899 3592 300-499 224 647 1491
ln(bedrooms) 1223 1315 9014 Demand
ln(plot) 11 20 7585 High demand area 1918 1585 2349
ln(ﬂoorspace) 536 411 9453 No vacancies around 771 1171 8175
Misc.
No crime perceived 287 688 936
Good public transport 173 644 1061
No secure windows 72 383 4404
Notes: Meanand standard deviation
in £/year. Theaveragevalues of  i
can be interpretedas the average
annual premium (or discount)
residentspayforanadditionalunitof
 . Forexample,living in a detached
house (in contrast toa apartment) is
worthon average£1,793,after
controllingfor size etc. A second
bathroom’sprice is £818.
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holdcomposition,householdtype,economicsituationofthe
household, income, employment status, educational level,
ethnicity, and attitudes of the inhabitants regarding the
dwellingtheylivein.
Equation (2′) states that imputed prices for each hedonic
characteristic are in fact marginal prices: the level of the he-
donic characteristic  i inﬂuences the marginal price  i. For
example, the willingness to pay for one additional bedroom
depends on the number of bedrooms already present in the
house. A household’s unobservable taste will impact both
the price and the quantity – someone with a strong prefer-
enceforagardenwillnotonlybewillingtopaymoreforthe
garden but is more likely to have a large garden as well. In
order to avoid the error term   being correlated to the left-
hand side  i, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS), as sug-
gestedbyBartik(1987). IncontrasttoGreenandHendershott
(1996), however, we employ 2SLS for the logarithmic vari-
ables only (ﬂoor space, plot size, # bedrooms). Income net
of housing, regional dummies, dummies on the tenure, and
dwelling type are used as instruments. Prices for character-
istics measured by dummy variables are estimated by OLS
omitting  i, since the values of the respective dummies are
diﬃcult to be replaced by instruments not already included
dummy for disabled person living in the household, dummy for house-
holds with children, dummies for personal motives of the residents (al-
ways lived in the dwelling, have familiy and friends close by, live close
to work, regard the dwelling as the “right kind of property”, aﬀordability,
wishingtomove),theusage(weekendandeveningsonly),thehousehold’s
income, the interactionsof income with age, and the household’ssize.
inour direct regressors.
Thedemandformosthousingcomponentsincreaseswith
household size. Especially detached houses and bungalows
are more in demand. As expected, the demand for more
(bath) rooms is positively related to the number of people
living in the dwelling. Singles do not have demand patterns
very diﬀerent from multi-person households after control-
lingfor householdsize.
Higher levels of income shift the reservation prices for al-
most all housing components upwards (or downwards for
inferior housing services). As an example, we estimate the
premiumahouseholdiswillingtopayforlivinginadetached
house (vs. living in a small terraced house) to increase by
3.3%when income doubles.
Beside this direct income eﬀect, we believe that a house-
hold’s human capital is driving its current housing con-
sumption decision. The optimal level of housing consump-
tion does not depend on current income solely, but to a
large extent on the present value of future streams of in-
come. The more income a household can expect, the more
housingservicesitcan(andwishesto)consumeoveritslife-
time. Borrowing on mortgage allows young households to
smooththeirconsumptioninter-temporally,ashigherlevels
ofhousingconsumptionarepossibleinearlieryearsalready.
Assuming a concave housing utility curve, the smoothing of
housing consumption increases a household’s lifetime util-
ity. In addition, transaction costs are reduced, as the level of
housing services does not necessarily need to be readjusted
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therefore have to rely upon education as a proxy for human
capital, assuming higher levels of education to be related to
higher future income. As an illustration, a well-educated
young professional can expect that her income will increase
moreinsubsequentyearsthantheincomeofalesseducated
householdwiththesamelevelofcurrentincome. Ourresults
show that, after controlling for income, households headed
by university graduates are willing to pay more (less) for all
normal (inferior) goods when compared to households with
lower educational achievements. This holds true for less ad-
vanced educational levels as well: having passed GCSE lets
thehouseholddemandmorehousingthanhouseholdswith-
out anyconventionaleducation (our reference group)14.
Similarly, health plays an important role in housing de-
mand. In our sample, households with members suﬀering
from long-term illnesses or including people with disabili-
ties consume less housing services. This does not imply that
housing has a lower priority for the ill or disabled. Health
problems,however,impairhumanwealthasfutureincomes
are expected to be lower, which in turn depresses overall
housing consumption.
14Relaxed borrowing constraints could be an alternative explanation, since
banks could be more willing to provide mortgages to better educated cus-
tomers.
We do not ﬁnd a direct impact of age on housing de-
mand. Most coeﬃcients for the cohort dummies are in-
signiﬁcant. Still, older households are more willing to pay
for housing than younger households. The higher income-
age interaction coeﬃcients for older age groups do not in-
dicate that older people spend more on housing in absolute
terms. Given the lower income for retirees, it is rather the
relative share of the income devoted to housing that drives
up the coeﬃcients. People simply stay in their houses af-
ter retiring, consuming the same amount of housing as be-
fore. This inter-temporal smoothing of housing consump-
tion makes sense from an investor’s life cycle perspective as
well: owner-occupiers build up housing wealth during their
working years and consume more than otherwise possible
when retiring. For aging owner-occupiers, housing services
are often as big as income. People apparently do not ac-
count for the opportunity costs of not renting out or sell-
ing the paid-oﬀ house they are living in. However, this line
of reasoning cannot explain why elderly renters pay rela-
tively more as well, since they have to make rent payments
in cash. We believe that moving is costly for older peo-
ple, both ﬁnancially, since they have to rely on professional
help more than younger households, and emotionally and
socially,sincetheyareleavingaplacetheylivedinforyears.
In the same line of reasoning, it is not surprising that most
of the coeﬃcients for the variable indicating retirement are
positiveandsigniﬁcant,indicatingaconstantwillingnessto
payfor housing evenwhen income decreases.
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Only few black and Asian households are included in the
sample, and they are not evenly distributed geographically.
Aftercontrollingforage,income,education,householdtype
and size, we ﬁnd Asian and black households to attach a dis-
count on being owner, having a parking lot, or a suburban
residential location. Dwellings constructed between 1850
and1914orlocatedinhighlydemandedneighborhoodscarry
a premium. These results do not necessarily imply diﬀerent
tasteswithregardtothesecharacteristicsdirectly,butwein-
terpret them as a preference for traditional migrant neigh-
borhoods in the historiccity centers.
Householdsthatareathomeonweekendsandinevenings
only are less inclined to spend on housing services than




is “the right kind of property” for them are willing to pay
more for many housing services. Households that are in-
tendingtomovesoon,ontheotherhand,consumelesshous-
ingthanexpected,giventheirlevelofincome,education,and




Having established the link between demographics and
the determinants of a house, we can now asses how demand
foraconstant-qualityhouse willchangein age. Nationalav-
erages are taken to deﬁne a representative constant quality
dwelling. Wecalculatethedemandforthisdwellinginthree
alternativeways:
First, we calculate a total age derivative, in which all de-
mographic characteristics of an age-group are changing in
age (life cycle variables). Age groups are assumed to have
thesamedemographiccharacteristicstheirpredecessorshad
earlier. This is, roughly, the Mankiw and Weil (1989) ap-
proach.
Second, we calculate a partial age derivative based on co-
horts, keeping all demographics beside age constant, which
is in line with the approach used by Green and Hendershott
(1996). For variables like the highest educational achieve-
mentorattitudesoftheresidents,thisassumptionisreason-
able. But for variables likeincome, it certainly is not.
Third, the results from the demographic regression (Ta-
ble 3.5) suggest that changes in household size, income, em-
ployment status, and health signiﬁcantly inﬂuence hous-
ing demand. We therefore deﬁne life cycle variables15, which
change with age, and estimate demand taking account of
likelychangesin these life cyclevariables.
Changes in income are estimated using (8). In general, a
household’s income ﬁrst increases with age, peaks around
age52,declinesuntilage65andstabilizessubsequently. The
better a household is educated, the more pronounced dy-
namics can be observed. For instance, income ﬁrst quadru-
15Life-cycle variables are income, household size, household type, health of
householdmembers, or employmentstatus.
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Age head of household 
University deg.  A-Levels  GSCE  No 
All values in £/year. A household’s income ﬁrst increases with age, peaks
around age 52, declines until age 65 and stabilizes subsequently. The better
a household is educated, the more pronounced dynamics can be observed.
Forinstance,incomequadruplesforhouseholdsheadedbyuniversitygrad-
uatesfromage25-52,anddecreasesagainbyonethirdasthemembersofthe
household retire, before it stabilizes. For lower educational levels, both the
increase and the decline are less steep. Households who’s head has enjoyed




ples for households headed by university graduates from
age 25-52, and decreases again by one third as the members
of the household retire, before it stabilizes. For lower ed-
ucational levels, both the increase and the decline are less
steep. Households who’s head has enjoyed no formal ed-
ucation start at very low income levels, experience robust
income growth until age 55, but do not suﬀer from income
losses as they reach retirement. This surprising result could
be linked to state transfers to the elderly and, more likely, to
cohort eﬀects in disguise: 62% of all household heads born
between 1925 and 1930 received basic schooling only, while
for the cohort born between 1975 and 1980, the share drops
toas lowas 11% (pleasesee Table3.3).
Afterage65,weassumeallhouseholdstoretire,thehouse-
hold size to go down to an average of 1.5, the share of house-
holds with at least one disabled member to rise to 15%, and
the share of households with long-term ill persons to rise to
35%16, and calculate an adjusted partial derivative. We ac-
knowledge that this is still a rough way of modelling which
could be reﬁned in the future. The age group of 50-54 is our
referencegroup for both partial derivatives.
Figure 3.2 shows that demand for housing increases from
age 20-24 until age 50-54 for all three derivatives by ca
50%. The total age derivative increases faster than the par-
16These assumptions are based on the averages for older age groups in our
sample(controlledforincomeandeducation). Werunrobustnesstests,us-
ingdiﬀerentparametersforincomedynamics,healthandhouseholdsize.
Wedo not observequalitativechangesin the results.
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Figure 3.2: Demand for an average dwelling as a function of age








































































We deﬁne a constant quality house based on national averages and calculate the
age-cohort speciﬁc demand for this house in three alternative ways:
1) Total age derivative, where all demographic characteristics vary with age
2) Partial age derivative, where the demographic proﬁle is kept constant over all
age-groups
3) Partial age derivatives with adjustments, which allows for changes in the selected
demographic characteristics of a cohort – relative income orh o u s e h o l ds i z ea r e
expected to change as a household moves through the housing life cycle.
28
Notes: We deﬁne a constant quality house based on national averages and
calculate the age-cohort speciﬁc demand for this house in three alternative
ways:
1) Totalage derivative,where all demographiccharacteristicsvarywith age
2) Partial age derivative, where the demographic proﬁle is kept constant
overall age-groups
3) Partial age derivatives with adjustments, which allows for changes in the
selecteddemographiccharacteristicsofacohort–relativeincomeorhouse-
hold size are expected to change as a household moves through the housing
life cycle.
tial derivatives, which can be explained by younger cohorts
having enjoyed a better education, earning more and hav-
ing overall a higher expected worth of human capital. Af-
ter 50-5417, the total age derivative declines again, indicat-
ing that older households were consuming less housing ser-




age 55, the adjusted demand stabilizes, although the house-
hold’s disposable income decreases. The unadjusted partial




diﬀerently: Mankiw and Weil were too pessimistic, while
Hendershott and Green probably overestimated future de-
mand. The adjusted partial age derivative’s demand projec-
tionswill be locatedin betweenthe twoextremepositions.
The pattern of the graph is very robust. Using diﬀerent
reference groups, alternative regression models, or diﬀer-
ent assumptions for the user-cost of housing   does not al-
ter the overall shape qualitatively. Choosing younger ref-
erence groups makes the diﬀerence between the total age
17Please note that the age indicated in the graph is the age of the household
reference person. By deﬁnition, this is not the average age of the house-
hold members, which is usually lower. Thus, the demand graphs for indi-
viduals insteadof householdsis shiftedtothe left.
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derivative and the partial age derivatives more pronounced
asyoungeragecohortsarebettereducatedanddemandmore
housing. Using a semi-logarithmic functional form for (1′)
does not change the results signiﬁcantly. The level of the to-
taldemand,however,isquitesensitivetohigher(lower)user
costofhousingassumed,whichwillshiftallthreegraphsup-
wards (downwards)in comparable ways.
The relative change of demand for housing services in age
is similar for all dwelling types, as Figure 3.3 shows. Only
the levels diﬀer: the willingness to pay is highest for de-
tached houses followed by terraced houses, bungalows and
apartments. Demand for bungalows and detached houses
rises faster in age than demand for apartments and terraced
houses.
3.5 Future Demand for Housing
Our results allow for a discussion of the future development
of housing demand in England with regard to changing de-
mographics. Wewillfocusonthetwodeterminantsofhous-
ingdemand: thenumberofhouseholdsandthelevelofhous-
ing servicesdemanded per household.
The number of households in England is expected to
growfurther. TheGovernmentActuary’sDepartment(GAD)
projectsEngland’spopulationtoincreaseby10percentto56
million in the period between 2007 and 2027 (GAD, 2007).
In addition, household size is expected to decrease, lead-
Figure 3.3: Demand disaggregated for dwelling types
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age head of household
flat detached house
terraced house bungalow
The relative change of demand for housing services in age is similar for all dwelling
types. Only the levels di er: the willingness to pay is highest for detached houses
followed by terraced houses, bungalows and apartments. Demand for bungalows





detached houses followed by terraced houses, bungalows and apartments.
Demandforbungalowsanddetachedhousesrisesfasterinagethandemand
forapartments and terracedhouses.
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ing to even more growth in household numbers suggesting
higher future demand for housing. This robust future out-
lookisverydiﬀerentfromtheprojectionsformanyotherEu-
ropean countries. Especially in many Central and Southern
European countries, population growth has already turned
into shrinkage and the population structure is older already
(UnitedNations Population Division, 2007).
Combining projections for the population numbers and
the age structure with the earlier established willingness to
pay for a constant-quality house, gives a forecast for aggre-
gate housing demand. Assuming the average household size
tostayconstant,wederivethenumberofhouseholdsperage
group and calculate aggregated demand based on Equation
(9) for eachyearuntil 2027.
Our calculations suggest that housing demand will con-
tinue to grow, with an average growth of 0.9 percent in the
next 20 years. Demand growth will peak in the period from
2012 until 2017 and slowdownafterwards.
Basedonalternativeassumptionsregardingfertilityrates
and migration dynamics, the GAD oﬀers so-called ‘variant
scenarios’ in addition to the most likely scenario. Assuming
higher fertility rates and higher net-migration into the UK
leads to a scenario with a younger population, while lower
fertility rates and low inﬂux of (mostly) young immigrants
results in projections of a relativelyoldpopulation.
ThegraphsinFigure3.4showthattheoverallhousingde-
mand development is very similar across the three scenar-
ios. Again, annual demand growth is positive for all years in
all scenarios with a peak in 2012-2017. For the younger pop-
ulation scenario, changes are mainly driven by shifts in the
total number of households. In the case of an older popu-
lation, however, almost the entire growth can be attributed
to higher per-household demand. Due to the robust outlook
under all scenarios covered, we expect English housing de-




contributes to the current debate in three ways: First, based
on a very detailed 2001 cross-section of English households,
we ﬁnd that human capital is a key driver for housing de-
mand. Variables that are positively related to human capital
increase the demand for housing. For instance, each addi-
tional levelof education a household has achieved, drivesup
itsreservationpricesforthehousingservicesconsumed. On
theotherhand,factorslikechronicillnessesthatimpairhu-
18To convert our demand forecasts into house price predictions, we need
information on supply elasticities in England. Malpezzi and Maclennan
(2001) investigate the supply elasticity for residential property in the US
and the UK. First, they ﬁnd that the supply elasticity is lower in the UK
than in the US. Second, for the post-war UK they estimate supply elastic-
ities between 0 and 1, depending on the parameter values chosen in the
models. This suggests that increased demand will further drive up house
prices.
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2005  2010  2015  2020  2025 
young population  base case  old population 
Notes: The Government Actuary’s Department oﬀers two alternative popu-
lationscenariosinadditiontothebasecase: Assuminghigherfertilityrates
and higher net-migration into the UK leads to a scenario with a younger
population, while lower fertility rates and low migration results in projec-
tions of a relativelyoldpopulation.
Combining projections for the population numbers and the age structure
with the earlier established willingness to pay for housing services, gives a




gregated level, even if the total number of households stops
growing. A scenario analysis with diﬀerent population pro-
jectionsshowsthattheupwardslopingpartialagederivative
issupporting demand in an aging society.
Second, we reﬁne the existing methodology by distin-
guishing between life cycle variables that are expected to
change with age for each household, and cohort variables,
thataredeterminedbythehousehold’sbirth-cohortandnot
by age. Earlier studies either let all demographics change
with age, or kept all variables constant during the entire
householdlife cycle.
Third, we believe that our ﬁndings are very relevant
for other European countries beside England. Despite the
cultural and economic heterogeneity within Europe, the
upward-sloping age-demand-relationship observed in Eng-
land should be a reasonable proxy for other European na-
tions, even in case of diﬀerent demographic proﬁles. Today,
Europeisfacinganunprecedenteddemographicchange: The
entire area reaching from Germany in the west, to Russia in
the east, and tothe Balkans in the south is losing population
alreadytoday–andthisdevelopmentisexpectedtogainmo-
mentum in the next decades (United Nations Population Di-
vision,2007).
A regional housing market with unattractive economic
perspectives and living conditions faces a double challenge:
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not only does the total number of households decline, but
householdshavingenjoyedabettereducationaremorelikely
than the less educated to move away to more prosperous
regions. Without the younger generation being better ed-
ucated and more wealthy than the generations before, the
pressure on housing demand caused by population shrink-
age cannot be oﬀ-set.
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Table 3.5: Demographic regression – selected results
price of Household Income Education Health Ethnicity Perceptions Usage
size income 20-24 60-64 GCSE A-lev. Univ. higher lt ill disab. retired black Asian right kind want move WE & ev. zi R2
Terraced small 87 0.028 167 262 229 0.14
Terraced large 0.013 -0.039 215 392 278 167 0.09
Detached 147 0.033 148 376 661 894 -235 235 279 -241 -122 0.21
Bungalow 223 0.045 306 492 -371 476 -1427 0.16
Yorkshire & H. -0.018 -101 -196 -250 0.11
N West & Mersey 135 0.032 254 501 905 -570 0.17
E Midlands 80 0.021 298 333 307 0.15
W Midlands 122 0.027 343 828 -178 0.20
S West 210 0.053 -0.107 -0.046 378 555 626 604 0.15
Eastern 174 0.049 386 385 416 667 -311 0.24
S East 409 0.048 -0.079 332 985 1060 -973 -503 -260 0.23
O/London 777 1184 1118 2183 -1586 -1644 -934 -757 0.27
I/London 734 1597 2654 3362 -3369 4119 -1643 3770 -1040 0.24
Owner occupied 130 0.053 0.043 278 544 1016 1240 -230 -360 -1055 -887 368 -575 -254 0.16
pre 1850 0.047 858 648 0.16
1850-1899 0.081 -0.087 519 806 906 -403 1358 1229 862 491 -329 0.17
1900-1918 114 524 568 877 597 388 624 0.19
1919-1944 0.023 316 534 1112 402 -112 0.13
1945-1964 -0.066 320 457 0.10
1965-1974 75 0.012 -0.021 200 238 -252 -158 0.09
1975-1980 294 -284 837 0.22
1981-1990 129 386 -262 226 0.09
City centre 0.21
Urban -328 -0.053 0.125 -359 -434 -775 -941 -1404 0.17
Suburban res. -251 -0.018 0.022 -431 -415 -531 -226 0.07
Rural residential -0.050 -358 -329 -486 0.09
Village centre -964 0.10
Under 100 0.028 -0.033 206 216 408 774 0.13
100-299 0.017 133 164 233 300 0.05
300-499 50 0.019 287 -108 0.09
isolated 0.26
Prking lot 0.013 53 117 104 -88 178 -292 -245 81 -99 -66 0.09
2nd liv. 0.015 -0.034 97 125 242 379 204 141 -69 -83 0.18
2nd bath 302 0.247 236 668 -821 271 164 0.31
2nd WC 39 0.026 -0.034 145 189 312 378 -138 205 280 -96 -78 0.20
No crime 140 161 219 0.06
Good pub. trans. 108 0.041 0.019 -86 0.33
No sec. windows -23 0.007 -0.007 -41 179 100 86 0.03
High demand area 75 0.025 -0.071 0.026 369 686 380 466 338 410 0.17
No vacancies -0.025 152 306 -73 244 -69 0.02
ln(bedrooms) 0.014 0.020 0.036 157 234 440 -76 -141 -255 640 216 344 0.10
ln(plot size) 0.000 0.000 2 4 2 2 3 -3 -1 -7 0.03
ln(area) -17 0.008 0.005 33 69 62 83 59 -29 -16 562 0.32
Notes: Only signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (p-value   0.1) are displayed. All others are omitted for the sake of readability. Due to space constraints, results for only
selected regressors are presented above. Prices for plot size, ﬂoor space, number of bedrooms, and repaircosts (all in logs) are estimated in a 2SLS, following
Bartik (1987). We use income net of housing, regional dummies, tenure dummies and house type dummies as instruments.    for 2SLS have no statistical
meaning and are therefore not stated. All other equations are estimatedbyordinaryleast squares.
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nomic trends, political, social, and technological advances.
UrbaneconomistslikeKrugman(Krugman,1991,1993;Fujita
et al., 2000) explain why people crowd together and found
cities in the ﬁrst place. Others investigate the relative com-
petitiveness of cities (e.g. Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Porter,
1996), carving out the causes for cross-sectional variation
and time-trends. Yet another discourse focuses on cities’
ability to adapt to changing environments, or, as Glaeser
(2005)called it, to“re-invent”themselves.
This paper researches within-city dynamics. It builds on
a broad strand of literature addressing the urban layout of
cities, which extends the mono-centric Alonso-Mills-Muth
model (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969) to a variety of
poly-centricspeciﬁcations. Bynowweunderstandhoweco-
nomic factors inﬂuence the formation of subcenters (Fujita
and Ogawa, 1982; McMillen and Smith, 2003). Price diﬀer-
entials across residential neighborhoods are exogenous, as
theyarereﬂectingdiﬀerencesinemploymentopportunities
oramenities in general.
Guerrieri et al. (2010) carry the debate to the next level
byexplicitlymodelingendogeneitiesinneighborhoodhome
price levels. They assume that wealthy households obtain a
higher utility from being close to other wealthy neighbors
than less wealthy households do. Ultimately, this leads to aCHAPTER 4. LOCAL PRICE DYNAMICS WITHIN CITIES
sortingofhouseholdswithinacitybasedonhomevalues. In
aself-enforcingprocess,therichandthelesswealthyhuddle
in separateparts of town.
Previous studies analyzed subcenters of huge metropoli-
tan areas that remained relatively large entities, compara-
ble to mid-size cities. Redfearn (2007), for instance, iden-
tiﬁes only 41 subcenters for the Los Angeles metropolitan
area based on a non-parametric identiﬁcation methodol-
ogy. Guerrieri et al. (2010) manage to zoom in a bit fur-
ther when analyzing 77 community districts for the city of
Chicago, each consisting out of several census tracts. Noth-
ing is known about endogenous price dynamics in smaller
townsor at more ﬁne-grained levelsof observations.
Endogeneous eﬀects, however, are likely to be the
strongest at very local levels. When choosing a location
to live, the relative magnitude of the endogenous forces
increases in the proximity of evaluated alternatives. Simply
speaking, when deciding to move to one block or to an
adjacent block, the usual determinants like proximity to
work or distance to city-wide amenities are less important
since they are very similar. Instead, local factors gain in
relative importance. Pushing it to the extreme: The only
spatial diﬀerence across two neighboring houses are the
non-mutual neighbors.
House prices were at the forefront of the latest ﬁnancial





as estimated by the Case-Shiller Composite 20 house price
index lost 31.6 percent in the 3 years following their peak in
April2006(CaseandShiller,2010). Inthesameperiodfore-
closures sky-rocketed, pushing the highly leveraged ﬁnan-
cialsystemoverthe edge.
This paper analyzes how changes in price trends trans-
late into changes in the spatial distribution of prices within
cities. Were certain quarters, for instance, more sensitive to
the the price bubble? Do prices converge across neighbor-
hoods when home values are decreasing in a metropolitan




povertywithin the tissue of a city?
Another set of questions is motivated by changing demo-
graphics. Over the last ﬁfty years, at least 370 cities world-
wide with populations over 100,000 have shrunk by more
than 10 percent (Oswalt and Rieniets, 2006). Classic exam-
ples of cities facing demographic challenges are Pittsburgh,
Detroit, or New Orleans. In Europe, more than one-third
of European cities lost population in the period from 1996
to 2001 (European Commission, 2007). The unprecedented
rates at which Central and Eastern European countries are
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currently losing population give a new urgency to the ques-
tions of how demographic contraction aﬀects not only the
total wealth of regions, but also the relative distribution of
housing wealth within these regions. For instance, all but
two Eastern German cities1 have suﬀered from falling pop-
ulation numbers and depressed home values in the last two
decades. I am not aware of any study that researches the
impact of demographic decline on the wealth distribution
within suchcities.
The Netherlands are an ideal test environment for study-
ing housing markets due to a national peculiarity: Hous-
ing supply is to a large extend exogenous. Vermeulen and
Rouwendal(2007)estimatethehousing supplyelasticityfor
TheNetherlandstobenegligiblysmall. Dutchmunicipalities
release land for new residential construction only in home-
opathic doses. In addition, zoning rules are extremely tight
and red tape around construction is dense. The average time
between the decision to start a building project and the be-
ginning of actual construction is estimated to be on average
90 months (Eichholtz and Lindenthal, 2008). Thus, any re-
sponses to demand shocks will be very delayed, if there is a
response at all. The market for existing homes, however is
entirely free and comparable to the United States or other
Westerncountries.
The paper is structured as follows: First, three ideas on
changing within-city price diﬀerentials are introduced. The
secondsectionsuggestsempiricalstrategiestotestthesethe-
1Dresdenand Leipzig
ories while the data used in this paper are described in sec-
tion three. The fourth part presents the empirical results,
followedbyan overalldiscussion.
4.2 Research question
Figure 4.1 simpliﬁes the relative price paths of buildings
with comparable quality characteristics across two neigh-
borhoods within the same metropolitan area. Neighbor-
hoodAisamoreattractivequarterenjoyingrelativehousing
wealth, while neighborhood B has lower home values. Line
   represents the original price gradient.
The relative price diﬀerences are not ﬁxed but evolve in
time. Anegativeshocktohousepricesatmetropolitanlevel,
for instance, leads to lower home values in both neighbor-
hoods. In case the general decline improved the relative at-
tractiveness of neighborhood A versus B, the stronger dif-
ferencesinhomevaluesacrossneighborhoods(  )leadtoa
steeper price gradient   . Alternatively, a shock could level
out the diﬀerences (  ), causing the inter-neighborhood
pricegradient toﬂatten(  ).
Why would a general swing in home values impact rela-
tive price diﬀerentials at local levels? First, Guerrieri et al.
(2010) reason that being in the proximity of rich neighbors
improves the general level of amenities like the quality of
schools or lower crime levels. Under the assumption that
richerhouseholdsderiveahigherutilityfromsuchamenities
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Neighborhood A Neighborhood B
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the relative price paths of buildings with com-
parable quality characteristics across two neighborhoods within the same
metropolitan area. Neighborhood A is a more attractive quarter enjoying
relativehousingwealth,whileneighborhoodBhaslowerhomevalues. Line
   represents the original price gradient.
A negative shock to house prices at metropolitan level leads to lower home
values in both neighborhoods. In case the general decline enforced the rel-
ativeattractivenessofneighborhoodAversusB,thestrongerdiﬀerencesin
homevaluesacrossneighborhoods(  )leadtoasteeperpricegradient  .
Alternatively,ashockcouldleveloutthediﬀerences(  ),causingtheinter-
neighborhood price gradient toﬂatten(  ).
than poorer families can, an endogenous price dynamic sets
in: the rich concentrate in (and further improve) amenity
richareaswhilethepoorfavorcheaphousinginlow-amenity
parts of town. When testing whether the predictions de-
rived from this model can be conﬁrmed empirically, Guer-
rieri et al. (2010) ﬁnd aﬀordable neighborhoods bordering
already expensive quarters to be the most sensitive to this
circle of endogenous gentriﬁcation. In boom years they will
gain more in value than other neighborhoods and, symmet-
rically, they will lose more in city-wide down swings. The
ﬁrsttwohypothesesofthispapertestwhethertheseﬁndings
canbe conﬁrmed with more detailed data.
Houses located in areas close to relatively high-value
neighborhoodswill …
  : …experience higher price growth than homes in areas
bordering comparable or low-price neighborhoods when
pricesriseatcity-level.
  : …losemorevaluethanhomesinareasborderingcom-
parableorlow-priceneighborhoodswhenpricesfallatcity
level.
The alternative hypotheses state that there is no (or an oﬀ-
setting) price growth eﬀect for proximity to more expensive
areas.
Household mobility is a necessary condition for any en-
dogenous sorting of households in wealthy and poor neigh-
borhoods. Without people moving, the virtuous circle of
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endogenous wealth accumulation in distinct quarters can-
not set in. The most mobile group of people are those that
just move into the city. If a city has a sizable inﬂux of new
residents, not only demand for housing in general is sup-
ported but also the speed of gentriﬁcation will accelerate. I
do not know of any paper investigating such a moderating
role of population growth on endogenous home price dy-
namics. This paper will therefore test the following hypoth-
esis:
  : Endogenousgentrificationeffectsincreaseinthecity’s
populationgrowthrate.
Second, sticky housing supply in combination with
shrinkinghouseholdnumberspotentiallyshiftsandtiltsthe
price gradient. Aggregate housing demand is a product of
the number of households and the demand for housing ser-
vices per household. A lower number of households causes
a lower level of aggregate demand (keeping everything else
constant) and pushes prices down as supply cannot adjust
quicklyenoughduetothedurablenatureofthestructuresin
place. If income, availability of ﬁnancing, and consumption
preferences of the remaining households are not aﬀected by
the decline in home values,2 these households can consume
2This sounds like a bold assumption since Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) ﬁnd
cities with falling home values to attract low human capital households.
For The Netherlands in general, however, income per households was not
at least the same amount of non-housing goods while si-
multaneously increase the consumption of housing services
without paying more for it. As a result, they will chose to
increase housing consumption, at least partially. Overall,
households will move from weak areas with less attractive
structures and amenities in place to stronger quarters,
‘ﬁlling up’ vacant higher quality apartments that used to be
out of reach. This population and human capital transfer
aggravates disparities within cities. Alternatively, if house
prices increase while population numbers drop, the relative
diﬀerentials will not change since poor households cannot
move ‘up’. In sum, changes in the within-city house price
gradients are expected to diﬀer depending on the the cities’
populationgrowthrates.
More formally speaking, the relative price diﬀerence be-
tween low price areas and neighboring high-price areas will
…
  : …stay equal or become smaller for areas with rising
city-wide home prices, regardless of changing population
numbers.
  : …becomemorepronouncedforareaswithfallingcity-
widehomepriceswhenpopulationnumbersdecline.
  : …stay equal or become smaller for areas with falling
city-widehomepriceswhenpopulationnumbersdecline.
depressed by falling home values and the global ﬁnancial crisis. On aver-
age households gross income decreases by just -0.28 percent in real terms
in2009 (CBS, 2010).
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Finally, one can think of an investment-driven reason for
changes in the inner-city price diﬀerentials. Above average
pricegrowthratesforselectedquartersintownduringboom
periods and subsequent higher losses in busts indicate lo-
calpricespeculationandovershooting. Investorschaseafter
good investment opportunities in those areas where prices
have been going up, further fueling the price rally. Once lo-
callyoverheatedmarketsdipintodecline,pricesinthese‘fast
rise’ areas will melt down quicker than in surrounding ar-
eas. A vast literature on home price bubbles emerged in the
last decade (for instance Himmelberg et al., 2005; Brunner-
meier and Julliard, 2008; Case and Shiller, 2003). Only few
papers, however, explicitly address the spatial diﬀusion of





Roehner’sﬁndings warrant a last hypothesis:
  : House prices in areas that have risen more than av-
erage in price upswings will decline more than average in
subsequentpricedownswings,regardlessoftherelativepo-
sitionoftheareaonthewithin-citypricegradient.
Although    falls short of a rigorous test for local price
bubbles, controlling for speculation in even a naïve manner
strengthens the ﬁndings from   through  .
4.3 Methodology
Thispapersuggeststwoempiricalapproachestoestimatethe
within-city price dynamics. The ﬁrst models neighborhood
eﬀectsbyincludingspatialdummiesbasedontheneighbor-
hood classiﬁcation oﬀered by the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS) into a hedonic regression. Subsequently it
analyzes endogenous changes in the neighborhood coeﬃ-
cients for several periods in time, both in booming and de-
cliningmarketregimes.
The second approach estimates continuous surfaces of
home values in metropolitan areas. House price index
surfaces are like topographic maps of a landscape: neigh-
borhoods carrying a location premium translate into ‘hills’
or ‘peaks’ in the surface, while less attractive areas form
‘troughs’or‘valleys’. Thisapproachdoesnotrelyonanyfor-
mal neighborhood classiﬁcation and uses the information
moreeﬃciently,allowingfor a more detailed analysis.
The following sub-sections lay out the empirical estima-
tiontechniquesin more detail.
4.3.1 Spatial dummy approach
Usingspatialdummiesisprobablythemoststraightforward
way of including location into a hedonic regression analy-
sis. The CBS subdivides The Netherlands into 2542 neigh-
borhoods,distributedacross441municipalities(CentralBu-
reau of Statistics, 2010a). We only include neighborhoods
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with suﬃcient numbers of observations across time. For
each neighborhood, we deﬁne a variable as 1 for all sales lo-
cated within this neighborhood and 0 otherwise. The fol-
lowingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)equationisestimatedfor
severalsubperiods:
    i        B i   GNi   ϵi  (4.1)
wherethenaturallogarithmofthesalesprice  ofhouse is
regressedagainstavectorofhedonicvariablesXi describing
thephysicalcharacteristicsofthehouse3andavectorNicon-
tainingthespatialdummies.  t istheregressionintercept,B
andGarevectorsofregressioncoeﬃcientsandϵi istheerror
term, which is expected to be normally and independently
distributed(IID).
The vector of neighborhood coeﬃcients G represents the
relative attractiveness of each neighborhood, which can be
understood as the value of a featureless home in a certain
location – the house-specific characteristics are already cap-
turedinthehedoniccoeﬃcientsB. Thesecondstepexplains
changesintheselocationcoeﬃcientsacrossthefourperiods
byestimating the followingequation with OLS:
∆t;t  Coeﬀn          bust;n     ∆t  ;t  Coeﬀn
    bust;n∆n;max;t  Coeﬀn   ϵn
(4.2)
3The following hedonic variables are included: interior ﬂoor space, lot size,
constructionperiod,housetype,numberofrooms,numberofﬂoors,pres-
ence of balconyor terrace,monument status of building.
Thechangeinthecoeﬃcientforneighborhood frompe-
riod   to isregressedagainstanintercept andaperiod
timedummy bust. Theneighborhoodcoeﬃcientsaremean
revertingincase   onthelaggedchangeincoeﬃcientsises-
timated to be smaller than -1. In case    is positive, coeﬃ-
cients are estimated to follow multi-period trends. ∆n;max
measures the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients of neighborhood  
anditsmostexpensiveneighborintheprecedingperiod. The
variable is not deﬁned in case all neighbors have lower co-
eﬃcients.    captures potential spillover eﬀects from high-
price neighborhoods to more aﬀordable areas (   and   ).
The interaction terms  bust allows for diﬀerent elasticities
across boom and bust market regimes. ϵn is the IID error
term.
4.3.2 Neighborhood analysis based on Kriging
This approach comprises of three steps. The house-speciﬁc
price component is ﬁrst explained in a standard hedonic
model,whichis a reduced versionof (4.1):
    i        B i    i   ϵi  (4.3)
At this stage we do not directly control for any location-
relateddiﬀerencesinhomeprices–allspatialdependencies
are captured in the error term  i. ϵi encompasses the re-
mainingestimationerror,whichisindependentlyandiden-
ticallydistributed(IID) around 0.




ﬁcient, the standard errors biased, and the predicted values
to be potentially incorrect (i. a. Dubin 1988). Eﬃciency and
standard error bias, however, are not a major concern in the
following step in which we carve out the spatial correlations
fromtheresidualsof (4.3). SinceϵisIID,itwilldropoutsub-
sequently.
In the second step, we estimate an index surface of hous-
ing values by means of ordinary kriging. Kriging is a mini-
mum mean squared error technique to interpolate the value
ofavariableatunobservedgeographiclocationsbasedonob-
served values close by. Originating from geology and min-
ing science, this procedure found several applications in the
domain of real estate research. Basu and Thibodeau (1998),
ﬁnd kriged predictions to be more precise than OLS-based
predictionsincasespatialdependenciesarecontainedinthe
residuals. For an introduction to kriging in real estate re-
search see Pace et al. (1998b); a more elaborated foundation
isprovidedbyCressie (1993).
Kriging is still not a standard estimation technique, so a
more elaborated motivation might be warranted that dis-
cussestheadvantagesofkrigingversuscontrollingforspace
throughdummies. Simplespatialmodelingbymeansofe.g.
space dummies estimate an index value for predeﬁned spa-
tial entities like provinces, counties, municipalities, neigh-
borhoods, and, in rare cases, residential blocks. This ap-
proach bears several problems. First, one needs (to deﬁne)
an adequate classiﬁcation into spatial units. Often, a classi-
ﬁcation at the desired level of aggregation is not available.
And, in case it is, the segmentation will follow possibly ar-
bitraryadministrativeboundariesthatareonlypartiallyrel-
evant for demarcating submarkets. Clapp and Wang (2006)
show that U.S. census tracts are not ideal for analyzing local
housing markets. Instead, they suggest a classiﬁcation and
regression tree technique to determine relevant boundaries
directly from the data. Second, sparse data prohibit very
detailed local index estimations based on ﬁne-grained spa-
tialentitiessinceaminimumnumberofobservationswithin
an entity is needed for achieving reliable results – a ‘natural
maximum’ in local detailedness cannot be surpassed. Third,
when relying on any kind of boundary-based segmentation,
theindexwill be discontinuous at spatial boundaries.
Anindexsurfacedoesnotrelyonanyboundaryclassiﬁca-
tions. Itestimatesanindexvalueforanypointonaplainand
is therefore continuous. Naturally, the precision of the sur-
faceincreasesinthedensityofobservations. Explicitlymod-
eling the spatial correlation across observations allows for
a more ﬁne-grained estimation as information from neigh-
boring observations support the otherwise too sparse data
in the researched area – one can ‘zoom in’ more. Clapp and
Wang (2006), however, argue that including more neigh-
bors is not automatically better. They present a trade-oﬀ
between more smoothness of the surface over space (when
manyneighborsareincluded)versuslowerlocation-speciﬁc
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bias: with fewer neighbors included, the surface will match
local diﬀerences more closely.
We estimate the outreach and functional form of the spa-
tialcorrelationbasedonﬁttedexponentialsemi-variograms
(Cressie, 1993). The variograms are used to compute the
weights  forthe basic ordinarykriging equation
        
i N ∑
i  
 i i  (4.4)
wheretheinterpolatedvalueatapointwithlocation     
is the weighted sum of the measured values at surrounding
points, subject tothe unbiasedness constraint
i N ∑
i  
 i      (4.5)
The index surface evolves in time as it is re-estimated for
every of the four periods in the sample.4 In a last step, we
explain diﬀerences in the interpolated values   for a point  
across time:
4Pace et al. (1998a) model the spatial and the temporal dependencies more
directly by estimating an equation containing simultaneously spatial and
temporallags.
∆t;t   i    t      bust;i     ∆t  ;t   i bust;i
        i;t   bust;i     ∆max i;t   bust;i
   ∆   i bust;i
   ∆   i∆max i;t   bust;i
   ∆t  ;t   exc;i bust;i   ϵi
(4.6)
In this regression equation, the change in ﬁtted values in
the index surface  t    t   is regressed against a bust pe-
riod dummy variable that is deﬁned 1 for changes after Q2
2008 (and 0 otherwise) and a set of variables characteriz-
ing the location of point  .  t is the regression intercept
while the coeﬃcient    captures the general price decline in
the bust period. Including the lagged change in ﬁtted values




of their levels. Calculating both the spherical distance and
the diﬀerence in estimated values to the closest local price
maximum and minimum controls for the relative position of
alocationonthelocalpricegradient. Apointonaﬁttedsur-
face is considered to be a maximum (minimum) if no other
5Mean reversion in the surface estimates could be caused by market partic-
ipants correcting deviations from the local mean in subsequent time pe-
riods. Alternatively, it could have a purely estimation technique reason
in case surface estimates are randomly distributed around a true mean to
whichtheymovebackin subsequent periods.
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pointinaradiusof750mhasahigher(lower)pointestimate.
A positive (negative) coeﬃcient    on the diﬀerence in ﬁt-
ted values (‘vertical distance’) to the nearest local maximum
∆max t   means that prices for locations far away from a
peak growat a faster(slower)ratethan the peak areas.
The ‘slope’ ( max    t            max to the nearest lo-
calmaximumrelatesthe‘vertical’distancetothe‘horizontal’
sphericaldistance. Thebiggerthevalueontheslopevariable
is, the bigger is the relative price diﬀerence to close neigh-
bors. A positive coeﬃcient    on this proxy variable sup-
ports the endogeneity theorybyGuerrieri et al. (2010).
∆    measures the resident population’s growth rate of
the year preceding each of the four periods. Interacting the
populationgrowthrateswiththepricediﬀerencetotheclos-
estmaximumdisentanglesendogenouspricedynamicsfrom
relative changes in the gradient due to sticky housing sup-
ply. Apositivecoeﬃcientonthisvariableindicatesthatlow-
price areas are more sensitive to changes in population than
high price neighborhoods.




 . If  exc;t   is bigger than  exc;t  , the location   has ap-
preciated relative to its close peers. Changes in this relative
pricepremiaordiscountscanbereadasanaïveproxyforlo-
cal price speculation.
All variables are interacted with the bust-period dummy
toallowforchangesinthecoeﬃcientsacrossboomandbust
periods.6
In (4.6) both the dependent variable and the independent
variablesare(partially)basedonestimatesfromthesamein-
dex surface. The slope variable, for instance, contains  t  
whichisacomponentofthedependentvariableaswell. This
violation of the underlying regression assumptions poten-
tially leads to wrong standard error estimates. The magni-
tude of the errors is probably small, since the independent
variables contain ‘non-toxic’ components that are not based
on the kriged index estimates. Nevertheless, an alternative
cross-sectional speciﬁcation (4.7) circumvents the problem
sincethedependentvariableandtheindependentregressors
relyon diﬀerent indexsurface estimations:
 exc;i;t    t      bust;i;t      exc;i;t  
        i;t   bust;i;t     ∆max;t   i bust;i;t
   ∆   i bust;i;t     ∆   i∆max i;t   bust;i;t
   ∆t  ;t      ϵi;t
(4.7)
All variables are deﬁned as in (4.6). The relative over- or un-
derpricing of location   versus the average index surface ﬁg-
ures in the proximity is regressed against a set of location
characteristics.
6Due to space constraints, the non-iteracted ‘base’ variables are not explic-
itly mentioned in (4.6) but enterthe estimation as well.
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4.4 Data
This paper relies on a database on all housing transactions
that were facilitated by the association of Dutch realtors
(NVM).7 The data cover about 2.6 million observations from
the years 1985-2009. The sample can be split into 0.8 mil-
lion apartments and 1.8 million single-family homes. About
50 variables describe the hedonics of each building (house
size, housing type, year of construction, number of bed-
rooms,numberofbathrooms/WC,basement,attic,parking),
itslocation(locationwithincommunitiy,distancetoameni-
ties), and details of the transaction itself (e. g. initial asking
price, ﬁnal transaction price, date of ﬁrst oﬀer, transaction
date). The NVM database provides the exact street address
of each transaction, which allows for geocoding each obser-
vation through the Google Maps application programming
interface(Google, 2010).
In the last 25 years, Dutch home prices knew only one di-
rection: up. The Dutch Realtor Association’s price index for
existingresidentialrealestate(NederlandseVerenigingvoor
Makelaars,2010)grewby130percentsince1985(270percent
in nominal terms). Only for the last 5 quarters of the sample
(2008Q3–2009Q3), one can observe a substantial price de-
cline. This paper focuses on transactions in this unique bust
periodandcomparesthemtosalesintheprecedingpeakpe-
7The NVM dataset is already used in multiple studies; i. a. De Wit, Englund
andFrancke(2009),BrounenandKok(2010),Brounen,Neuteboom,andXu
(2008).
Figure 4.2: Four phases in the latest Dutch house price cycle
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nominal index
real index
Notes: The solid line depicts the development of prices for Dutch detached
homes adjusted for inﬂation, while the dashed line shows prices in nomi-
nal terms. The four grey bars visualize the periods of investigation in this
study. Phase 1 (1997Q1–1998Q1) provides for a snapshot in the middle of
a period of price increases, with the most rapid price gains still to come –
where markets turn from ‘warm’ to ‘hot’. Phase 2 (2005Q3–2006Q3) covers
thethelastquartersoftheboomphase,whilePhase3(2007Q1–2008Q1)in-
cludes the tipping point where prices peak, before entering a phase of price
losses. Phase 4 (2008Q3–2009Q3) is the only period in the sample where
pricesfall.
Sources: Price index by NVM (2010), deﬂator from Central Bureau of Statis-
tics(2010).
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riod and two boom intervals. Phase 1 (1997Q1–1998Q1) pro-
vides for a snapshot in the middle of price increases, with
the most rapid price gains still to come – where markets
turn from ‘warm’ to ‘hot’. Phase 2 (2005Q3–2006Q3) cov-
ers the the last quarters of the boom phase, while Phase 3
(2007Q1–2008Q1) includes the tipping point where prices
peak, before enteringa period of price losses.
Subsampling the same amount of transactions per neigh-
borhood in each phase keeps the spatial distribution across
CBS neighborhoods constant in time. This ensures that dif-
ferencesinestimatesarenotcausedbydiﬀerentsamplesizes
or changes in liquidity across time.8 Summary statistics for
the samplescan be found in Table4.1.
The index surfaces based on (4.4) are estimated for ar-
eas only that are actually used for residential construction




and neighborhood are obtained from the Central Bureau of
Statistics (2010c). Figure 4.3 visualizes the geographic clas-
siﬁcation of Dutch municipalities at the example of the city
of Maastricht. Each municipality is subdivided into quar-
ters represented by bold lines and neighborhoods, depicted
in thin lines. In 2009, The Netherlands were structured
in 441 municipalities, 2,542 quarters and 11,574 neighbor-
hoods. The average headcount per municipality, quarter,
8Only quartersthat haveat least 10 observationin eachphaseare included.
and neighborhood is 37383, 6486, and 1425 inhabitants re-
spectively. These areas are not regularly shaped as they fol-
lownaturalfeaturesoftheenvironment,demographicchar-
acteristics of the population and the physical characteristics
of the housing stock. Their sizes range from below 500 m in




The starting point of both approaches is the estimation of
the hedonic regression equation (4.1) and (4.3), respectively.
Table 4.2 presents the estimated coeﬃcients for both equa-
tions in all 4 sub-periods. Most coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the one percent signiﬁcance level, which is not surprising
giventhehighnumberofobservationsandtheparsimonious
model speciﬁcation. The signs and magnitude of the regres-
sion coeﬃcients are as expected. The regression estimates
suggest positive elasticities on interior ﬂoor space, lot size,
numberofrooms,monumentstatus,presenceofabalconyor
terrace and younger building vintage years. Semi-detached
homes are valued less then detached buildings. Overall, the
coeﬃcients are stable in time - with one exception: the co-
eﬃcients on the number of ﬂoors change signs across time-
periods.
Theoverallexplanatorypowerofthespatialdummymodel
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for subsamples
Phase 1 2 3 4
N 13,853 13,853 13,853 13,853
Price(Euros,inthousands) 1st Q. 118 221 233 220
Median 153 292 310 293
Mean 175 325 342 328
3rd Q. 209 395 423 400
Interiorﬂoorspace(  ) 1st Q. 120 120 120 120
Median 137 145 145 140
Mean 149 153 154 151
3rd Q. 166 175 175 171
lotsize(  ) 1st Q. 251 255 257 253
Median 341 349 353 345
Mean 594 611 625 630
3rd Q. 580 580 593 575
Yearofconstruction(in%) 1500-1905 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.5
1906-1930 14.2 12.6 12.6 13.1
1931-1944 10.3 9.2 8.5 9.0
1945-1959 8.0 7.3 8.0 8.5
1960-1970 13.1 11.5 11.1 12.1
1971-1980 17.0 14.1 13.5 13.1
1981-1990 18.2 13.6 13.3 12.8
1991-2000 15.0 20.8 20.2 17.8
2000 n.a. 6.6 8.1 9.1
Numberofrooms(in%) 1-2 0.7 2.3 1.3 0.9
2-4 43.3 32.9 29.4 29.2
5-7 53.8 59.5 63.5 63.6
Numberofﬂoors(in%) 1 2.2 3.2 3.6 3.7
2 66.0 69.0 70.2 69.8
3+ 31.8 27.7 26.2 26.6
Othercharacteristics(in%) detached 43.6 45.2 46.2 42.6
monument status 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5
balcony/terrace 15.9 19.6 17.8 18.1




acrossneighborhoods in time is
achievedbystratiﬁed sampling.
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Table 4.2: Hedonic regression coeﬃcients from (4.1) and (4.3)
Variable 1997Q1–1998Q1 2005Q3–2006Q3 2007Q1–2008Q1 2008Q3–2009Q3
Intercept 7 515
    7 045
    7 963
    7 611
    7 856
    7 616
    7 810
    7 460
   
ln(int. space) 0 528
    0 791
    0 560
    0 793
    0 585
    0 831
    0 602
    0 849
   
ln(lot size) 0 202
    0 162
    0 211
    0 153
    0 214
    0 148
    0 207
    0 145
   
Neighborhooddummies                
Yearofconstruction 1906-1930 0 026
   0 059
    0 029
   0 049
     0 012 0 019 0 022
  0 067
   
(vs. 1500-1905) 1931-1944 0 096
    0 088
    0 083
    0 033
  0 039
    0 025 0 091
    0 097
   
1945-1959 0 109
    0 149
    0 063
    0 053
    0 026
   0 043
   0 064
    0 083
   
1960-1970 0 143
    0 108
    0 076
    0 025
  0 038
    0 012 0 063
    0 051
   
1971-1980 0 196
    0 078
    0 091
     0 036
  0 054
     0 044
   0 092
    0 007
1981-1990 0 260
    0 173
    0 148
    0 045
   0 107
    0 026
  0 150
    0 088
   
1991-2000 0 321
    0 218
    0 212
    0 087
    0 169
    0 058
    0 194
    0 100
   
post 2000     0 224
    0 079
    0 205
    0 090
    0 246
    0 156
   
Semidetached(vs. detached)  0 127
     0 071
     0 101
     0 053
     0 100
     0 049
     0 092
     0 048
   
Numberofrooms: 3-4 0 116
    0 047 0 022
  0 044
  0 005 0 003 0 005  0 025
(vs. 1-2) 5-7 0 139
    0 076
  0 054
    0 082
    0 034
  0 029 0 036
  0 004
8+ 0 148
    0 112
   0 045
   0 047
  0 019  0 030 0 030  0 056
 
Numberofﬂoors: 2  0 041
     0 176
    0 119
    0 010 0 078
     0 045
   0 105
    0 007
(vs. 1) 3+  0 017
   0 122
    0 144
    0 044
   0 101
     0 020 0 126
    0 019
monument 0 120
    0 203
    0 064
   0 033 0 075
   0 039 0 128
    0 226
   
terrace or balcony 0 036
    0 138
    0 039
    0 133
    0 043
    0 144
    0 035
    0 126
   
adj.  
  0 877 0 569 0 824 0 554 0 833 0 544 0 820 0 533
Notes:   signiﬁcantat       ;         ;          ;            . Mostcoeﬃcientsaresigniﬁcantattheonepercentsigniﬁcancelevel,whichisnotsurprising
given the high number of observations and the parsimonious model speciﬁcation. Signs and magnitude of the regression coeﬃcients are as expected. The
regression estimates suggest positive elasticities on int. ﬂoor space, lot size, # of rooms, monument status, presence of a balcony or terrace and younger
building vintage. Semi-detachedhomes are valued less then detachedbuildings. All but one coeﬃcient are stable in time.
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not regularly shaped as they
follownatural features of the
environment,demographic
characteristicsof the
population and the physical
characteristicsof the housing
stock. Theirsizes range from
below500m in diameterfor
neighborhoods in city centers
toseveralkilometersin rural
areas.
Data: Central Bureau of
Statistics (2010).
is very high with adjusted   -values ranging from 0.82 to
0.87.9 Omitting the spatial dummies causes an overall lower
modelﬁt(adj.    from0.53to0.57). Obviously,theresiduals
contain a substantial amount of spatial correlations, which
violates OLS’ assumption of independent error terms. Fur-
thermore, the coeﬃcients are estimated to be bigger for in-
teriorﬂoorspaceandtobesmallerforlotsizewhennotcon-
trollingforlocation,indicatingthatexpensivehomes,onav-
erage,carrybigger homes on relativelysmall lots.
Table4.3presentssummarystatisticsforthespatialdum-
mies instead of individual coeﬃcients due to the high num-
ber of neighborhoods. The coeﬃcients are re-centered
aroundzerotoachievebettercomparabilityacrosstime. The
values for the   th percentile, median and   th percentile
are robust in time (only slightly increasing for the later pe-
riods), suggesting a stable general distribution of neighbor-




borhoodsin the city-wideprice gradients.
Still, there is variation in the coeﬃcients that can be fur-
ther explained by (4.2). The average change in the coeﬃ-
cients (∆t;t  Coeff) is about 0.130 to 0.152 for the boom pe-
riod and        to        in the bust period (adding up the
coeﬃcients               for column 1). The direction and
9Brounen et al. (2009) run a GLS on similar NVM data and achieve compa-
rablehigher adj.    of0.83.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of coeﬃcients for spatial dummies
Phase
1 2 3 4
Min -0.941 -0.694 -0.754 -0.760
1st Q. -0.171 -0.174 -0.188 -0.192
Median -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.003
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3rd Q. 0.161 0.167 0.171 0.170
Max 1.131 0.727 0.805 0.849
Correlations
Phase 1 2 3 4
1 1
2 0.95 1
3 0.94 0.96 1
4 0.94 0.95 0.97 1
Notes: 592neighborhoodsdummycoeﬃcientswereestimatedforeachofthe
4 phases. The upper panel provides summary statistics for the coeﬃcients,
normalized to a mean of 0. The lower panel shows correlation estimates
for the coeﬃcients across time. The high correlation numbers of 0.94 and
higher suggest inter-temporalstability of the regression coeﬃcients.
magnitude of these price developments are in line with the
NVM index trends. Changes in the coeﬃcients are nega-
tively autocorrelated. If prices in an area increase by 10
percent, for instance, they will decrease by an additional -
3.14 percent to -3.77 percent. This mean reversion eﬀect has
the same magnitude in boom and bust period as the coeﬃ-
cients for the interaction with the bust dummy is not signif-
icantlydiﬀerent from zero.
Areas bordering richer neighborhoods (column2 in Ta-
ble 4.4) experience a stronger price growth. For each per-
centage point diﬀerence in home values, the lower area will
rise additional 12 basis points in the next period. This result
supports    and is in line with earlier studies. No signiﬁ-
cant change in this eﬀect is found for the bust period, which
speaks against   . It is interesting to note that the spill-
over eﬀect is one-sided: Being close to low value areas does
nothaveastatisticallysigniﬁcanteﬀectonaneighborhood’s




   through  , whichwill be addressed in the nextsection.
4.5.2 Kriging results
The functional form for the spatial correlations in the resid-
uals from (4.3) is obtained by ﬁtting a spherical semi-
variogram (Cressie, 1993). Figure 4.4 shows the variogram
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Table 4.4: Regression coeﬃcients for neighborhood analysis (4.2)
∆t;t  Coeﬀ 1 2 3
Intercept                           
                       
 bust                            
                       
∆t  ;t  Coeﬀ                            
                       
|  bust                   
                       
∆n;max;t  Coeﬀ        
       
|  bust       
       
 ∆n;min;t  Coeﬀ       
       
|  bust      
       
  1180 726 712
adj.                     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.   signiﬁcant at        ;          ;
           
(black dots) individually estimated for each period and the
ﬁtted models (solid lines). All variograms show strong spa-
tialcorrelation,especially for distances smaller than 2 km.
Formal testing for time varying spatial correlations opens
up another research direction, but simple eyeballing of the
variogramssuggestanincreaseinthenuggetsize(the‘inter-
cept’)inthebustperiod,indicatinganincreasedheterogene-
ity in the house-speciﬁc error-term component. The spatial
dependenciesbecomelessstrongafter2km,whichsuggests
arelativelyﬁne-grainedneighborhoodstructure. Neverthe-
less, the variograms keep a slightly positive slope even for
distances exceeding 50 km due to region-wide correlations.
Sincethefocusofthisstudyisonneighborhood-leveldiﬀer-
ences,thesefarreachingdependenciesaredisregardedanda
rangeof 10 km is chosenwhen ﬁttingthe variograms.
For each sub-period, I estimate an index surface based on
a universal kriging estimation provided by the gstat library
(Pebesma, 2004) in the R software environment for statis-




The average distance from surface 1 to 2, 1 to 3, and 1 to
4 is 0.57, 0.6, and 0.58 (Table 4.5), which is in line with the
national price changes found in the NVM index. For each
period, about 4,700 points are classiﬁed as local maxima or
minima.10 The average distance of a point to a maximum or
10A point is deﬁned to be a local maximum (minimum) if no other point
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Figure 4.4: Variograms for Dutch detached homes through time






































Note: Thevariograms (Cressie, 1993)are calculatedbased on the error termsfrom (4.3) with gstat libraryin R (Pebesma,2004).
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Figure 4.5: Index surface for detached home prices, The Netherlands, 2007Q1–2008Q1
Note: Indexsurfaceestimatedonresidualsfrom(4.3)byordinarykriging. Darkareasindicatehighlocation-speciﬁcprices,whilelighterareasvisualizemore
aﬀordable neighborhoods.
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minimum is about 1.25 km and home values at the maxima
are on average 3.5 percent higher, while the minimum areas
carry a discount of similar magnitude. This documents sub-
stantial price variation within small distances. Within a cir-
cle of about two kilometers, the range in price diﬀerences is
on average7 percent.
How did prices change within the cities? Figure 4.6
presents price gradients for parts of Amsterdam, Breda,
Groningen and Maastricht. Each panel shows the price es-
timates for the boom, the peak and the bust period along
selected circles of latitude. The examples give a mixed pic-
ture: For Breda, Groningen, and Maastricht, the slope of
the gradient becomes ﬂatter during the bust period, indicat-
ing bigger relative losses in home values in expensive quar-
ters. ForcentralAmsterdam,however,thepricegradientbe-
comes steeper. The following part investigates these shifts
formally.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the regression coeﬃcients and
standard errors for in total six regression equations derived
from (4.6) and (4.7). With four cross-sectional surfaces ini-
tially estimated, only three periods remain after diﬀerenc-
ing the index estimates once. Since (4.6) and (4.7) include
lagged variables, only two periods in time will be compared
ﬁnally: The boom period just before the house prices reach
their peak, and the subsequent bust. As expected, the coef-





The coeﬃcient on ∆t  ;t    in Table 4.6 is negative and
signiﬁcant, suggesting that growth rates fade out. Still, in-
dex levels (not growth rates) will only revert to their means
when this coeﬃcient is equal to or smaller than -1. During
the bust period, the coeﬃcients fall tovalues of -0.35, which
suggests that only a third of the growth rate experienced in
boom phases fade away in subsequent periods. This persis-
tence in home value growth is in line with the momentum
found by Case and Shiller (2003) for the American housing
marketin the 1970sand 1980s.11
Mean reversion occurs in relative terms, however. The
coeﬃcients estimates for ∆t  ;t   exc in (4.6) are signiﬁ-
cantly negative (-0.13 to -0.145). Locations that have enjoyed





to its close surroundings will not vanish entirely, but slowly
fade. In the alternative speciﬁcation (4.7), a price elevation
above local averages will melt down to 0.41 or 0.42 percent
in the next period. In the bust period, the reversion to the
meanis slightly quicker(by-0.027to-0.036).
Locations close to a local maximum and with a large price
11A multi-period mean reversion, however, is still possible but is not tested
for in this empirical setup.
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics of index surface estimates for four sub-periods
Phase 1997Q1–1998Q1 2005Q3–2006Q3 2007Q1–2008Q1 2008Q3–2009Q3
Predictions
Min -0.86 -0.45 -0.43 -0.39
1st Qu. -0.56 0.02 0.04 0.01
Median -0.4 0.19 0.24 0.21
Mean -0.4 0.17 0.20 0.18
3rd Qu. -0.25 0.32 0.36 0.34
Max 0.11 0.59 0.60 0.57
Descriptives
# minima 2344 2341 2339 2361
# maxima 2490 2269 2279 2317
distance to min (m) 1262 1276 1319 1302
distance to max (m) 1191 1294 1303 1307
 t    min;t 0.040 0.035 0.036 0.036
 max;t    t 0.043 0.036 0.037 0.037
 t    t   n/a 0.572 0.040 -0.020
Note: All residential area as deﬁned by Dutch zoning points are added to a regular 200 m-by-200 m grid for which point estimates in the four phases are
calculatedbyordinarykriging. Number of points in grid: 56,332.
The relative attractiveness of neighborhoods is described by their distance to local extreme values in the index surface. A point is deﬁned to be a local maxi-
mum (minimum) if no other point within 750m has a higher (lower)indexvalue. Isolatedsettlementscoveringonly small areas (         )are excluded.
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Figure 4.6: Estimated price gradients for selected cities
Amsterdam (at latitude 52.36576) Breda (at latitude 51.5742)


























































































Groningen (at latitude 53.2309) Maastricht (at latitude 50.8472) Notes: Theﬁgures showprice gradients
for cuts along the circlesof latitude
through the indexsurfaces estimated
for the cities of Amsterdam,Breda,
Groningen and Maastricht. Theboom
phasegradientismarkedbypyramids,
the peak gradient bycircles,and the
bust period byboxes. ForBreda,
Groningen, and Maastricht,the slope
of the gradient becomes ﬂatterduring
the bust period, indicating bigger
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Table4.6: Regressionresultsonchangesinindexsurfaceduringboom
and bust (4.6)
∆ t;t   1 2 3
Intercept                                                
 bust                                                   
∆ t  ;t                                                     
|  bust                                                   
∆t  ;t   exc                                                  
|  bust                                                   
∆                                                 
|  bust                                            
                                    
|  bust                                
| ∆                                  
|  bust∆                                  
∆max t                                  
|  bust                                 
| ∆                                
|  bust∆                                  
adj.                     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 98,471.   signiﬁcant at        ;
        ;          ;            . This set of regression is based on
(4.6). Thechangeinﬁttedvaluesintheindexsurface t   t   isregressed
against the change one period before ( t      t  ), the diﬀerence in ﬁt-
tedvalues(‘verticaldistance’)tothenearestlocalmaximum( max  t  ),
andthe‘slope’( max  t            max tothenearestlocalmaximum.
∆t  ;t   exc isthechangeinthediﬀerencebetweentheindexestimateof
point  andthe averageindexvalue within acircleof 1000 m. ∆    arean-
nual changes in the resident population at municipality level. All variables
areinteractedwiththebust-perioddummytoallowforchangesinthecoef-
ﬁcients across boom and bust periods.
Table4.7: Regressionresultsonchangesinindexsurfaceduringboom
and bust, alternative speciﬁcation (4.7)
 exc;i;t 1 2 3
Intercept                                                
 bust                                                   
 exc;i;t                                                     
|  bust                                                      
∆                                                
|  bust                                                      
                                                        
|  bust                                             
| ∆                                              
|  bust∆                                                    
∆max t                                      
|  bust                               
| ∆                                   
|  bust∆                                  
 t      t                    
|  bust                  
adj.                     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 88,849.
  signiﬁcant at        ;         ;          ;            
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diﬀerential to this maximum (high values for      ) have
higher price appreciation in the boom phase (coeﬃcient of
0.142 for      ) than points where price diﬀerences are less
pronounced. During the bust, these gentrifying neighbor-
hoods still perform better than peers bordering lower-price
areas (the sum of the coeﬃcients is still positive). The eﬀect
is conﬁrmed in (4.7). These ﬁndings support hypothesis   
and are in line with the results from Guerrieri et al. (2010).
   cannot be conﬁrmed, though.
The moderating eﬀect of population growth is conﬁrmed
by the positive coeﬃcient of 10.058 for the interaction term
     ∆   in(4.6). Theeﬀectpersistsduringthebustphase,
but only at a quarter of the boom’s rate (10.058-7.548 = 2.51).
For (4.7) the moderating role is prominent in the bust phase
only (coeﬃcients of 0.232 to 0.389). Overall, these results
support  .
Pricesinalreadyexpensiveneighborhoodsunderperform
more aﬀordable locations during boom times. The coeﬃ-
cient estimate on the position relative to the closest local
maximum ∆max;t    is signiﬁcant and positive (0.159 and
0.170): the bigger the vertical distance of a location to a lo-
cal peak, the bigger the gain in the boom period. The coeﬃ-
cient for population-growth interaction term is not signiﬁ-
cant. Thus,   cannot be rejected.
Statistically, the convergence eﬀect is weakened in the
bust phase as the coeﬃcient for the interaction term is -
0.033. Economically, this drop is only 21 percent. Demo-
graphic trends again interfere: When population growth
rates turn negative and home values decline, the 0.627 or
0.673coeﬃcientwillturnnegative. Economically,thiseﬀect
isnon-negligible,asaquickback-of-an-envelopecalculation
reveals. The ﬁrst quartile in the latest three-year population
growth distribution of Dutch municipalities is -0.4 percent.
Multiplying the coeﬃcient and this number gives growth
ratesforlocalminimathatare25basispointsbelowthecor-
responding rates of maxima, which are just a few hundred
metersaway. Forminimathatarelocatedinthe25percentof
municipalities whose population grew with at least 1.5 per-
cent, the price gap to maxima will narrow down due to a 1
percenthigher growthrate.    and   cannotbe rejected.
4.6 Discussion
This paper researches within-city home price dynamics in
bullish and bearish residential real estate markets. It con-
tributes to the literature addressing the urban layout of
cities by formulating and empirically testing hypotheses on
changes in the price gradients across neighborhoods under
diﬀerentmarketregimes and demographicconditions.
First, the existing concept on endogenous house price dy-
namics is extended by the notion of the moderating role
of demographics. New residents ﬂocking into the city will
speed up the sorting process as the wealthy settle close to
each other and the poor prefer the aﬀordable homes in
poorer quarters. Indeed, the empirics show that higher in-
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tensities of endogenous gentriﬁcation can be found in areas
with robustpopulation growth.
Second, this paper discusses how a decline in a city’s pop-
ulation and a simultaneous negative shock to home values
lead to a home value polarization within cities. Under such
ascenario,thepricegapbetweenwealthyandpoorareasin-
creases. Falling prices allow households to move up in the
housing ladder since they receive ‘more house’ for the same
money. This eﬀect is estimated to be economically signiﬁ-
cant for Dutchneighborhoods.
Third, evidence for momentum in house prices at the
neighborhood-level is presented. A cross-sectional analysis
of growth rates suggests a mild mean reversion in the trend.
Changes to levels, however, are sticky. The magnitude in the
meanreversioninthetrendsdependsonthemarketregime,
so in case one tries to exploit this potential market ineﬃ-
ciency,a good understanding of markettrends is warranted.
Fourth, a new level of spatial detailedness is achieved by
analyzing a high-quality data-set for The Netherlands. The
datacompriseof1.8millionsinglefamilyhometransactions
and 0.8 million apartments sold by members of the Dutch
Realtor Association (NVM). Previous studies have worked
with American data, so this paper oﬀers an international
perspective. These data are geocoded and matched with de-
mographicinformation through means of GIS analysis.





ona spatial error model(SER).
The results of this study are not only relevant from a real
estate ﬁnance point of view. Case et al. (2001) and others
(Carroll et al., 2006; Bostic et al., 2009) link housing wealth
to consumption. They ﬁnd that households’ consumption is
moresensitivetochangesinhousingwealththantochanges
inwealthfromholdingstocks–attheaggregatelevel. Ifthese
ﬁndings hold at the neighborhood level as well, a relative
shift in the housing wealth within a city will change non-
housingconsumption levelsacross neighborhoods.
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Conclusion
Housing markets are like the weather, sports, or politics:
They are one of the truly big topics almost everybody has an
opinionabout. Often,whenbeingintroducedatapartywith
“ThisisThies. Heiscurrentlywritingadissertationinfinance…” the
ﬁrst reaction was an unconvincing “Oh really? How interest-
ing — ”, followed by awkward silence and an uneasy search
for excuses to leave. A quickly uttered “Myresearchisonhouse
prices…” usually saved the moment. Smooth and pleasant
small-talk directly evolved, fuelled by an endless supply of
housing-related anecdotes and personal experiences shared
bymynewly-foundfriends.
Leaving behind party chit-chat, serious discussions soon
sprung up. People were looking for answers to questions
they were facing: Should they buy that house down the road
now or would it be better to wait one more year? Where are
prices in this city heading to? Will they be able to sell their





This dissertation researches four aspects of housing mar-
kets. First, it examines the long run relation between prices
andrentsforhousesinAmsterdamfrom1650through2005.
Spanning 355 years, this study probably holds the world
recordforanalyzingthelongesttimeseriesintheassetpric-
ingliteratureingeneral,nottospeakofresidentialrealestate
research in particular. Chapter 1 shows that, in the long run,




ical basis (Figure 1.6).
If houses are over- or undervalued compared to the rental
streams they produce, will either prices adjust or rents? Ta-
ble 1.4 presents the results from an error correction model
whichindicatesthatthe‘balance’isachievedmainlythrough
price changes. Rents are more sticky and respond to a
smaller extend.
Based on these results, can an investor make money by
betting on corrections? In principle, yes. Such an investor,
however,needsdeeppocketsandalonglifeasthecorrection
back to equilibrium can take decades. Throughout the sec-
ond half of the   th century, for instance prices of Amster-
dam’s houses remained overvalued for more than 50 years.
This result is a warning for those who read the massive de-
cline of Berlin’s single family homes during the last 15 years
(Figure 2.3) as a soon-reverting deviation from the long run
mean. Berlin’s homes seem to be aﬀordable right now. Still,
they are a risky bet, since there is no guarantee that prices
will moveup again in the near future.
Second, the dissertation is the ﬁrst to estimate how house
prices volatility is aﬀected by so-called real options. An ex-
ample of a real option is the possibility to extend the size of
an existing home by adding more rooms or by taking down
the existing structure and building a bigger new house. Real
options carry value since they give the owners of a building
ﬂexibility. When markets develop favorably and the value
for additional space increases, the owner can ‘execute’ the
option and start building. In case additional space is not
in demand, he/she can just postpone any new development.
Chapter 2 measures the value of the option to extend in dif-
ferent market climates. It incorporates this real option in a
standard hedonic regression model and shows how neigh-
borhoods and houses with unrealized renovation potential
canbe identiﬁed.
The study uses an unexplored dataset of housing transac-
tions in West Berlin, covering thirty years between 1978 and
2007. West Berlin is an ideal test environment for this type
ofstudybecauseitoﬀersdetaileddataonthemaximumsize
allowed under current zoning for each building sold. In ad-
dition, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 stirred-up hous-
ing markets. A clear division in a tranquil ‘walled-in’ phase
(1978-1989),a‘bigbang’periodwithhighhousepricegrowth
directlyafterthewallcamedown(1990-1995)andalong‘cool
down’ phase (1996-2007) gives the opportunity to compare
thevalue of this real option in diﬀerent marketregimes.
Theempiricalresultsshowthathousevaluehasanelastic-
ityofabout0.15withrespecttodevelopmentpotential,mea-
sured by the ratio between the maximum square meters al-
lowedbyzoningandtheexistinghousesize. Forhighoption
value properties the elasticity increases to 0.23 (Table 2.4).
Theevidencepresentedsuggeststhatthe‘bigbang’boompe-
riodbetween1989and1994wasassociatedwithasigniﬁcant
increase in option value for the properties with substantial
redevelopment potential; about 40 percent of the boom was





than 68 percent of all sales have increased volatility over the
cycledue tounrealized option value.
The history of home values in Amsterdam also motivated
research on a third aspect of housing markets in this dis-
sertation. The crisis years of 1781-1814 were the only time
inAmsterdam’shistorywhenthecity’spopulationnumbers
declinedsubstantially. Inthese22years,homevaluesfellby
on average 3 percent annually. This massive loss in hous-
ing wealth indicates a strong link between demographics
and housing markets (and the general economy, of course).
Chapter 3 aims to investigate how demographics determine
the amount and the quality of housing servicesdemanded.
Based on a very detailed 2001 cross-section of English
households, it ﬁnds that human capital is a key driver for
housing demand. Variables that are positively related to hu-
man capital increase the demand for housing. For instance,
each additional level of education a household has achieved,
drivesupitsreservationpricesforthehousingservicescon-
sumed. Ontheotherhand,factorslikechronicillnessesthat
impair human capital have a negative impact on housing
consumption. Since each generation is better educated than
the generations before, an aging society will demand more
housing on an aggregated level, even if the total number of







relationship observed in England should be a reasonable
proxy for other European nations, even in case of diﬀer-
ent demographic proﬁles. Today, Europe is facing an un-
precedented demographic change: The entire area reaching
from Germany in the west, to Russia in the east, and to the
Balkansinthesouthislosingpopulationalreadytoday–and
this development is expected to gain momentum in the next
decades(UnitedNations Population Division, 2007).
A last point to take-away from this study is that regional
housing markets with unattractive economic perspectives
and living conditions face a double challenge: not only does
thetotalnumberofhouseholdsdecline,buthouseholdshav-
ing enjoyed a better education are more likely to leave for
more prosperous regions than lower educated households.
Without the younger generation being better educated and
more wealthy than the generations before, the pressure on
housing demand caused by population shrinkage cannot be
oﬀ-set.
The fourth chapter researches how the distribution of
housing wealth within a city is changing once average prices
change for the city in general. This study was motivated
by the observation that some neighborhoods in Berlin like
Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain or Mitte ﬂourished in the
last years while Berlin as a city experienced strong losses in
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housing wealth. Data availability let me conduct this study
on all of The Netherlands instead of the city of Berlin,1 but
the question remained the same: How do within-city home
pricedynamicschangeinbullishandbearishresidentialreal
estate markets? What is the role of demographics in this
process? It contributes to the literature addressing the ur-
ban layout of cities by formulating and empirically testing
hypotheses on changes in the price gradients across neigh-
borhoods under diﬀerent market regimes and demographic
conditions.
This study ﬁnds that a decline in a city’s population and a
simultaneous negative shock to home values lead to a home
value polarization within cities. Under such a scenario, the
price gap between wealthy and poor areas increases. Falling
prices allow households to move up in the housing ladder
since they receive ‘more house’ for the same money. This
eﬀect is estimated to be economically signiﬁcant for Dutch
neighborhoods.
Furthermore, evidence for momentum in house prices at
1Chapter4achievesaunprecedentedlevelofspatialdetailednessbyanalyz-
ing a high-quality data-set for The Netherlands. The data comprise of 1.8
millionsinglefamilyhometransactionsand0.8millionapartmentssoldby
membersoftheDutchRealtorAssociation(NVM).Thesedataaregeocoded
and matched with demographic information through means of GIS analy-
sis. To fully exploit this ﬁnely-grained data, a spatial estimation technique
is borrowed from the geoscience domain. This gives results that were out
of reach when relying on traditional hedonic regressions. This is the ﬁrst
paperthatestimateshomepriceindexsurfacesforanentirecountrybased
ona spatial error model(SER).
theneighborhood-levelispresented. Across-sectionalanal-
ysis of growth rates suggests a mild mean reversion in the
trend. Changestolevels,however,aresticky. Themagnitude
in the mean reversion in the trends depends on the market
regime, so in case an investor tries to exploit this potential
market ineﬃciency, a good understanding of market trends
iswarranted.
Earlier papers have developed a closed form model that
predicts endogenous home price dynamics. Very casually
speaking, they predict that rich households beneﬁt from
and prefer to have other well-oﬀ people as neighbors. This
preference leads to a segmentation of cities in rich and
poor neighborhoods, endogenously linked to home values
in these areas. Chapter 4 extends this literature by the no-
tion of the moderating role of demographics. New residents
ﬂocking into the city will speed up the sorting process as
the wealthy settle close to each other and the poor prefer
the aﬀordable homes in poorer quarters. Indeed, the empir-
icsshowthathigherintensitiesofendogenousgentriﬁcation
canbe found in areas with robustpopulation growth.
The essence of this dissertation is that housing markets
are more risky than they appear to be. When I started my
research in 2007, residential real estate seemed to be a safe
asset class, characterized by steady positive returns and low
risk. Thefollowingyearsprovedthisperceptiontobewrong
– and so does my research. Mispricings occur often and per-
sistforlongperiodsoftime. Realoptionsamplifythesedevi-
ations from fundamentals and thereby increase house price
126volatility. Demographics ultimately determine the demand
for housing services. Against common belief, an aging soci-





127128Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Housing matters. Voor geïndustrialiseerde landen zijn
woningen het grootste onderdeel van de private consump-
tie. Het Amerikaanse Bureau of Labor Statistics schat dat
woningbezitters in de Verenigde Staten ongeveer 24 pro-
cent van hun totale bestedingen in 2010 aan wonen uit-
gaven. Het kopen van een woning is voor de meeste
huishoudens de grootste investering van hun leven. In
Nederland zit voor de gemiddelde woningbezitter ruim 60
procent van zijn totale kapitaal vast in de woning. En
woningen domineren niet alleen de bezittingen, maar ook
de schulden van huishoudens: voor het gemiddelde Neder-
landse huishouden vertegenwoordigt de woninghypotheek
zo’n 33 procent van het totale kapitaal. De woningmarkt
is groot genoeg om een indrukwekkende invloed op de al-
gemene economie te hebben. De waarde van het Ned-
erlandse eigen-woningbezit (dus exclusief huurwoningen)
wordt geschat op €1.7 biljoen (!) in 2009. Dit is meer dan
twee keer ons nationale Bruto Nationaal Product en oversti-
jgt ruimschoots de totale marktkapitalisatie van alle bedri-




uleerde de Verenigde Staten de woningmarkt door goed-
koop krediet om zowel de dot-com crisis als de economis-
cheschoknadeaanslagenop9/11teverzachten. Woningpri-
jzenlekenoneindigtekunnengroeien. Tussen2000en2006
nam de Case/Shiller huizenprijsindex voor de 20 grootste
Amerikaanse steden toe met 105 procent. Deze prijsstijging
leidde tot oververhitting voor de rest van de economie en
inmiddels kennen wij het einde van deze sage: ineenstor-
tende woningprijzen in de Verenigde Staten luidden het be-
gin in van een wereldwijde economische crisis die de ﬁnan-
ciëleindustrieverlamde,enleiddetot“TheGreatRecession”.
Deze crisis heeft op een pijnlijke manier duidelijk gemaakt
datkennisvandedynamiekvanwoningmarktenonontbeer-
lijkis.
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt risico’s op de woningmarktvanuit vier verschillende perspectieven. Allereerst gaan wij
nader in op de lange termijn relatie tussen huren en pri-
jzen van woningen in Amsterdam – van 1650 tot 2005. Met
een periode van 355 jaar kan dit onderzoek waarschijnlijk
het wereldrecord claimen voor het analyseren van de lang-
stetijdreeksindeliteruuroverdewaarderingvanﬁnanciële
activa (om over de vastgoedliteratuur maar niet te spreken).
Hoofdstuk 1 laat zien dat woningprijzen op de lange ter-
mijn verklaard kunnen worden door een theoretische fun-
damentele waarde, berekend op basis van huren en rente
niveaus. Dehuur-prijsverhoudinglaatoverdeeeuwenheen
niet alleen een indrukwekkende stabiliteit zien, maar keert
ook telkens terug naar een theoretische basis. Maar, in-
dien woningen over- of ondergewaardeerd zijn in vergelijk-
ing met de huurstromen die ze genereren, dan is de vraag
of de prijzen zich aanpassen, of juist de huren. De resul-
taten van een error-correctie model tonen aan dat het even-
wicht voornamelijk hersteld wordt doordat woningprijzen
veranderen. Huurstromen zijn stabieler en minder gevoelig
voor marktveranderingen. Echter, het evenwichtsherstel
kan tientallen jaren duren. Gedurende de tweede helft van
de negentiende eeuw bleven woningen bijvoorbeeld overge-
waardeerd voormeer dan vijftig jaar.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift is een eerste, unieke
verkenningindewetenschappelijkeliteratuurnaarderelatie
tussendevolatiliteitvanwoningprijzenendewaardeveran-
deringen van zogenoemde reële opties (“real options”). Een
voorbeeld van een reële optie is de mogelijkheid om de om-
vang of inhoud van een bestaande woning te vergroten door
het toevoegen van een aanbouw, of door de bestaande won-
ing af te breken en een grotere woning te bouwen. Reële op-
ties hebben ﬁnanciële waarde omdat deze de eigenaar van
een woning een bepaalde ﬂexibiliteit geven. Op het moment
dat de woningmarkt aantrekt en de vraag naar additionele
ruimte of grotere woningen toeneemt, kan de eigenaar zijn
optie uitoefenen en gaan bouwen. In het geval dat de vraag
naar (grotere) woningen beperkt is, kan de eigenaar de in-
vesteringsimpelweguitstellen.
Hoofdstuk 2 meet de waarde van de reële optie in de
woningmarkt tijdens verschillende marktomstandigheden.
De reële optie wordt meegenomen in een standaard he-
donisch regressiemodel om wijken en woningen met on-
gerealiseerd waardepotentieel te kunnen identiﬁceren. De
studie gebruikt een nog niet onderzochte steekproef van
woningtransacties in West-Berlijn van 1978 tot en met 2007.
West-Berlijnbiedteenidealeonderzoeksituatie,omdatdaar
gedetailleerde data over de maximale woningomvang (als
gedeﬁnieerd in het bestemmingsplan) voor iedere woning-
transactie beschikbaar zijn. Daarnaast leent de dynamis-
che historie van de stad Berlijn zich uitstekend voor de
vergelijking van de optiewaarde ten tijde van zeer diverse
– positieve en negatieve – marktomstandigheden. De em-
pirische resultaten tonen een elasticiteit van woningprijzen
tenopzichtevanontwikkelingspotentieelvan0.15,waaron-
twikkelingspotentieel gemeten wordt door de verhouding
tussen het maximale aantal vierkante meters als toegestaan
130inhetbestemmingsplanenhethuidigeaantalvierkanteme-
tersindewoning. Voorwoningenmeteenhogeoptiewaarde
neemt de elasticiteit toe tot 0.23. De resultaten suggereren
dat Berlijn’s bloeiperiode – van 1989 tot 1994 – voor wonin-
gen met een substantieel ontwikkelingspotentieel tot een
signiﬁcante toename van optiewaarde leidde; zo’n veertig
procent van de waardevermeerding in de woningmarkt kan
worden verklaard door optiewaarde. Er is echter ook een
keerzijde: gedurende de tien jaar malaise op de woning-
markt na 1994 was ongeveer vijftig procent van de prijsdal-
ing te wijten aan optiewaarde. Volatiliteit van deze omvang
geldtvoorongeveertienprocentvandeverkochtewoningen,
maargedurendedevastgoedcyclusheeftruim68procentvan
alle woningtransacties een toegenomen volatiliteit door on-
gerealiseerde optiewaarde.
Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift heeft tot doel om de in-
vloed van demograﬁe op kwantiteit en kwaliteit van won-
ingvraag te onderzoeken. Gebaseerd op een zeer gede-
tailleerdecross-sectievanBritsehuishoudenslaatdithoofd-
stukziendatmenselijkkapitaal(“humancapital”)eenbepal-
ende factor is voor woningvraag. Variabelen die posi-
tief gecorreleerd zijn met menselijk kapitaal leiden tot
een toenemende vraag naar woningen. Met iedere stap
dat bijvoorbeeld het scholingsniveau van een huishouden
toeneemt, vermeerderd de betalingsbereidheid voor won-
ingvraag. Echter, factoren die menselijk kapitaal beperken,
zoalsbijvoorbeeldchronischeziekten,hebbeneennegatieve
impact op de consumptie van woningen. Het hoofdstuk laat
zien dat, aangezien iedere generatie beter is opgeleid dan de
voorgaande, vergrijzing een toenemende totale vraag naar
woningen tot eﬀect zal hebben, zelfs als de omvang van
het aantal huishoudens stabiliseert. Een scenario analyse
aan de hand van verschillende oﬃciële bevolkingsprojecties
demonstreert dit eﬀect: zelfs in het meest negatieve ver-
grijzingscenario zal de totale vraag naar woningen blijven
groeien, er vanuit gaande dat inkomen en kapitaal van de
vergrijzendeleeftijdscohortenniet afneemt.
Het vierde empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift
bestudeert hoe de verdeling van woningkapitaal binnen een
stad veranderd op het moment dat de woningwaarde van de
stad als geheel veranderd. Deze studie vindt zijn grondslag
indeanekdotischeobservatiedatbepaaldewijkeninBerlijn,
zoalsPrenzlauerBerg,FriedrichshainenMitte,deafgelopen
jaren ﬂoreerden, terwijl de stad Berlijn als geheel te maken
had met substantiële vermindering van het woningkapitaal.
Debeschikbaarheidvandataveranderdedegeograﬁschefo-
cus van deze studie naar Nederland. Echter, de vraagstelling
bleef hetzelfde: hoe verandert de dynamiek van woningpri-
jzen binnen een stad in opwaartseen neerwaartse markten?
Enwat is de rolvan demograﬁe in dit proces?
Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de literatuur over stadsindel-
ing door het theoretisch onderbouwen en empirisch testen
vanhypothesenbetreﬀendeprijscurveninverschillendewi-
jken, in verschillende marktomstandigheden en onder ver-
schillendedemograﬁschecondities. Deresultatenlatenzien
dat een neergang in de bevolkingsomvang van een stad,
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prijzen, tot een polarisatie van woningwaarden in een stad
leidt. In een dergelijk scenario neemt het verschil in won-
ingprijzen tussen arme en rijke wijken toe. Een neerwaartse
prijsspiraal staat huishoudens toe om op te klimmen op de
woningmarkt, omdat zij “meer woning” voor hetzelfde geld
krijgen, waardoor de arme wijkenafglijden totverval.
Eerdere onderzoeken ontwikkelden een gesloten model
dat een vicieuze cirkel voor woningprijsontwikkelingen
voorspelt. Dit impliceert simpelweg dat rijke huishoudens
gelijkgestelde buren prefereren en hiervan proﬁteren. Deze
voorkeurleidttoteenzichzelfversterkendesegmentatievan
steden in arme en rijke wijken, hetgeen een groot eﬀect
heeft op woningprijzen in de deze wijken. Hoofdstuk 4
borduurt voort op deze literatuur door de modererende rol
van demograﬁe in ogenschouw te nemen. Nieuwe inwon-
ers in een stad versnellen het segmentatie-eﬀect, omdat de
welgestelden dicht bij elkaar gaan wonen en de minder be-
deelden kiezen voor meer betaalbare woningen in de arme
wijken. De resultaten laten zien dat gebiedsverbetering en -
verslechteringvooralplaatsvindeningebiedenmeteenmeer
robuustebevolkingsgroei.
De belangrijkste boodschap van dit proefschrift is dat
woningmarktenrisicovollerzijndanzeopheteerstegezicht
lijken. Toen ik mijn onderzoek in 2007 begon werden
woningmarkten als een veilige belegging ervaren, gekarak-
teriseerd door consistente, positieve rendementen en een
laag risico. De daarop volgende jaren weerlegden deze per-
ceptie, net als dit proefschrift. Incorrecte waarderingen
zijn aan de orde van de dag en zetten vaak voor een lan-
gere periode door. Reële opties versterken deze afwijkingen
van de fundamentele waarde en daardoor de volatiliteit van
woningprijzen. Demograﬁe bepaalt uiteindelijk de vraag
naar het product “woning”. Geheel tegen algemene veron-
derstellingen in hoeft een vergrijzende maatschappij niet
per deﬁnitie een afnemende vraag naar woningen te im-
pliceren. Menselijk kapitaal is de bepalende factor, niet
leeftijd. Tenslotte heeft een woningmarkt gekarakteriseerd
door prijsdalingen een toename in ongelijkheid binnen ste-
den met een krimpende populatie tot gevolg. Gegeven Eu-
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